

THE CRISES OF ARMENIAN CHURCH IN RUSSIA (1903-1905) AND ITS IMPACT ON OTTOMAN-ARMENIAN RELATIONS

*Ramazan Erhan GÜLLÜ**

ABSTRACT

Beginning from the time of Tsar Alexander III who ascended the throne in 1881, the policy of “one state (Tsardom), one nation (the Russians) and the only faith (Orthodoxy)” began to be active in Russia. This policy was adhered to during the period of Tsar Nikola II who was replaced with Alexander III in 1894. This policy, which attempted to “Russificate” Armenians together with the other Russian dominated nations, would cause an increase in general unrest in the region. For the enforcement of these policies, Tsar appointed Prince Golitsin to the General Governorship of the Caucasus. Prince Golitsin has become a symbol of the Russification policy in the Caucasus, hardening the attitudes of Armenians. This policy took shape more clearly in 1903. In June of 1903, on the advice of the Governor General of Caucasus Prince Golitsin, Tsar Nikola II ordered the confiscation of the properties belonging to the Armenian Church and the transference of Armenian schools to Russian authority. Golitsin aimed at speeding up the policy of Russification to break the power of the Armenian revolutionaries. In fact, by interfering with the church, Golitsin was confronting not only the committee members but also the entire Armenian community. At that time Malachia Ormanian was serving as the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul and Mkrtich Khrimian, who had previously served as the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, was Etchimiadzin Catholicos. Khrimian, in the face of above mentioned Russian policies, chose to get closer with the Ottoman State, with which he had previously experienced many problems. He wanted help from the Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul Ormanian in this area. However, the Patriarch Malachia Ormanian, who had good relations with Abdulhamid II, refrained from being in close contact with catholicos. In this paper, the influence of these policies which had applied until the revolution of 1905 in Russia, greatly impacting relations between the Ottoman State and the Armenians and the role of the Armenian leaders in these relations, will be examined.

Key Words: Armenian Church, Russia, Etchimiadzin Catholicosate, Armenian Question, Istanbul Armenian Patriarchate

RUSYA’DA ERMENİ KİLİSESİ KRİZİ (1903-1905) VE KRİZİN OSMANLI-ERMENİ İLİŞKİLERİNE ETKİLERİ

ÖZET

Rusya’da 1881 yılında tahta çıkan Çar III. Aleksandr döneminden itibaren “tek devlet (Çarlık) tek millet (Ruslar) ve tek inanç (Ortodoksluk)” siyaseti etkin olmaya başlamıştı. 1894 yılında Çar III. Aleksandr’ın yerine geçen Çar II. Nikola döneminde de bu siyaset benzer olarak sürdürülmüştü. Ermenilerle birlikte Rus egemenliğindeki diğer tüm milletleri Ruslaştırmaya yönelik bu politikalar Rusya’da genel huzursuzluğun artmasına sebep olacaktı. Çar ayrıca bu politikaların uygulamaya geçirilebilmesi için Kafkasya Genel Valiliği’ne Prens

* Assist. Prof. Dr., Istanbul University, Department of History, r_erhangullu@yahoo.com.tr

Golitsin'i atamıştı. Prens Golitsin özellikle Kafkasya'daki Ruslaştırma siyasetinin sembol adamı haline geldiği gibi Ermenilere karşı daha da sert tavırlara sahipti. Bu sert politikalar 1903 yılında daha da keskin bir hal almıştı. Kafkasya Genel Valisi Prens Golitsin'in tavsiyesiyle, Çar II. Nikola 1903 yılı Haziran'ında, Ermeni kilisesine ait malların istimlak edilmesini ve okulların Rus yetkisine verilmesini emretti. Bu sayede Ermeni devrimcilerin gücünü kırmayı ve Ruslaştırma siyasetini hızlandırmayı hedefleyen Prens Golitsin, aslında kiliseleri doğrudan devletleştirerek sadece komitecileri değil tüm Ermeni toplumunu karşısına almış oluyordu. Bu dönemde İstanbul Ermeni Patrikliği'nde Malachia Ormanian, Eçmiyazin Katoğikosluğu'nda da yine daha önce İstanbul Ermeni Patrikliği yapmış olan Mkrtich Khrimian görev yapmaktaydılar. Khrimian İstanbul Ermeni Patrikliği yaptığı dönemde Osmanlı idaresi ile de çeşitli problemler yaşamıştı ve başta bu olayların yaşandığı dönemin Osmanlı Sultanı II. Abdülhamit olmak üzere Osmanlı yetkililerince tasvip edilen bir din adamı değildi. Ayrıca Khrimian, İstanbul Patriği Ormanian'ın da kendileri ile yakın ilişkiler içinde olmasını istiyordu. Fakat Ormanian, Osmanlı idaresi ile ilişkileri daha iyi olan bir din adamıydı ve katoğikoslukla yakın ilişkiler kurmaktan kaçınıyordu. Bu çalışmada Rusya'daki 1905 olaylarına kadar devam eden bu kargaşalar ve yaşananların Osmanlı-Ermeni ilişkilerine etkileri incelenmeye çalışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ermeni Kilisesi, Rusya, Eçmiyazin Katoğikosluğu, Ermeni Sorunu, İstanbul Ermeni Patrikhanesi

INTRODUCTION

The Mother Cathedral of Holy Etchmiadzin, located within the territories of Yerevan, ranks as the highest authority of the Armenian Church. The head of the Mother Cathedral of Holy Etchmiadzin, the Catholicos of All Armenians, is the worldwide spiritual leader of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin has been the spiritual headquarters of the Armenian Church but the Catholicosate was transferred to Anatolia, particularly to Ahtamar and Sis, due to the security concerns posed by Mongol invasions. Although Etchmiadzin continued to be the highest Catholicosate after the Mongol invasions, other Catholicosates in Sis and Ahtamar also continue to perform the duties of Catholicosates. After the establishment of the Patriarchate in Jerusalem and Constantinople, the number of the religious authorities within the Armenian Church had reached five. Religious leaders in Ahtamar and Sis were assigned to the status of Catholicosate, and were given particular spheres of spiritual responsibilities but they ranked below the

Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin within the horizontally hierarchized Armenian Church structure¹.

The Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin was an integral part of the Armenian Church, and its spiritual and administrative role renders it a natural target for those who sought to exercise authority over the Armenians. The Russian policies on Armenians between 1903 and 1905, for instance, exemplify the Russian hegemonic aims on the Armenians. The Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin was under the Ottoman authority from the sixteenth century to the early nineteenth century. During the era of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, all the spiritual centers of Armenian Church, including the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin, began to operate within the jurisdiction of Ottoman State. Yet, the Patriarchate of Constantinople was recognized as the main political representative by the Ottoman State due to its proximity to the capital. This hybrid structure created ambiguity regarding the highest authority figure of the Armenian Church. Even though the Catholicosates of Etchmiadzin, Sis and Ahtamar ranked higher than the Patriarchate of Constantinople in terms of their spiritual authority, the Patriarchate of Constantinople was recognized as the leader of all Armenians by the Ottoman Government due to its location and its role as facilitator in the interactions between the Ottoman State and the Armenian Church. Therefore, the political presidency was transferred to the Patriarch of Constantinople while spiritual authority still resides in the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin. The Ottoman State had enjoyed such political supremacy over the Armenian Church that it assigned the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin and exercised its sovereignty on the Catholicosate even during the Iranian hegemony in the region. This Ottoman supremacy however would come to an end by the Russian conquests of the region in 1828².

In response to the Ottoman hegemony in the Armenian Church structure, Tsarist Russia sought to expand its control over the region and its efforts gave fruit with the annexation of Etchmiadzin in 1828. Russia intensified its efforts to penetrate the administrative structure of the Catholicosate during the end of eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century³.

The Qajar Dynasty was the first target of Tsarist Russia's expansionist policies in the Caucasus. The sovereignty of the Qajar Dynasty in the Caucasus was drastically transferred to Russia with the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813 and the Treaty

¹ Ali Arslan, *Ermeni Papalığı – Eçmiyazın Kilisesi 'nde Stratejik Savaşlar*, (İstanbul: Paraf Yayınları, 2010), 13-19; Canan Seyfeli, *İstanbul Ermeni Patrikliği*, (Ankara: Aziz Andaç Yayınları, 2005), 37-48.

² Ali Arslan, *Ermeni Papalığı – ...*, 15-16.

³ Aina Askarova, "Türk – Rus İlişkilerinde Eçmiyadzin Ermeni Katogikosluğu'nun Yeri (1914-1983)", İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, *Unpublished Phd Dissertation*, (İstanbul: 2010), 1-21.

of Turkmenchay in 1828⁴. The region of Etchmiadzin, including the Catholicosate, began to be controlled by Russia. The Ottoman-Russo War of 1828-9 also brought major changes to the region. During the War, the majority of the Armenians militarily assisted the Russian army⁵. Finally, Russians declared their victory in the region despite the excessive costs of the war for Russians⁶. The Armenians of the Ottoman State and the Qajar Dynasty were encouraged to migrate to Russia by the Russians and this way Russia sowed the seeds of an independent Armenia, thereby also strengthening its own hegemony. Roughly around the same time, the Tsardom announced that Revan and Nahcivan Khanate were united administratively and declared as forming an Armenian province⁷.

Subsequent to the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828, Yerevan and Etchmiadzin were controlled by Russia and the political sovereignty of the Catholicosate was expected to shift to the Russian jurisdiction. However, Russia had yet to penetrate into the Armenian Church in the early years of post-Turkmenchay Treaty. Armenians fell into a self-delusion regarding to the relative autonomy of their church vis-à-vis Tsarist Russia. By 1831, that is three years after the Treaty of Turkmenchay, Russia changed its policies and sought to manipulate the elections of Catholicos. The nominees that were sent by the Ottomans and Qajars were obstructed by Russians on the basis that the Catholicos were to be elected by the members of the Catholicosate. Russia mainly sought to extend its jurisdiction over Armenians and at the same time minimize the Ottoman influence on the Catholicosate. This situation led to further disagreements not only between Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman State but also between the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin and the Patriarchate of Constantinople⁸.

⁴ Gene R. Garthwaite, *İran Tarihi – Pers İmparatorluğu'ndan Günümüze*, translated by Fethi Aytuna, (İstanbul: İnkılâp Kitabevi, 2011), 177-179.

⁵ According to Russian novelist Alexander Puskin who used to be a soldier for the Russian Army during the war of 1828-29, Armenian community in the Eastern Provinces were very helpful to the Russian soldiers and he explains their relationship in his memoirs as in the following: “It is a scene worth to see. Turks were watching us with grief. The streets were packed by many Armenians. The children were running behind our horses and calling us Christian, Christian, while making the sign of cross.” Aleksandr Puşkin, *Erzurum Yolculuğu*, translated by Ataol Behramoğlu, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2001), 52.

⁶ Nicholas V. Riasanovsky – Mark D. Steinberg, *Rusya Tarihi – Başlangıçtan Günümüze ...*, translated by Figen Dereli, (İstanbul: İnkılâp Kitabevi, 2011), 343.

⁷ Kemal Beydilli, “1828-1829 Osmanlı – Rus Savaşında Doğu Anadolu'dan Rusya'ya Göçürülen Ermeniler”, *Belgeler – Türk Tarih Belgeler Dergisi*, Cilt: XIII, No: 17, (Ankara: T.T.K. Yayınları, 1988), 365-410; Musa Marjanlı, *Armenians. Russia. The Caucasus.*, (Dubai: Khazar University Press, 2011), 10-13.

⁸ For a detailed account on the course of the relationship between Tsarist Russia, Ottoman State and the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin, see Paul Werth, “Imperial Russia and the Armenian Catholicos at Home

The Russification Policies of Tsarist Russia Towards Minorities

Russia started to fully exert its hegemony over the Armenian Church based on an amendment, called 'Polojeniye' which redefined the jurisdictions of the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin and Tsarist Russia. The 'Polojeniye', which was declared on 11 March of 1836, came to mark the absolute authority of the Russians over the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin⁹. The Catholicosate started exercising its responsibilities within the political jurisdiction of Russia, and the Tsar was designated as the sole arbiter over the elections of the Catholicos. In other words, the Russian Tsar and his envoy of the region, the mayor of Caucasus, restrained the major responsibilities of the Catholicosate despite its maintenance of spiritual leadership over the Armenian communities. Yet, Armenians had contempt for the Russian expansionist policies towards the Armenian Church, which turned into the major source of various disagreements between the Armenian communities and Tsarist Russia. The new amendment of called the Polojeniye thus raised the concerns of Armenians who lived in Russia as well as those outside the territories of Russia. Russification policies towards Armenians began to intensify by the late nineteenth century¹⁰.

During the reign of Tsar Alexander III, Russification policies dominated the state agenda by exerting the notions of mono-state, mono-identity, mono-religion: Tsarist state, Russian nation and Orthodoxy, respectively. The successor of Alexander III, Tsar Nikola II, also maintained the identity policies which sought to Russify not only Armenians but also other non-Russian communities¹¹. Prince Golitsin was particularly assigned as the Major of Caucasus to implement the Russification policies¹². Prince Golitsin, later became the symbolic figure of the

and Abroad", *Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds*, (Ed.: Osamu Ieda – Tomohiko Uyama), (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2006), 203-236.

⁹ For the original text of Polojeniye in Armenian, see *Partakuyn Garavurutyun: Khagakis Garavarutyun Kordzots Lusavorçagan Hayots Yegeğetsvo İ Rusasdan (High Governance: Internal Affairs of the Armenian Church of Lusavoric in Russia)*, Etchmiadzin 1836. For a Turkish translation of the Charter which was registered on 11 of March, 1836 in St. Petersburg, see "Bolognya: Rusya'da kâin Ermeni Lusavoriçagan Kilîsası umûr u husûsâtının idâresine dâir nizâmname olub Petersburg'da 11 Mart 1836 târihinde tanzîm ve neşr edilmiştir.", Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA.) Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı (Y.MTV.) no. 233/96.

¹⁰ Samuel Graham Wilson, "The Armenian Church in Its Relation to the Russian Government", *The North American Review*, Vol.: 180, No.: 578, January 1905, 88-101.

¹¹ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Rusya Tarihi (Başlangıç'tan 1917'ye Kadar)*, (Ankara: T.T.K. Yayınları, 2010), 377.

¹² For an overview of the Russian politics in the given era, see Ali Arslan, *Ermeni Papalığı - ...*, 103-109; Hayrullah Cengiz, "Rusya'nın 1895-1905 Yılları Arasında Kafkasya Ermenileri Politikası – Ermenileri Ruslaştırma Çabaları", *Kafkas Araştırmaları IV*, (İstanbul: 1998), 175-194; Nicholas V. Riasanovsky – Mark D. Steinberg, *Rusya Tarihi ...*, 404-416.

Russification policies and pursued more strict policies towards the Armenians. He sent a report to the Tsar on the current political situation of Armenians which later became the reference text in the implementation of the Russification policies. The major issues in that report were as follows:

1- The Armenian movement has a final objective, the independence of Armenia. The movement is more prevalent among the Armenian clergy and urban intellectuals and is less prevalent among rural populations. Members of Armenian Committees and the Armenian press fuel the nationalist sentiments.

2- The officials of Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin had been acting beyond their spiritual jurisdiction. The Catholicosate should be warned to act in line with the law that demarcates its responsibilities.

3- Armenian priests had much influence on Armenian primary schools, which should be minimized if not prevented. Therefore, Armenian primary schools should be governed by the Russian Ministry of Educational Affairs.

4- The Armenian press is one of the main separatist organizations. In this regard, necessary measures should be taken to keep the Armenian press under surveillance.

5- Armenian philanthropic organizations exert considerable influence on politics. The existing codes of law are not sufficient to keep these organizations under surveillance. The Russian major of the Caucasus should be given permission to impose necessary sanctions.

6- There is a lack of inspection within the Caucasian villages. The Major of Caucasus should be fully authorized to deal with the issues in rural areas.

7- Armenians enjoy considerable privileges in the city councils. A new set of laws should be executed for the election of members of city councils by the Russian government¹³.

Upon the implementation of Prince Golitsin's report, discontent among Armenians within Tsarist Russia spread rapidly. The situation was especially worse for the Armenians who migrated to Russia after the eruption of inter-communal violence in Anatolia. These Armenians had been encouraged to migrate to Russia by the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin. Despite their efforts to migrate back to Anatolia, the officials of Ottoman State did not allow them to re-enter the Ottoman territories. This situation created a marked cleavage between the Armenian community and the Ottoman State¹⁴. The Russian government and the Major of Caucasus Prince Golitsin

¹³ Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*, (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1976), 371-375.

¹⁴ Armenian migrations from Ottoman State to Russia was a common practice in the early 19th century. The number of migrants especially increased as a result of the Sasun revolts and the inter-communal violence of 1895-96 in Anatolia. The major causes of the migrants can be listed as follows; Armenian desires to live in the homeland, the concerns of Armenian committee members regarding to possible

intensified the Russification policies starting in 1903. Until the outbreak of 1905 Russian Revolution, Russification policies created backlash among the Dashnaks and led to further polarization of the Armenian committees. Initially the Dashnaks had not planned to launch any assault on the Russian territories. However, the recent Russification policies had fueled anti-Russian sentiments among its members. Russification policies varied in its target and scope. Upon the suggestion of the major of Caucasus, Tsar Nicola II ordered the confiscation of properties that belong to Armenian Church and for the full authorization of the Russian officials at Armenian schools. These policies actually had legal covering since they were enacted based on the legislation called the "Polojeniye." Prince Golitsin initially sought to weaken the Armenian committee members but his policies created a major backlash among all the segments of the Armenian community. Finally, the confiscations led to a turning point for the Dashnaks who started carrying out armed assaults within the Russian territories¹⁵.

Prince Golitsin sought a mandate from the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin to implement the verdicts of 'Polojeniye'; however, the Catholicosate did not approve of it. Armenian clergy members in Tbilisi explicitly opposed the verdicts of Polojeniye. The Armenian church of Tbilisi also organized mass protests with the participation of priests in the same city where the Russian Mayor of the Caucasus resided. The public unrest led to large-scale clashes between the Russian military and the Armenian community with considerable numbers of casualties. Russian officials viewed the alliance between Armenian community and the clergy during the public unrest as a fundamental challenge to the Tsarist Russia, and thereby gave warning to the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin to contain the unrest. Even though the Catholicosate did not seek to fuel the public unrest, Russian officials thought of the situation otherwise. They viewed the Catholicosate as working hard behind the scenes in preparation for these clashes. Russian officials drew the attention of the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin that "the clergies' opposition to the verdicts is understandable but its involvement in the public protests is not tolerable."¹⁶ Tsar

Ottoman retaliatory measures that might be taken against them, Armenian communities who were discontent with the chaotic political situation of the region. For a detailed account on the Armenian migrations to Russia and their subsequent efforts to come return back to Anatolia, see Cezmi Eraslan, "I. Sasun İsyanı Sonrasında Osmanlı Devleti'nin Karşılaştığı Siyasî ve Sosyal Problemler", *Kafkas Araştırmaları II*, (İstanbul: 1996), 65-92.

¹⁵ E. Aknoui, *Political Persecution: Armenian Prisoner of Caucasus (A Page of the Tzar's Persecution)*, (Translated from the Author's Manuscript by A. M. And H. W.), (New York: 1911), 40.

¹⁶ The translation of a text which was written on 17 of September, 1903, for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Consulate of St. Petersburg; BOA.Yıldız – Sadaret Husûsi Maruzat Evrakı (Y.A.HUS.) no. 459/125 lef 3.; BOA. Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım (HR.SYS.) nr. 2868/14. For the translated

Nicola II and Prince Golitsin asked the Armenian community to implement the terms of 'Polojeniye' and to execute the confiscation of the properties of the Armenian Church by the Russian officials. The Armenian Archbishop of Tbilisi, in a speech during a public demonstration, cursed the Tsar and addressed him as an evil despot. The Archbishop was arrested after the demonstrations¹⁷.

As a response to these public demonstrations, Russia imposed further restrictions on Armenians and they even banned the Armenian Church from ringing its bells in Tbilisi. Russian impositions led to a backlash among Armenian community which was against the officials of Russia and the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin. During the protests organized around the Catholicosate, the current Catholicos of All Armenians, Mkrtych Khrimian, was requested to protest the verdicts of 'Polojeniye' and to push the Russian government to repeal it. Later, the target of the Armenian opposition shifted from the Catholicosate to the Russian Government on the grounds that the division among the Armenian Church and the public could lead to Russians to have more say on the issue¹⁸. In this regard, the protests against the Catholicosate did not appeal to Armenians in large scale and they sought to channel the public grievances against the Russian Government. Despite the immense number of Armenian casualties, the public protests had radicalized and there was even a failed attempt to assassinate the Major of Caucasus, Prince Golitsin, in October 1903. Prince Golitsin radicalized his measures on Armenians especially after he was informed that the Armenians would bomb his castle. The Prince assigned approximately one hundred soldiers to search for the dynamite around the castle and arrested around 350 Armenian committee members on the grounds that they had attempted assassination. Also, various Armenian merchants were sent away from Tbilisi and the Caucasus as a whole¹⁹.

The clashes between Russian officials and the Armenian communities of the region sparked further protests among the Armenians who lived outside the Russian jurisdiction. The committee members of Dashnaks and Hinchaks were the main entities that actively organized the protests outside Russia. During the religious

version of a text which was written on 18 of September, 1903 for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Ottoman Consulate of St. Petersburg; BOA.Y.A.HUS. nr. 460/64 lef 2.

¹⁷ "The Armenian Church. An Archbishop Curses The Czar.", *The Argus*, (October 20, 1903), 5.

¹⁸ According to the intelligence received by the Ottoman Government, Armenians threatened to kill the Catholicos for failing to perform his duties. After Russian Government was notified by the Catholicos, the Headquarter of Catholicosate was began to be guarded by the Russian Government. In addition to that, around 100 Kazak soldiers were assigned for protecting Catholicos Khrimian. For a translated version of the text that was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Ottoman Consulate in Tbilisi on August 19, 1903. BOA. Y.A.HUS. no. 459/7.

¹⁹ For the translation of the text that was sent to Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Consulate General of Ottoman State in Tbilisi; BOA. Y.A.HUS. no. 465/34 lef 3.

ceremonies, the liturgies started addressing those who lost their lives during the clashes with the Russian officials. During the protests in the Armenian Church, the question of the Ottoman Armenians was also raised and it created further concerns among Ottoman officials²⁰.

The Attitudes of the Ottoman State and the Ottoman Armenians Towards the Verdicts of Polojeniye

During the implementation of the verdicts of Polojeniye in 1903, Mkrtych Khrimian who was the Catholicos of All Armenians had been serving as the Patriarch of the Constantinople. However, during his term of Patriarchy, Khrimian was not endorsed by Abdulhamid II due to his cooperation with the Armenian revolutionary committees. Prince Golitsin also conceived of Mkrtych Khrimian as an ally with the Armenian committees, and imposed measures accordingly. Concerning the Tsarist policies towards the Catholicos, Khrimian did nothing but fueled the grievances of Armenian Church and the committees, which later consolidated their authority over Armenians. Khrimian was explicit in opposing the Tsarist policies and endorsing the Armenian committees. On the other hand, he pursued an appeasement policy towards the Ottoman State. Yet his negative reputation for his involvement with the activities of the Armenian committees led the Ottoman State to have doubts about the reliability of his anti-Russian and pro-Ottoman rhetoric²¹.

During the era when Khrimian served as the Catholicos, Malachia Ormanian was the Patriarchate of Constantinople. He was, unlike Khrimian, endorsed by Sultan Abdulhamid II, but his close relations with the Ottomans were received negatively by the Armenians. The Patriarch Ormanian was blamed for failing to perform his duties to protect the rights of Armenians and instead serving the interests of Abdulhamid II. Thus, during the Armenian public unrest of 1903 that erupted within

²⁰ For instance; Ottoman official follow the protests in Varna with utmost attention. Ottomans received an intelligence stating that the leader of Hinchak committees of the region and one of the teachers of Armenian school will be giving a speech during a ceremony in Armenian Church of Varna regarding to the living conditions of Armenians in Russia and Ottoman State. In this regard, local officials of Ottoman Government were told to investigate the ceremonies and send reports to the Government. The official letter sent from the Inspector Agency of Bulgaria to Mabeyn on 27 Teşrîn-i Evvel 1319 (November 9, 1903) BOA. Yıldız Perâkende Evrakı – Müfettişlik ve Komiserlikler Tahrirâtı (Y.PRK.MK.), no. 16/100. Another official letter sent to Viziership by the Inspector Agency of Bulgaria; BOA. Sadaret Eyalet-i Mümtaze Bulgaristan Evrakı (A.MTZ. 04) no. 106/94 lef 1. Official document sent to the Ministry of Security by the Ministry of Internal Affairs on 11 Teşrîn-i Sâni 1319 (November 24, 1903); BOA. Dâhiliye Nezâreti Tesri-i Muamelat ve Islahat Komisyonu Muamelat Kısmı (DH.TMIK.M.) no. 158/30.

²¹ For the views of Mkrtych Khrimian on İstanbul Armenian Patriarchate, see Ramazan Erhan Güllü, "Ermeni Sorununun Ortaya Çıkışı ve Gelişim Sürecinde İstanbul Ermeni Patrikhanesi'nin Tutumu (1878-1923)", İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, *Unpublished Phd. Dissertation*, (İstanbul: 2013), 56-58.

the territories of Tsarist Russia, the members of Armenian committee assassinated Ormanian on 19 of January, 1903. Despite the pro-Ottoman label attached to Ormanian, I argue the otherwise. It is true that Ottoman officials made considerable efforts in establishing closer ties with Ormanian. Yet his policies towards the Armenian communities led to a schism between the Ottoman State and the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople. Many Ottoman officials had doubts about his commitment to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman State. That the Ottomans had assigned an investigator to conduct surveillance of Ormanian reflects the Ottoman concerns about him²². Thus, I argue that Ormanian sought to act as a facilitator, rather than a contender, in reconciling the divergent interests of the Ottoman officials and the Armenian community.

Ormanian sought to support the Armenian protests of 1903 and the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin since the Russian policies towards the Armenian community were received as a threat to the Armenian communities of the world. Armenian communities in the Ottoman State, including the clergies, were utterly critical of the Russian Government. Upon the eruption of public protests in Tsarist Russia, the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople convened the members of the spiritual assembly and discussed the necessary measures that they needed to get in order to address the anti-Armenian policies of Tsarist Russia²³. The Catholicosate of Sis and the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem demanded that the Patriarchate of Constantinople send a letter directly to the Tsar to protest the Russian attitude towards its Armenian population²⁴. The Patriarch of Constantinople gave a positive response to this demand and sent a letter to Tsar Nicola II, on behalf of the Catholicosate of Sis and the Patriarchy of Jerusalem. The letter was written by the Patriarch Malachia Ormanian with the signatures of other high level clergies of the Patriarchate. However, Sultan Abdulhamid II perceived the Armenian Patriarchy's efforts as an intrusion to the sovereignty of the Ottoman Government. The Patriarch of Constantinople, as a legal subject of the Ottoman State, should not have sent a letter directly to a foreign entity, according to Sultan Abdulhamid II. The Ottoman Government warned the Patriarch; however, the Patriarch Ormanian was decisive in publicly raising their concerns to Russia regarding their anti-Armenian policies. To appease Ottoman officials, Patriarch Ormanian stressed the unofficial nature of the letter as it was sent by the clergy rather than the assembly of the Patriarchate²⁵.

²² Ibid., 303-367.

²³ The report sent from the Ministry of Justice and Sectarian Affairs to Head of Secretaryship, 8 August 1319 (August 21, 1903) BOA. Y.MTV. no. 249/133.

²⁴ The report sent from the Ministry of Justice and Sectarian Affairs to Head of Secretaryship, 27 August 1319 (September 9, 1903) BOA. Y.MTV. no. 251/67 lef 2.

²⁵ The report sent from the Ministry of Justice and Sectarian Affairs to Head of Secretaryship, 6 September 1319 (September 19, 1903); BOA. Y.MTV. no. 251/67 lef 1.

Despite the disagreement between the Armenian Church and the Ottoman Government, the Patriarch convened high level officials of the church to discuss how to react to the Russian policies in the Caucasus²⁶. The Ottoman Ministry of Justice sent its officials to one of the meetings of spiritual assembly where they discussed the content and form of the letter. Sultan Abdulhamid II made his position clear that unless the Ottoman Government gave permission²⁷ they could not send an official letter to the Tsar. According to the claims of some Ottoman officials, Armenian bishops were planning to send a petition to the Christian leaders of European countries in order to protest the anti-Armenian policies of the Russian Tsar. Upon these allegations, Ottoman officials requested an explanation from the Patriarch Malachia Ormanian, and the Patriarch stated that Armenian clergy was yet to send any official petition to the European countries. But he also pointed out that anti-Armenian agitation in the Caucasus might lead to the radicalization of the Armenian communities and he claimed to do his utmost to placate the Armenian community and the clergy²⁸. The Patriarch Ormanian's policies reflect his efforts to establish a balance between the concerns of the Armenian community and Sultan Abdulhamid II. In other words, during his term, The Patriarch sought to reconcile his political and spiritual responsibilities towards Armenians and Ottoman government. Despite the fierce opposition of Sultan Abdulhamid II, Patriarch Malachia Ormanian sent an official letter that he had written himself, along with three other bishops, to the Tsar²⁹. However, Russia had yet to step back from its anti-Armenian policies and it actually even radicalized its attitude towards the Armenians³⁰.

Mkrtich Khrimian as the Catholicos of All Armenians was struggling to find a resolution to the public unrest in the Caucasus. After Russia banned the Armenian church bells from ringing in Tbilisi, Khrimian had a plan to meet with Tsar Nicola II in St. Petersburg to indicate that the properties of the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin not only belong to Russian Armenians but also to the whole Armenian population in Ottoman State, Qajar and India. Despite his efforts to convince the Tsar to repeal the

²⁶ The document sent from the Ministry of Safety and Security to Head of Secretaryship 9 September 1319 (September 22, 1903); BOA. Yıldız Perâkende Evrakı Zabtiye Nezareti Maruzatı (Y.PRK.ZB.) no. 33/52.

²⁷ "... bir devlet tebeasının diğer bir devlete müracaatı devlet-i metbû'âsının muvâfâkatine vâbeste olmak lâzım gelüb ..." An official letter sent from Ministry of Justice and Sectarian Affairs to the Secretaryship Adliye ve Mezahib on 27 September 1319 (October 10, 1903); BOA. Yıldız Perâkende Evrakı – Adliye ve Mezahib Nezareti Maruzatı (Y.PRK.AZN.) no. 23/78.

²⁸ An official letter sent to the Secretaryship by the Ministry of Justice and Sectarian Affairs on 21 Teşrin-i Evvel 1319 (November 3, 1903); BOA. Y.PRK.AZN. no. 23/82.

²⁹ The official letter sent to Secretaryship by Viziership regarding to the newspaper news in Vienne covering the letter that was sent to Russian Tsar by the Armenian Patriarch and other clergies on 26 Teşrin-i Sâni 1319 (December 9, 1903); BOA. Y.A.HUS. no. 462/106.

³⁰ "The Armenians. Russian Precautions.", *The Argus*, (December 11, 1903), 5.

verdicts of 'Polojiye', his visit to St. Petersburg was not even permitted. As a second option, Khrimian had planned to transfer the Catholicosate to a location within the jurisdiction of the Ottoman State³¹. Due to the strained relations between Khrimian and Sultan Abdulhamid II during his Patriarchal term in Constantinople, Khrimian was aware that he could not perform his duties as Catholicosate of All Armenians in Constantinople. Thus, he proposed to transfer the Catholicosate to Sis, located in the province of Adana, which was already another spiritual location of a Catholicosate for Armenians. But Sultan Abdulhamid II strictly opposed Khrimian's proposal and the mediation efforts of the Patriarch Ormanian³². The Catholicos Khrimian was sent a letter by the Patriarch Ormanian, which stated that the proposal to transfer the Catholicosate to Sis was not approved of, and recommended that it remain in Etchmiadzin³³. The public unrest in the Caucasus continued to draw the public attention of various countries. Khrimian's last resort to transfer the Catholicosate to Sis became especially a matter of public debate in large scale in various countries³⁴.

1905 Russian Revolution and its Aftermath

The Catholicos of All Armenians allied with the Armenian revolutionary committees due to the conflict of interests with the Ottoman State. Dashnaksutiun was the leading committee, which was also supported by the Armenian community as they communally organized around the church. Hinchaks were also in close cooperation with Dashnaksutiun. They were both involved activities that terrorized particular locations within Russia such as assassination attempts against high level officials of Russia, including the Russian Major of the Caucasus, Prince Golitsin. Amidst political turmoil in the region, the Russian Revolution of 1905 erupted on 9 of January as a chain events starting with Bloody Sunday, in which Tsarist military opened fire on the Russian protesters in St. Petersburg. The Russian Revolution of 1905 paved the way for Armenians and Dashnaks to realize their goals. The Russian Tsar commenced to implement reforms in the region of Caucasus and pursued an appeasement policy towards Armenians. The shift in the attitude and policies of the Tsar enhanced the status and power of Dashnaks in Russian politics. Eventually, the

³¹ The translation of a text that was written for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Ottoman Consulate in Tbilisi on December 23, 1903; BOA. Y.A.HUS. no. 460/22 lef 2.

³² Ali Arslan, *Kutsal Ermeni Papalığı ...*, 108; Hayrullah Cengiz, "*Rusya'nın 1895-1905 Yılları Arasında Kafkasya Ermenileri Politikası ...*", 182.

³³ The official letter sent to the Viziership by the Ministry of Justice on 22 Teşrin-i Evvel 1319 (November 4, 1903); BOA. Y.A.HUS. no. 460/133 lef 2.

³⁴ "Russia and the Armenian Church", *Bunbury Herald*, (September 16, 1903), 2; "Russia and the Armenian Church. Seizure of Property", *The Evening Post*, (September 16, 1903); "The Armenian Church", *The Argus*, (September 17, 1903), 5.

Tsar declared to repeal the verdicts of 1903, which led to an intimate political atmosphere with the Armenian community³⁵.

However, political turmoil in the region had not come to a stop after the Russian Revolution of 1905. Violence prevailed all over the Caucasus in a state of anarchy due to the revolts of peasants and workers. Subsequent to the Russian Revolution of 1905, the conflict between Azeris and Armenians in Baku spilled over into other parts of the region where both ethnic groups lived side by side³⁶. The upshot of the political turmoil was the mass migrations, and the Ottoman State was one of the main destinations for the migrants. At the onset of the verdicts of 1903, Armenians sought to migrate to the Ottoman State, but their efforts were rejected by the Ottoman officials based on a previous decision of the Ottoman Government. Upon the eruption of inter-communal violence between Azeris and Armenians in Caucasia in 1905, the Ottoman State once again rejected those who sought to migrate to the Ottoman borders. There was an immense number of Armenians around the region of Kara Kilise, Erzurum, who tried to enter to the Ottoman territories due to Russia's excessive use of force³⁷. However, Ottomans were adamantly strict in their decision and did not allow any Armenians to enter into the Ottoman territories³⁸. In addition to that, the military forces that were stationed on the border were given an

³⁵ For an overview of the developments subsequent to the crises of Armenian Church within Russia, see, Anaide Ter Minassian, *Ermeni Devrimci Hareketi'nde Milliyetçilik ve Sosyalizm 1887-1912*, translated by Mete Tunçay, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995), 51-54; Aram Arkun, "Into the Modern Age, 1800-1813", *The Armenians – Past and Present in the making of National Identity*, (Editors: Edmund Gerzig – Marina Kurkchiyan), (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 83; Christopher J. Walker, *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan Publishing, 1990), 70-74; George A. Bournoutian, *Ermeni Tarihi – Ermeni Halkının Tarihine Kısa Bir Bakış*, translated by Ender Abadoğlu – Ohannes Kılıçdağı, (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2011), 239-240; Onur Önel, "The Armenians and Tsarist Russia (1870-1906)", The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences of Bilkent University, *Unpublished Master's Thesis*, (Ankara: 2009), 51-72; Ronald Grigor Suny, "Eastern Armenians Under Tsarist Rule", *The Armenian People From Ancient to Modern Times (Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century)*, (Editor: Richard G. Hovannisian), Vol.: II, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 133-135; Rouben Paul Adalian, *Historical Dictionary of Armenia*, (Lanham MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 130-131; Sarkis Papajian, *A Brief History of Armenia*, (Fresno: Armenian Evangelical Union, 1974), 24; Samuel Graham Wilson, "The Armenian Church in Its Relation to the Russian Government", *The North American Review*, Vol.: 180, No.: 578, January 1905, 88-101; Simon Payaslian, *The History of Armenia – From the Origins to the Present*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Publishing, 2007), 121-122.

³⁶Anaide Ter Minassian, *Ermeni Devrimci Hareketi'nde ...*, 66-69; Onur Önel, "The Armenians and Tsarist Russia ...", 72-86.

³⁷ A Telegraph sent to Viziership by the Major of Erzurum on 29 Teşrin-i Sâni 1321 (December 12, 1905); BOA. Sadâret Mektûbî Kalemî Mühimme Odası (A.MKT.MHM.) no. 550/6 lef 2.

³⁸ The code that was sent to the Major of Erzurum by the Viziership on 6 Kânûn-ı Evvel 1321 (December 19, 1905); BOA. A.MKT.MHM. no. 550/6 lef 3.

absolute order not to allow any illegal entries³⁹. Ottomans also requested that the Russian Consulate in Erzurum and the Major of Kars prevent the Armenians to gather in large numbers around the Ottoman-Russo border⁴⁰.

The developments in Caucasia had certain implications in the internal affairs of the Ottoman State as well. I argue that there is a close connection between the increase of Dashnaks' influence in Russian politics and the Armenian assassination attempt of Sultan Abdulhamid II. The historical data confirm that the assassination attempt was carried out by the Dashnak committee members and they sought to get revenge on Sultan Abdulhamid II for his rejection of Catholicos Khrimian's requests during the political turmoil in the Caucasus. I also argue that Dashnaks gained the upper hand against the Russian government after the Russian Revolution of 1905, and then they sought to assassinate the Ottoman Sultan, thus trying to accomplish two goals in two different settings. However, these assassination attempts failed and the Dashnaks could not realize their aims in the Ottoman State⁴¹.

Conclusion

During the implementation of the 1903 decisions and the political turmoil in Caucasus, the Ottoman State's policies towards Armenians were intrinsically tied to the personal relations of Sultan Abdulhamid II with Catholicos Mkrtych Khrimian and the Patriarch Malachia Ormanian. The Sultan's firm negative attitude towards Catholicos Khrimian also halted Patriarch Ormanian's efforts to enhance the conditions of Armenians residing in Russian territories. Ormanian, as a spiritual leader of the Armenian community, was subject to the Ottoman law and thereby could not take any political actions in foreign countries without the permission of

³⁹ A Coded Telegraph sent to Seraskerlik by the Commander of 4th Army stationed in Erzincan on 4 Kânûn-ı Evvel 1321 (December 17, 1905); BOA. A.MKT.MHM. no. 550/6 lef 5.

⁴⁰ The telegraph sent to the Viziership by the Major of Erzurum on 6 Kânûn-ı Evvel 1321 (December 19, 1905); BOA. A.MKT.MHM. no. 550/6 lef 6.

⁴¹ For a detailed account on the attempted assassination of Sultan Abdülhamit II, see Pars Tuğlacı, *Tarih Boyunca Batı Ermenileri, Cilt: III (1891-1922)*, (İstanbul: Pars Yayıncılık, 2004), 287-289; Tahsin Paşa, *Abdülhamit – Yıldız Hatıraları*, (İstanbul: Milliyet Matbaası, 1931), 111 (and more); Bülent Yıldırım, "Bulgaristan'daki Ermeni Komitelerinin Osmanlı Devleti Aleyhine Faaliyetleri (1890-1918)", (Ankara Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2014), 82-89; Hratch Dasnabedian, *History of The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaksutium 1890-1924*, (Milan: OEMME Edizioni, 1990), 76-77; Levon Panos Dabağyan, *Osmanlı'da Şer Hareketleri ve Abdülhamid Han*, (İstanbul: IQ Kültür-Sanat Yayıncılık, 2006), 361-380; Süleyman Kâni İrtem, *Ermeni Meselesinin İç Yüzü*, (Copy Editing: Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu), (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2004), 51-143; Vahdettin Engin, "Sultan II. Abdülhamit'e Düzenlenen Ermeni Suikastı ve Bu Sebeple Belçika İle Yaşanan Diplomatik Kriz", *Ermeni Meselesi Üzerine Araştırmalar*, (Editor: Erhan Afyoncu), (İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı Yayınları, 2001), 115-132; Ramazan Çalık, "II. Abdülhamit Devrinde Ermeni Olayları – Batı Kaynaklarına Dayanarak Yapılan Çalışmalar ve Tarihi Gerçekler", Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, *Unpublished Phd. Dissertation*, (Konya: 1994), 132-138.

the Ottoman government. Yet, from the perspective of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin was the highest authority in the Armenian Church and they felt spiritually and politically responsible for the political conditions in Etchmiadzin. Sultan Abdulhamid II viewed political turmoil in the Caucasus as the domestic affairs of Russia and he wanted neither the Ottoman Government nor the Patriarchate of Constantinople to get involved in the public unrest. Moreover, Sultan Abdulhamid II branded Armenian committee members as traitors to Ottoman territorial integrity. He was also suspicious of the alliance between Russians, Armenian committee members and the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin. One of the main concerns of Abdulhamid II was the possible internationalization of the Armenian issue which in turn may have led major European countries to put pressure for reforms on the Ottoman State. Thus, the Ottomans were reluctant to get involved in the public unrest in the Caucasus to prevent any spill-over effect on the Eastern provinces of the Ottoman State. The Sultan did not meet the demands of the Patriarchate of Constantinople or the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin, and in this regard the Ottomans remained aloof from Russia's domestic relations with the Armenians in the Caucasus region.

BIBLIOGRAPHY**Archives Sources**

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi / Office of the Prime Minister Ottoman Archives, İstanbul (BOA)

Published Sources

Bunbury Herald, September 16, 1903.

Partakuyn Garavarutyun: Khagakis Garavarutyun Kordzots Lusavorçagan Hayots Yegeğetsvo İ Rusasdan (High Governance: Internal Affairs of the Armenian Church of Lusavoric in Russia), Etchmiadzin 1836.

The Argus, September 16, 1903; October 20, 1903; December 11, 1903.

The Evening Post, September 16, 1903.

Other Sources

Adalian, Rouben Paul, *Historical Dictionary of Armenia*, Lanham MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010.

Aknouni, E., *Political Persecution: Armenian Prisoner of Caucasus (A Page of the Tzar's Persecution)*, (Translated from the Author's Manuscript by A. M. And H. W.), New York: 1911.

Arkun, Aram, "Into the Modern Age, 1800-1813", *The Armenians – Past and Present in the making of National Identity*, (Editors: Edmund Gerzig – Marina Kurkchian), London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005.

Arslan, Ali, *Ermeni Papalığı – Eçmiyazın Kilisesi'nde Stratejik Savaşlar*, İstanbul: Paraf Yayınları, 2010.

Askarova, Aina, "Türk – Rus İlişkilerinde Eçmiyadzin Ermeni Katogikosluğu'nun Yeri (1914-1983)", İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, *Unpublished Phd Dissertation*, İstanbul: 2010.

Beydilli, Kemal, "1828-1829 Osmanlı – Rus Savaşında Doğu Anadolu'dan Rusya'ya Göçürülen Ermeniler", *Belgeler – Türk Tarih Belgeler Dergisi*, Cilt: XIII, No: 17, Ankara: T.T.K. Yayınları, 1988.

Bournoutian, George A., *Ermeni Tarihi – Ermeni Halkının Tarihine Kısa Bir Bakış*, translated by Ender Abadoğlu – Ohannes Kılıçdağı, İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2011.

Cengiz, Hayrullah, “Rusya’nın 1895-1905 Yılları Arasında Kafkasya Ermenileri Politikası – Ermenileri Ruslaştırma Çabaları”, *Kafkas Araştırmaları IV*, İstanbul: 1998.

Çalık, Ramazan, “II. Abdülhamit Devrinde Ermeni Olayları – Batı Kaynaklarına Dayanarak Yapılan Çalışmalar ve Tarihi Gerçekler”, Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, *Unpublished Phd. Dissertation*, Konya: 1994.

Dabağyan, Levon Panos, *Osmanlı’da Şer Hareketleri ve Abdülhamid Han*, İstanbul: IQ Kültür-Sanat Yayıncılık, 2006.

Dasnabedian, Hratch, *History of The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaksutiun 1890-1924*, (Milan: OEMME Edizioni, 1990.

Engin, Vahdettin, “Sultan II. Abdülhamit’e Düzenlenen Ermeni Suikastı ve Bu Sebep Belçika İle Yaşanan Diplomatik Kriz”, *Ermeni Meselesi Üzerine Araştırmalar*, (Editor: Erhan Afyoncu), İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı Yayınları, 2001.

Eraslan, Cezmi, “I. Sasun İsyamı Sonrasında Osmanlı Devleti’nin Karşılaştığı Siyasî ve Sosyal Problemler”, *Kafkas Araştırmaları II*, İstanbul: 1996.

Seyfeli, Canan, *İstanbul Ermeni Patrikliği*, Ankara: Aziz Andaç Yayınları, 2005.

Garthwaite, Gene R., *İran Tarihi – Pers İmparatorluğu’ndan Günümüze*, translated by Fethi Aytuna, İstanbul: İnkılâp Kitabevi, 2011.

Güllü, Ramazan Erhan, “Ermeni Sorununun Ortaya Çıkış ve Gelişim Sürecinde İstanbul Ermeni Patrikhanesi’nin Tutumu (1878-1923)”, İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, *Unpublished Phd. Dissertation*, İstanbul: 2013.

İrtem, Süleyman Kâni, *Ermeni Meselesinin İç Yüzü*, (Copy Editing: Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu), İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2004.

Kurat, Akdes Nimet, *Rusya Tarihi (Başlangıç’tan 1917’ye Kadar)*, Ankara: T.T.K. Yayınları, 2010.

Marjanlı, Musa, *Armenians. Russia. The Caucasus.*, Dubai: Khazar University Press, 2011.

Önol, Onur, “The Armenians and Tsarist Russia (1870-1906)”, The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences of Bilkent University, *Unpublished Master’s Thesis*, Ankara: 2009.

Papajian, Sarkis, *A Brief History of Armenia*, Fresno: Armenian Evangelical Union, 1974.

Payaslian, Simon, *The History of Armenia – From the Origins to the Present*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Publishing, 2007.

Puşkin, Aleksandr, *Erzurum Yolculuğu*, translated by Ataol Behramoğlu, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2001.

Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. – Steinberg, Mark D., *Rusya Tarihi – Başlangıçtan Günümüze*, translated by Figen Dereli, İstanbul: İnkılâp Kitabevi, 2011.

Suny, Ronald Grigor, “Eastern Armenians Under Tsarist Rule”, *The Armenian People From Ancient to Modern Times (Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century)*, (Editor: Richard G. Hovannisian), Vol.: II, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.

Tahsin Paşa, *Abdülhamit – Yıldız Hatıraları*, İstanbul: Milliyet Matbaası, 1931.

Ter Minassian, Anaide, *Ermeni Devrimci Hareketi’nde Milliyetçilik ve Sosyalizm 1887-1912*, translated by Mete Tunçay, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995.

Tuğlacı, Pars, *Tarih Boyunca Batı Ermenileri, Cilt: III (1891-1922)*, İstanbul: Pars Yayıncılık, 2004.

Uras, Esat, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1976.

Walker, Christopher J., *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation*, London: Palgrave Macmillan Publishing, 1990.

Werth, Paul, “Imperial Russia and the Armenian Catholicos at Home and Abroad”, *Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds*, (Ed.: Osamu Ieda – Tomohiko Uyama), Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2006.

Wilson, Samuel Graham, “The Armenian Church in Its Relation to the Russian Government”, *The North American Review*, Vol.: 180, No.: 578, January 1905.

Yıldırım, Bülent, “Bulgaristan’daki Ermeni Komitelerinin Osmanlı Devleti Aleyhine Faaliyetleri (1890-1918)”, Ankara Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2014.