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**THE ROLE OF SMALL STATES IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE CASE OF THE
GAMBIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST COLD
WAR (1990-2016)**

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ABSTRACT

Small states have been seen as only observers in the international system, most especially by realist aligned studies due to their emphasis on power and capabilities. Others argue that small states can be active actors in the international system, if they align with big or strong powers. Yet others argue that small states are mainly concern with economic interest and for this reason they join international organizations. However there have been many small states constructing their foreign policies on the basis of nonmaterial factors.

The Gambia as a small state has not attracted much research interest especially in its foreign policy domain and when it does, it is with realists or liberal lens. In this study, Discourse Analysis is used to study the construction of the Gambia's foreign policy, precisely in international organisations. Thus, a constructivist perspective is adopted in the study.

The findings belied assumptions that small states policies are influenced by only their insecurities or economic needs. This thesis argues that the construction of the Gambia's foreign policy was mainly influenced by multiple identities, namely, regime type identity, cultural affinity and its identity of a developing country.

Key Words: Constructivism, Discourse Analysis, Foreign Policy, Identity, International Organisation, the Gambia

ÖZET

Realizm ile bağılı çalışmaları güç ve kabiliyete önem verdiğiinden dolayı, bu çalışmaları küçük ölçüt devletlere uluslararası sistemde yalnızca gözlemci olarak bakılmıştır. Diğer açıklamalara göre, küçük ölçüt devletler eğer büyük ya da güçlü devletlerle bağılı olurlarsa uluslararası sistemde aktörler olabilirler. Yine diğer açıklamalara göre ise, küçük ölçüt devletler, ekonomiye önem verdikleri için uluslararası örgütlere üye olmaktadır. Ancak, çok küçük devletlerin dış politikaları maddi olmayan faktörlerce de inşa edilmektedir.

Gambiya küçük ölçüt devlet olduğu için, dış politika alanında, fazla araştırma görmemektedir. Yapılan araştırmalar ise ya Realizm ya da Liberalizm perspektifinden konuyu ele almaktadır. Bu çalışma, Söylem Analizini kullanarak, Gambiya'nın dış politikasının uluslararası örgütlerdeki rolünü incelemektedir. Çalışma, konuyu Yapısalcılık perspektifi ile analiz etmektedir.

Çalışmanın sonuçları, küçük ölçüt devletlerin yalnızca güvenliksizlik ya da ekonomi ile şekillendiğine karşı çıkmaktadır. Bu araştırmaya göre Gambiya'nın uluslararası örgütlerdeki politikaları maddi olmayan üç faktörle şekillenir. Bunlar, rejim tipi kimliği, kültür ve ülkenin az gelişmiş kimliğinde inşa edilmesidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dış Politika, Gambiya Kimliği, Söylem Analizi, Uluslararası Örgütler, Yapısalcılık,

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Dedication

To my father, Dodou Lenn and grandmother Mahaddy Jobe who did not witness this day to see the fruits of their wisdom in sending me to school and supporting my early education. And to my late childhood friends, Cherno Marong, Bubacarr Darboe and Fatou Fatty with whom I started schooling but death took them away so soon. May their souls rest in peace.

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List of Abbreviations

ACP	Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
AFPRC	Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council
APRC	Alliance for Patriotism Reorientation and Construction
AU	African Union
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOSOG	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa
EU	European Union
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NAI	New Africa Initiative
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
PPP	People's Progressive Party
PAGE	Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Portuguese: União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola)
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
US	United States
SU	Soviet Union

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INTRODUCTION

Currently, there are more than 195 states in the international system,¹ of these 193 are accepted as sovereign states and are members of the United Nations,² the world's largest international organization.³ However, these countries come in different sizes; some are so large, others are middle sized, yet there are others that are either small or so small that they have been referred to as "Lilliput's in Gulliver's World".⁴ According to Baskin Oran, states in the international system are generally classified into two types, 'big states' and 'small states'; and states which do not fit any one of these can be referred to as 'middle/medium powers'.⁵ For him, small states are recognized by their inability to have any significant effect neither on their region nor on the international system.⁶ Tom Croward, on the other hand defined small states as countries with a population of 2.7 million; land area of 40,000 and an income of as low as two billion US dollars.⁷ Although the meaning of small states and the criteria used to determine the rank of states are heavily contested,⁸ four main strands of definitions can be identified. These are definitions based on population and/or land size, economic output, military capability, and socio-psychological measure.⁹

Notwithstanding this disagreement on definition, the existence of small states and their role had been recognized for long.¹⁰ With their small size, these countries have been generally referred to as observers rather than actors in the international system; thus they have not been

¹ World Meters' list includes 195 states excluding Taiwan and The Cook Islands and Niue.

World Meters. <http://www.worldometers.info/geography/how-many-countries-are-there-in-the-world/> (accessed October 3, 2016)

² For a full list of the 193 member states see the United Nations website: <http://www.un.org/en/member-states/>

³ Sudan, the 193rd member was admitted in 2011. UN News Center. www.un.org. July 14, 2011.

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39034#.WO4GfKGPIV> (accessed October 11, 2016).

⁴ Neumann, Iver B., and Sieglinde Gstöhl. "Lilliputians in Gulliver's World? Small States in International Relations ." *Center for Small States Studies-Institute of International Affairs-University of Iceland* working paper 1 (May 2004): 1-25.

⁵ Oran, Baskin. *Türk Dış politikası Cilt1 (1919*1980): Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*. Vol. 1. Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2004.

⁶ Ibid, p.29.

⁷ Croward, Tom. 2002. "Defining The Small State Category." *Journal of International Development* (14): 133-179

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Thucydides. 1919. *History of the Peloponnesian War, with An English Translation*. Translated by Charles Forster Smith. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

seen as taking major foreign policy decisions.¹¹ This characterization of small states is not new, since the emergence of state, small states have been seen to be weaker and therefore obedient to bigger and stronger states.¹² This thinking has found way into modern international thought as a result of flourishing Neorealist thinking especially in the post-World War II Era and the Cold War Era.¹³ This is more evident when the particular state concerned is found in the Third World where underdevelopment is generally tallied with being small and weak; hence seen as an observer.¹⁴

However, the emergence of other approaches and methods of study has suggested and even proved that smallness is neither synonymous to being weak nor does it mean being an observer.¹⁵ This has been displayed by Norway in the Sri Lankan conflict.¹⁶ As Annette Baker Fox has proven, small states can be and are sometimes actors and designers of both bilateral and multilateral relations.¹⁷ Notwithstanding some are more decisive and successful in their foreign policies than others.¹⁸ Evidently, small states can be different just like how different large states can be in both domestic politics and foreign policy. But a mere understanding of the outcome of a particular foreign policy, that is whether it is successful or not (whether that success is measured in economic terms or military terms) does not sufficiently explain the foreign policy of small state(s). Therefore, there is a need to understand the non-material factors that lead to the formulation and implementation of the policy.

Considering the above, this work studies the role that identity, ideology, norms, beliefs and ideations play in the formulation and implementation of the Gambia's foreign policy in the

¹¹ Bartman, John Barry. *Micro-states in the International System: the Challenge of Sovereignty*. PhD Thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, London: ProQuest, 2014.

¹² A classic example of this is Thucydides' explanation of Peloponnesian War which shall be examined in Chapter One.

¹³ Bartman, op. cit.

¹⁴ In fact, some studies using population and land size as a criterion for small states definition include countries that have huge land size and populations in their classification of small states. An example of this can be found in World Bank's list of small states where Congo is listed as a small though it has a higher population and larger land size than all the countries listed.

¹⁵ Björkdahl, Annika. "Norm Advocacy: a Small State Strategy to Influence the EU." *Journal of European Public Policy* 15, no. 1 (2008): 135-154.

¹⁶ Moolakattu, John Stephen. "Peace Facilitation by Small states: Norway in Sri Lanka." *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association* 40, no. 4 (2005): 385-402.

¹⁷ Fox, Annette Baker. *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.

¹⁸ Scheldrup, Macklin. "Lilliputian Choice: Explaining Small State Foreign Policy Variation." Undergraduate Honours Thesis paper 191, International Affairs, University of Colorado-Boulder, Spring 2014.

international system. This will help prove that small states are not always observers; they too can be actors depending on what those in charge think and belief about a particular circumstance. The work uses a selection of policies that have been pursued by the Gambia but are yet to be fully explained by researchers and academics.

Precisely, the work examined the construction of the Gambia's foreign policy in intergovernmental organizations from 1990-2016. This is because a lot of international activities take place within organizations.¹⁹ Even big and strong powers do not act alone now,²⁰ thus this will help to unveil the role of small states in an increasingly globalized world through organizations. This is done by examining the policy and role of The Gambia in regional organisations like the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), European Union (EU) and a global organisation, the United Nations (UN).

Each of these cases provides a puzzle for theorists who view small states as observers rather than actors. But also, rationalist approaches to these bilateral relations are likely to miss an important factor that drives foreign policies of small states, the Gambia in particular. Thus, Constructivism as a theoretical base is used in contrast to Realist and Liberal approaches to establish the role of identities, ideation, culture and beliefs in the Gambia's foreign policy.

Statement of the Problem

Small states and the Gambia in particular have received less attention in the scholarly world especially in the domain of foreign policy due to their size. When they do, it is either implicitly or explicitly done to show that they play a secondary role or an observer status rather than being primary actors in the international system. Furthermore, where research exists, it has been conducted through tools or methods that were exclusively favourable to unveiling multilateral and bilateral brute power relations especially during the First World War, Second World War and the Cold War Period. Although there has been a shift from this paradigm, most of the literature focuses on small states with huge tangible leverages.²¹

¹⁹ Iriye, Akira. *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*. Berkeley. Los Angeles. London: University of California Press, 2002.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Croward, Tom. op. cit.

With its small size and poor nature, the Gambia has not attracted much attention especially in its foreign policy dimension as one book only is fully dedicated to the Gambia's foreign policy and that text is limited to the first republic (1965-1994) which corresponds to the post Second World War to the pre-Cold War period.²² However, most of the scanty literature (Journals, opinion papers, thesis) uses rational approaches to explain the Gambia's foreign policy which do not take into account the role of norms, identities and culture in foreign policy. This is similar to much of the literature on small states study that either treats them as observers of big powers or subjects mainly acted by big powers. Therefore, the literature both on small states and particularly on the Gambia does not fully explain policy choices of the Gambia. This is the gap that this research aims to fill.

Aims and Objectives

This research aims to provide a sufficient explanation of the Gambia's foreign policy in international organisations from 1990-2016. With the help of specific foreign policy scenarios, it explores whether dominant paradigms such as Realism and Liberalism used in explaining foreign policies of small states fully explains the Gambia's foreign policy or not. Constructivist approach will be simultaneously used with the theories to establish the role of norms, ideas, identity and culture in the formulation and implementation of The Gambia's foreign policy. The incorporation of norms, ideas, identity and culture will satisfy two main objectives, namely:

- To explore the insufficiency of Realism and Liberalism in explaining foreign policies of a small state, the Gambia.
- To explore the need to incorporate the role of norms, ideas, identity and culture in understanding the foreign of small states particularly the Gambia
- Taken altogether, this thesis aims to contribute to theory discussion while exploring the Gambia's role in international organizations.

²² Omar A. Touray. *The World and The Gambia: The History of The Foreign Policy of Africa's Smallest State*. Hamburg Institute of African Studies. Hamburg. 2009.

Significance

This research will fill the gap that exists on Gambian studies especially in foreign policy. The knowledge generated will help those interested in foreign policy of the Gambia and small states in general. In this manner, it will help policy makers and professionals. Finally, it will help academics and students willing to study foreign policy through constructivist lens, and small state studies especially in Africa. The study focuses on the construction of the Gambia's foreign policy within international organizations. It uses Discourse Analysis to establish the role of identity in the Gambia's foreign policy. The study period is limited to 1990-2016.

The next section provides an informative historical background of the Gambia which will reveal the status and role attached to the country due to its territorial size to understand that the size and foreign policy of the Gambia has been a peculiarity and that an in-depth analysis is needed to understand the intricacies and issues involved. This will help to explain the research problem in detail.

CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE GAMBIA

This chapter provides a general background about the thesis. It is divided into two main sections. The first section gives a detailed historical background of the Gambia as a small state while the second section deliberates on the research problem of small states and the Gambia in particular.

Historical Background of The Gambia

The Gambia,²³ located in West Africa is the smallest country in mainland Africa with a population of about 1.9 million people,²⁴ a total land area of approximately 11000 square kilometers,²⁵ and a Gross Domestic Product of \$851 million in 2014.²⁶ It is bordered by Senegal

²³ David Perfect and Arnold Hughes prefer to use “The Gambia” when they refer to ‘independent Gambia’, the period from 1965 onwards while “Gambia” is used to refer to “colonial Gambia”, the period before independence in 1965. (Hughes, Arnold, Perfect, David. *A Political History of The Gambia, 1816-1994*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2006. p.6.). However, Momodou Loum has suggested an explanation for the difference between the two. He argued that “Gambia” was used to refer to the colony alone (that is Banjul where the colonial administration was situated and its surrounding) but when the Protectorate Ordinance was passed, it became “The Gambia” to mean both the protectorate and the colony. The protectorate Ordinance brought the colony and the rural area under the administration of the colonial authorities. (Loum, Momodou. "An Analysis of The Gambia Coup of 1994." Master Thesis, Department of Political Science,, Carleton University, Canada, April 2000.). Notwithstanding, Fodeh Baldeh, argued “the Gambia” is used because it is a geographical name as the country derived its name from its river. This is from a grammatical point of view. Yet Gambia can be used without the definite article “the” (Baldeh, Fodeh. *Mind Your English*. Kanifing: Fulladu Publishers. p.131-133.

Officially, the country is known as the Republic of the Gambia or simply The Gambia. Although Yahya Jammeh former president declared that the country would be known as Islamic Republic of The Gambia in 2016 which was incorporated in the United Nations website, no legislation was passed to that effect. In fact, a Gambian passport issued in August 2016 maintained the name “The Gambia”. The new president of the Gambia, Adama Barrow who was elected in December 2016, has said that all declarations made without due law including the name of the country are no longer valid. Therefore, I will use “the Gambia” throughout the work except where direct quotations are made.

²⁴ Gambia Bureau of Statistics. *Population and Housing Census Preliminary Results*. Census, Kanifing Institutional Layout: The Gambia Bureau of Statistics, 2013. (See appendix 5 for population growth p.155).

In the 2003 national census, The Gambia had a population of 1.2 million people. In 2013, another census was conducted by the Bureau of Statistics. Although it is yet to be validated and launched, its preliminary results put the country’s population at about 1.9 million (1,882,450). The report is accessible through the following link: <http://www.gbos.gov.gm/uploads/census/The%20Gambia%20Population%20and%20Housing%20Census%202013%20Provisional%20Report.pdf> (Accessed November 5th 2016).

²⁵ There is a slight difference in the figures of the size of the country given by authors but 11,000 can be accepted as the median. For instance, Omar Touray puts it at 11,360 square kilometers (Touray, Omar A. *The Gambia and The World: A History of The Foreign Policy of Africa’s Smallest State*. Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 2000.) while the World Fact Book of the CIA gives the size as 11,300 sq. km (Central Intelligence Agency-United States. <https://www.cia.gov>. n.d. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ga.html> (accessed November 14, 2016). Perhaps the difference is because there are no natural boundaries between the Gambia and Senegal. Fafa Mbai has recounted that during the 1970s some residents of villages in the border used to dodge taxation from both the Senegalese and Gambian authorities. They will tell custom officers from Senegal that they are Gambians and have paid their Gambian taxes but when they are approached by Gambian tax officers, they will

on all sides with whom it shares 600 kilometers of porous borders except the west where the Atlantic Ocean lies.²⁷ It is 10 kilometers wide from both sides of the River Gambia which runs through the middle of the country.²⁸ Fafa M'bai states it more precisely, "the navigable waterway is surrounded by 12-25 kilometers wide strips of territory on each bank, so that after the usual riverside marshes there are rarely more than two or three Gambian villages before entering Senegal..."²⁹ The country is a flat land with no mountains, characterized by a Sahelian climate and the rainy season runs from late June to October while the rest of the year is usually dry.³⁰ The country is divided into almost two equal halves by the River Gambia.³¹

It is important to make some observations about the River Gambia as it has been one of the most important features of the country and it was used as an argument to prevent the cession of the territory to the French which shall be discussed later. Sir Thomas Southorn, former colonial governor of the Gambia from 1936-1942 referred to the River Gambia as the life-line of the country; "a magnificent waterway believed at one time to be a branch of the Nile".³² Because of its navigability, for more than three hundred miles, adventurers of the time found it very valuable in their expeditions to reach the interior for gold.³³

Before the arrival of the English and French colonizers, the land known as the Gambia today comprised many kingdoms and chieftaincies within the former Sonhay Empire, the Jollof Empire and the Kaabu Empire.³⁴ For instance, Barra, Baddibu, and Lower Nyani, all contemporary districts in the Gambia were part of the Jollof Empire which covered part of

claim to be Senegalese. This shows how difficult it is to practically tell the exact borders between The Gambia and Senegal. (M'bai, Fafa Edrissa. *A Senegambian Insight*. Surrey: Unwin Brothers Ltd, 1992.

²⁶ United Nations. <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=gambia> (accessed November 14, 2016)

²⁷ Saine, Abdoulaye. *The Paradox of Third-Wave Democratization in Africa: The Gambia Under AFPRC-APRC Rule, 1994-2008*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009. p.1. (See appendix 2 on page 155.)

²⁸ Hughes, Arnold, and David Perfect. *A Political History of The Gambia, 1816-1994*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2006. p.6.

²⁹ M'bai, Fafa Edrissa. *A Senegambian Insight*. Surrey: Unwin Brothers Ltd, 1992.

³⁰ The Gambia Bureau of Statistics (GBOS); ICF International. *The Gambia Demographic and Health Survey 2013*. Survey, Banjul, The Gambia, and Rockville, Maryland, USA: GBOS and ICF International, 2014.

<https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR289/FR289.pdf> (accessed November 15, 2016)

³¹ See Map at appendix 1 on page 155.

³² Southorn, Thomas. "The Gambia: Earliest British Settlement in West Africa." *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts* (Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce) 91, no. 4647 (September 1943): 529-539.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.531. There was a myth that at the end of the River Gambia lies a mountain of gold narrated Sir Thomas.

³⁴ Davidson, Basil, and Francis K Buah. *A History of West Africa, 1000-1800*. Essex: Longman Group Limited, 1977. p56.

present day Senegal and the Gambia. With time, some of these kingdoms had either attained full independence or were part of a loose federation. Donald R. Wright referring to Niumi, currently a district in the Gambia wrote that “For 500 years, it was a separate political unit –a state, or kingdom, in western terms...”³⁵ With renewed interest in the colonizing of Africa, the English and French competed severely for the Senegambia area.³⁶ “Used in the ordinary sense the territorial scope of Senegambia refers to the two countries of Senegal and The Gambia within their present international boundaries” but in the wider sense, it extends to include the valleys of Futa Jallon in present day Guinea.³⁷

Over two thousand years ago, it was visited by Hanno, the Carthaginian but there is no trace of evidence that the Carthaginians established any settlements in the Gambia though it is the Carthaginians who gave the earliest accounts about the Gambia.³⁸ In 1445 the Portuguese Prince, Henry the navigator sent Alvico Cada Mosto on an expedition to find the River Gambia which he successfully did.³⁹ He came back the following year and sailed up to an uninhabited island which he named St. Andrews Island, the island that later became the first permanent British settlement in The Gambia and a center for Anglo-French rivalry. The Portuguese were the first arrivals but they established trading posts only along the river and made no attempt to establish permanent residence.⁴⁰

In 1587 two British ships visited the River Gambia marking the first contact between the two; soon others followed and the Crown started issuing charters to companies for monopoly who would receive protection against competitors and pirate attacks.⁴¹ The Courlanders who built the fort at St. Andrews Island were defeated by the Royal Adventurers who renamed the

³⁵ Wright, Donald. *The World and a Very Small Place in Africa: A History of Globalization in Niumi, theGambia*. 3. New York: M.E Sharpe, 2004. p.1.

³⁶ Ibid., p.282.

Harmon, Daniel E. *West Africa 1800 to the Present: A Cultural Patchwork*. Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2001.

³⁷ M'bai, Fafa. op. cit.

³⁸ Southorn, Thomas. "The Gambia: Earliest British Settlement in West Africa." *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts* (Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce) 91, no. 4647 (September 1943): 529-539.

³⁹ Armitage, Cecil. "The Gambia Colony and Protectorate." *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts* (Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce) 76, no. 3944 (June 1928): 810-818.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.812.

⁴¹ Southorn, Thomas. op. cit.

place James Island and the first British settlement was established there in 1661. Two decades later, the French also established a trading post in Albreda just opposite James Island.⁴²

In the beginning the English were more interested in commerce than political administration and even the Royal African Trading Company had to regularly pay dues to the local chiefs. In fact, “dues were regularly paid to the king of Barra by all vessels entering or leaving the river” which shows that the territory of the Gambia enjoyed independence at the time and the forts were mainly meant for commercial activities.⁴³ The Company of Merchants Trading to Africa was established by an act of the British parliament which dissolved the Royal African Company in the middle of the eighteenth century, also requiring members of the new company not to engage in commerce in the continent.⁴⁴ Thus it was the first attempt to separate commerce from government as they were to regulate foreign and private traders. Sir Thomas noted that the company and its predecessor “never attempted the conquest of any part of the mainland”.⁴⁵ Hence, it is acceptable to trace British colonial government in the Gambia to 1816 as Arnold Hughes and David Perfect did.

After the Anglo-French Wars in 1783, the fort was handed back to the merchants but its poor state meant that the trading company could not do much to rehabilitate it.⁴⁶ Therefore, when slavery was abolished in 1807 while some traders continued using the river for the trade, Britain knowing that it needed to promote legitimate trade decided to look for a new military posts. This is what led to the purchase of Banjulo, an uninhabited island at the mouth of the River Gambia.⁴⁷

Hughes and Perfect traced modern Gambia to 1816, the year that Captain Alexander Grant with his forces from Goree Island which is found in present-day Senegal, purchased the uninhabited Island of Banjul (locally called Banjulo) from the King of Kombo for 103 iron bars.⁴⁸ After the founding of Bathurst, the commandant of the garrison was in charge of the new

⁴² Ibid., p.535.

⁴³ Ibid., p.535.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.538.

⁴⁸ The island was uninhabited at the time and it was used by the locals in kombo and Niuni to fetch firewood, or local ropes to make beds and the like. It was well known for its bang, a tree that was popular for making furniture, hence the name Banjulo. (Hughes and Perfect. *A Political History of The Gambia, 1816-1994*. op. cit.)

settlement but the Gambia was not an independent colony as it was placed under the jurisdiction of the governor general of Sierra Leone until 1843 when the two were partially separated.⁴⁹

The small size of the country had attracted attention again in 1844 when the House of Commons in Britain questioned the profitability of the Gambia. Thereafter, a Parliamentary Select Committee on British Holding in West Africa was established to come up with recommendations on whether to abandon the colony or not but the committee recommended that Britain should not abandon The Gambia because it possessed untold riches.⁵⁰ Again in 1866, Gambia, Lagos, Gold Coast and Sierra Leone were joined to form the West African Settlements and the governor in Sierra Leone became the governor in chief for the Gambia once again, but in 1874 the West African Settlements was divided into two namely Gold Coast and Sierra Leone.⁵¹ At this time Lagos was placed under Gold Coast and the Gambia was placed under Sierra Leone, thus once again being jointly administered by the governor in Sierra Leone.⁵²

In fact, shortly after this adjoining to Sierra Leone, the cession of the Gambia to France took a center stage in British colonial policy. Arthur Kennedy who represented British advocates for cession argued that trade in groundnut, Gambia's main export and other items were on the decline and that Britain's mission of civilizing the locals was not progressing.⁵³ However, this was resented by many of the British merchants and inhabitants and in a petition 'to *The Right Honourable Earl Carnarvon, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Colonies*' they reminded the secretary that they have earlier written to Granville that any transfer of the Gambia would mean 'denationalization' of British subjects that would have impacts on their wealth also. The colonial office acknowledged receipt of the letter but added that the idea had been dropped and there was no need to belabor on the issue.⁵⁴

Furthermore, a report issued by the Council of the Royal Colonial Institute on the Gambia question in 1876 also argued that Britain should not give up the Gambia because

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.42.

⁵⁰ Havinden, Michael, and David Meredith. *Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960*. New York: Routledge, 2002. p.55.

⁵¹ Hughes and Perfect. op. cit.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Royal Colonial Institute. *Report of the Council of the Royal Colonial Institute on the Gambia question: January 1876*. Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection, 1876.

⁵⁴ Brown, Thomas. "Letter addressed to Earl Carnarvon, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies." *Bristol Selected Pamphlets*, September 1875.

“Bathurst is only ten days by steamer from Liverpool...the proposed cession would hand over to a foreign power the possession of a viable water highway, giving access to the interior...”.⁵⁵ This shows the importance that was attached to the Gambia despite its small size by some British. The Gambia was finally separated from Sierra Leone in 1888 but maintained an administrator as its head of government until 1900 when it was upgraded to a governor.⁵⁶ Thus, the Gambia got its first governor resident in the Gambia in 1900.⁵⁷

In 1889, the British restarted formal discussions with the French to exchange the Gambia for another French territory.⁵⁸ Because the French like their British counterparts were less interested in this small territory the negotiations failed. The French were willing to exchange some nonviable trading posts only and were not ready to give in more territory as the British wanted them to do.⁵⁹ Consequently the Berlin Conference (1884) had sought to guaranteed that European nations would not compete or engage in hostilities for territories in Africa, the competition dwindled and the permanent borders of the Gambia were fixed at 10 kilometers north and south of the River Gambia as established by the Anglo French Convention.⁶⁰ Armitage described the demarcation as “ridiculous”.⁶¹ This demarcation has remained in place until the 1970s when some villages within the borders have to be properly re-demarcated though slightly.⁶²

At the time of demarcation, most of the local resisting chiefs and kings whose kingdoms have extended to both so-called French and English territory had been defeated or coopted,⁶³ hence giving way to easy demarcation.⁶⁴ Therefore, although the British had expressed interest and control over some parts of the territory and even passed the Protectorate Ordinance in 1894, no absolute colonial rule of the whole territory was established until the early 1900s.⁶⁵

⁵⁵ Royal Colonial Institute. op. cit.

⁵⁶ Hughes and Perfect. op. cit. p.42-43.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Southorn, Thomas. "The Gambia: Background for Progress." *Journal of the Royal African Society* (Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society) 43, no. 170 (January 1944): 10-15.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Hughes, and Perfect. op. cit. p.43.

⁶¹ Armitage, Cecil. op. cit.

⁶² M'bai, Fafa. op. cit.

⁶³ Hughes, and Perfect. op. cit. p. xxxvi.

⁶⁴ Harmon, Daniel E. *West Africa 1800 to the Present: A Cultural Patchwork*. Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2001. p.35.

⁶⁵ Hughes, and Perfect. op. cit.

Negotiations to exchange the two territories will emerge again in the early 1900s but it never materialized and that was the last time it surfaced. Through the Protectorate Ordinance which was first passed in 1894, the British established a dual system of rule in the Gambia whereby the colony of Bathurst and its surroundings (renamed Banjul at independence, the present capital of the Gambia) was ruled according to British laws and enjoyed some social amenities while the protectorate was placed under native chiefs who ruled according to the wishes of the British authorities, collected taxes from locals and handed it to British authorities.⁶⁶

In 1939, a federation between the Gambia and Sierra Leone was recommended by the Dufferin Committee but it did not materialize.⁶⁷ Again in 1951, prime minister Clement Attlee established the Committee on Small States to give recommendations about the future relationship of smaller territories and Islands.⁶⁸ The Committee recommended that island and city states (small ones for that matter) should be prevented from achieving autonomy/independence rather a permanent relationship should be forged with these small territories.⁶⁹ According to Fafa Mbai, this approach was favoured by Percy, the then governor of the Gambia. However, the idea went to the dustbin after Attlee was defeated in the elections of the same year.⁷⁰

Meanwhile the demand for independence had begun and by the 1960s, independence became a possibility for many countries. The Gambia too would need to be granted independence but its size will emerge as an issue once again. A merger with Sierra Leone was not viable precisely due to the distance between the two though they have been jointly administered; hence merging it with Senegal its prime neighbour became a pursuable option. Thus in 1963, a team of UN experts descended in Banjul for a preliminary study to determine if the Gambia could be part of Senegal as a region, a policy that resonated well with the British and Senegalese officials; or should it be granted independence; or join Senegal in a loose union.⁷¹ The committee recommended the formation of a “Senegambia federation” which was rejected by the Gambians; hence it became independent in 1965.⁷²

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ M'bai, Fafa. op. cit.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Hughes, and Perfect. op. cit.

⁷² Ibid., p.44.

The Gambia, in part because of its tiny size, was the last British West African colony to achieve independence.⁷³ This was echoed in the British Parliament in 1965:

The size, the shape and the limited resources of The Gambia had undoubtedly been obstacles on her road to independence, and clearly these problems would continue, in one form or another, to face her as an independent country...[T]he Government and people of The Gambia were well aware [of this]. They had a population of only just over 300,000 living within an artificial boundary imposed by a colonial past. The economy depended almost entirely on one crop, groundnuts, and there was at present a substantial Budget deficit.⁷⁴

In fact, instead of wholly breaking away from Britain, the Gambia sought to maintain the queen as the ceremonial head of state. "Mr. Greenwood said that the Bill did not provide for the constitution of The Gambia as an independent country. The Gambian Government wished that The Gambia should for the present have a monarchical form of government, and Her Majesty had agreed to become Queen of The Gambia on independence."⁷⁵

Considering the above Halifa Sallah has argued that the Gambia was not practically independent in 1965. He argues that because the queen of Great Britain wielded authority as the ceremonial head of the Gambia and was represented by the governor who had to represent the queen's interest though a Gambian was elected as prime minister meant that the country had just become autonomous.⁷⁶ It is also important to note that many important posts remained in the hands of British after the declaration of independence. These included the Chief Justice, Attorney General, registrar general, Director of Marine Commissioner of Police, etc.⁷⁷ However, Sallah one of few who hold this view as the state and many others continue to celebrate 18th February 1965 as the day for independence.

⁷³ BBC. *bbc.co.uk*. February 17, 1965.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/17/newsid_2546000/2546949.stm (accessed October 16, 2016).

⁷⁴ African Affairs at Westminster (Parliamentary Correspondent). "African Affairs at Westminster ." *African Affairs* (Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society) 64, no. 255 (April 1965): 107-115.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.108.

⁷⁶ Halifa Sallah 2014, Seminar on Republican Day. University of The Gambia, Brikama Campus, Auditorium.

⁷⁷ Rice, Berkeley. *Enter Gambia: The Birth of an Improbable Nation*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967.

In fact, the Gambia became the 116th member state of the United Nations and 21st member of the commonwealth in the same year.⁷⁸ In 1967, Berkeley Rice published a book titled “*Enter Gambia: The Birth of An Improbable Nation*” where he questioned the future of the country due to its size and lack of resources.⁷⁹ In the book, one comes across the monumental challenge that lay ahead for this small country. At the time, Rice stated that the Gambia had six cabinet ministers, a foreign ministry with two personnel and a foreign service, one teacher training college, one standard hotel, one hospital, a dentist and pharmacist, three high schools and one technical school, barely 10 primary schools and 150 Field Force personnel (security personnel), one road, no television, and a revenue of less than \$7 million.⁸⁰

With this deficiency in the country’s status, the government supported a referendum on republicanism 6 months after the declaration of independence but it failed to win; however, in 1970, it became a sovereign republic with another referendum.⁸¹ The then prime minister, Dawda Kairaba Jawara became the first president of the Republic of the Gambia while the office of the governor was abolished. From 1982 to 1989, the Gambia and Senegal formed a loose union called the “Senegambia Confederation, combining their military forces and cooperating in economic policies and other sectors but irreconcilable disputes soon ended the collaborative experiment.⁸² Jawara and his People’s Progressive Party (PPP) government led the Gambia from 1965 until 1994 when his regime was toppled by the military. At the time, the Gambia was one of only four democracies in Africa.⁸³

From 1994 to 1996, the Gambia was ruled by the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council under the chairmanship of captain Yahya Jammeh.⁸⁴ During the period, the constitution was suspended, political parties and activities were banned thus leading to the end of the first republic.⁸⁵ However, in 1996, a referendum was held and a new constitution was voted and adopted. According to the constitution, the Gambia is a secular republic that guarantees the

⁷⁸ BBC. *bbc.co.uk*. February 17, 1965.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/17/newsid_2546000/2546949.stm (accessed October 16, 2016).

⁷⁹ Rice, Berkeley. *Enter Gambia: The Birth of an Improbable Nation*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Hughes, and Perfect. op. cit.

⁸² M’bai, Fafa. op. cit.

⁸³ Saine, Abdoulaye. *The Paradox of Third-Wave Democratization in Africa: The Gambia Under AFPRC-APRC Rule, 1994-2008*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

fundamental freedoms and rights enshrined in it. The country practices a presidential system of government. The president is directly elected every five years through a secret ballot. However, the winner is decided through first past the polls (simple majority).⁸⁶

With that constitution and referendum, came a new republic generally referred to as the second republic. In the presidential elections that ensued, former chairman of the Military Council, Yahya Jammeh contested and won the elections under his newly formed party, the Alliance for Patriotism, Re-orientation and Construction, becoming the second president of the Gambia but first president of the second republic.⁸⁷ Jammeh won all elections except the December 1st, 2016 election which he lost to Adama Barrow. Therefore, most of the period to be studied, that is 1990-2016, falls under the second republic and the APRC government headed by Yahya Jammeh.

The Gambia is inhabited by 10 main different ethnic groups, the main ones being Mandinka, Fula, Wolof, Jola, Serahuli, Serere, Aku, Manjago, Bambara, etc.⁸⁸ Over 90% of the population is Muslim, the remaining 5-9% is Christian and the rest hold other beliefs.⁸⁹ Ethnic and religious conflicts are an exception in the Gambia as intermarriages are common among the different ethnic groups and religions.⁹⁰ The Gambia is predominantly an agrarian society as most of the population (70%) is either directly or indirectly engaged in the agricultural sector.⁹¹ With

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Hughes and Perfect listed 10 ethnic groups as found in the 1993 census. (Hughes, Arnold, and David Perfect. *A Political History of The Gambia, 1816-1994*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2006.). This list seems to be accurate though it may slightly differ with earlier accounts. For example, a report on the natives of the Gambia in the 1880s listed "Niominka" as an ethnic group. This is inaccurate because "Niominka" simply means a native of Niomi, the ancient kingdom in Barra. Still now people from this district are generally called "Niuminkol" though they are from different ethnic groups. The same report listed Laobey as a distinct ethnic group, however the Laobeh is largely treated as an artisan class of the Fula ethnic group. ("Notes From Parliamentary Reports. No. I.—The Native Races of Gambia." *The Archaeological Review* (Folklore Enterprises, Ltd.) I, no. 1 (March 1888): 7-16.) This may explain why Hughes and Perfect have not listed it as an ethnic group.

⁸⁹ Perfect and Hughes notes that in both 1983 and 1993 census, Muslims accounted for 95% of the population. However, there have been some changes in the current composition. The International Religious Freedom Report of 2011 by the US Department of State noted that 90% of the population was Muslim, 9% Christian and less than 1% practiced traditional religion. (US Department of State. *The International Religious Freedom Report of 2011*. Annual Report, US Department of State, 2011. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192927.pdf> (accessed October 17, 2016).

⁹⁰ Saine, Abdoulaye. *The Paradox of Third-Wave Democratization in Africa*. op. cit.

⁹¹ Republic of the Gambia and European Community. "Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the Year 2008-2013." Strategy Paper, Lisbon, 2007. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/csp-nip-gambia-2008-2013_en.pdf (accessed October 12, 2016).

its small size, lack of substantial mineral resources and poor management, tourism and aid from other states, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organisations continue to be important sources of revenue.

Background to the Problem

Small states have received less attention in the scholarly world and it occupies a “niche position in International relations”.⁹² Furthermore the existing literature especially that which emerged after World War II is generally preoccupied with questions of capability and security.⁹³ One of the causes for this is the bias attached to ‘great powers’.⁹⁴ In light of the above-mentioned approach, Payne stated that “Small states are mostly acted upon by much more powerful states and institutions...Vulnerabilities rather than opportunities...come through as the most striking manifestations of the consequences of smallness in global politics.”⁹⁵ This and similar approaches fail to take into account economic factors and social-cultural factors which have significant impact on policy choices.

However there have been studies that mainly focused on the economic status of small states and how it informed their policies. For instance, East argued that the interests of small states are quite different from big powers because small states’ main goal in foreign policy is the economy while big powers concentrate on other goals.⁹⁶ Furthermore Katzenstein’s study had been a huge contribution to Neoliberalism as it challenged security matters as the primary goal for small states’ foreign policy.⁹⁷

Therefore, the research on small states has been mainly conducted using Neorealism which neglects small states as it is mainly concerned with power politics and security; and

The Gambia Bureau of Statistics (GBOS); ICF International. *The Gambia Demographic and Health Survey 2013*. Survey, Banjul, The Gambia, and Rockville, Maryland, USA: GBOS and ICF International, 2014.
<https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR289/FR289.pdf> (accessed 2016)

⁹² Neuman, and Gstohl. *Lillituan in the World? Small States in International Relations*.

⁹³ Rothstein, Robert L. *Alliances and Small Powers*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.

Vital, David. *The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.

⁹⁴ Neumann, Iver B., and Sieglinde Gstöhl. op. cit.

⁹⁵ Clark, Colin, and Tony Payne. *Politics, Security and Development in Small States*. London: London: Allen and Unwin, 1987. p.634.

⁹⁶ East, Maurice A. "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models." *World Politics* 25, no. 4(1973): 556-576.

⁹⁷ Katzenstein, Peter J. *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985.

Neoliberalism which to a large extent focuses on cooperation and interdependence especially in organisations etc. Both approaches have not been able to account for the non-material factors such as beliefs, ideas and identity that inform policy formulation and implementation. However, this gap has been filled to some extent with the use of other approach(es). For example, Björkdahl had argued that ideation and norms do play a significant role in foreign policy and went on to study the role that small states play in peacekeeping missions.⁹⁸ However most of this study focuses on the Scandinavian small rich countries thereby leaving the poor small countries behind.

The Gambia as a small state is a good case that represents the problem of small states studies. Although its history has attracted many works,⁹⁹ the Gambia has not attracted much attention in its foreign policy domain except its relationship with Senegal. Other than its history, its economy and the military regime which ruled the country has also attracted research. This is a problem that the Gambia shares with many small countries since the great powers are usually taken to be more important.¹⁰⁰ After Berkeley's book which challenged its viability prophesying that the new African small state may emerge as a fail due to its size and economy,¹⁰¹ interest in the small state dwindled immediately in the academic world as no major publications about its foreign policy took place until recently.

Major works include Donald Wright's work on globalization in the Gambia which focused on Niumi a former state and current district in The Gambia.¹⁰² Furthermore Arnold Hughes and David Perfect's "*A Political History of the Gambia, 1816-1994*" is a rich work that has detailed the history of the Gambia and contains a chapter on foreign policy from independence until 1994.¹⁰³ Although it gives a background detail of the country's history and policy, it contains a minute section (four years only, that is from 1990-1994) of what interest this

⁹⁸ Björkdahl, Annika. "Norm Advocacy: a Small State Strategy to Influence the EU." *Journal of European Public Policy* 15, no. 1 (2008): 135-154.

⁹⁹ Touray, Omar A. op. cit.

¹⁰⁰ Neuman Iver, and Sieglinde Gstohl. op. cit.

¹⁰¹ Rice, Berkeley. op. cit.

¹⁰² Wright, Donald. *The World and a Very Small Place in Africa: A History of Globalization in Niumi, the Gambia*. 3. New York: M.E Sharpe, 2004.

¹⁰³ Hughes, Arnold, and David Perfect. *A Political History of the Gambia, 1816-1994*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2006.

work.¹⁰⁴ The “*Historical Dictionary of the Gambia*” too gives a chronological account of important events in the Gambia but it does not deal with policy issues in the proper sense of the word as only two paragraphs are dedicated to foreign policy where it was argued that foreign policy revolved around the personalities of the country’s heads of state.¹⁰⁵

Similarly, Saine’s “*The Paradox of Third Wave Democratization in Africa: The Gambia Under AFPRC-APRC RULE, 1994-2008*” also provides a rich account of policy shifts and issues of the Jammeh regime from 1994-2008 with a specific chapter dedicated to foreign policy.¹⁰⁶ However, it can be fairly regarded as democratic studies as its primary focus is the governance and human rights issues in the advent of the APRC government. Notwithstanding one can deduct rational choice arguments from the chapter dedicated to foreign policy.¹⁰⁷ In fact, for Saine, the AFPRC policies were primarily driven by economic concerns.¹⁰⁸ Although it stated that it focused on making friends too, the ideas, beliefs and culture that influenced such a policy were not considered. Furthermore, the timeline of that study is limited to 2008. In the same vein, his article on Gambia’s foreign policy took a similar approach.¹⁰⁹

The first detailed and comprehensive study of the Gambia’s foreign policy is Omar Touray’s book, *The Gambia and the World: A History of the Foreign Policy of Africa’s Smallest State, 1965-1995* which can be fairly regarded as a landmark because it has been the only one that has explicitly studied the country’s foreign policy as a small state with other states and intergovernmental organisations.¹¹⁰ The main question answered in the book is how the Gambia has survived as a small state. Touray argued that it was a robust foreign policy that brought economic and political capital to the country which led to its survival.¹¹¹ In fact, when Touray wrote his work there were only two unpublished PhD theses on the Gambia’s foreign policy thereby making it one of the only accessible studies on Gambia’s foreign policy, other than this

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Hughes, Arnold, and David Perfect. *A Historical Dictionary of the Gambia*. Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2008.

¹⁰⁶ Saine, Abdoulaye. op. cit.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Touray, Omar A. *The Gambia and The World: A History of The Foreign Policy of Africa’s Smallest State, 1965-1995*. Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 2000.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

the rest are what he called “fragments” in journals.¹¹² And it may be added that the Gambia has been selected as a case among others in a couple of thesis.

Touray’s work is a case study that sees domestic factors such as personality, poverty etc. as the main driving force of the Gambia’s foreign policy thereby dismissing realist credence of international factors as the driving force behind small states policies.¹¹³ However most of the assumptions made on these thematic issues seem to have been falsified.¹¹⁴ An important strength of Touray’s work is his separation of development and size as variables because some scholars may have had confused the problems associated with underdevelopment with smallness.¹¹⁵ However, the work seemed to have focused on rational arguments too much to explain that underdevelopment and size were the driving force to maintain sovereignty, security and promote development and “national prestige”.¹¹⁶

In fact, Touray seemed to have downgraded the role of nonmaterial factors when he wrote that the respect for human rights under the PPP regime was meant to garner support for the country’s security and development. This seems to downplay the role of nonmaterial factors as dependent variables while security and economy appeared to be independent variables. Although Touray may have shunned realist arguments but somehow, he ended with the same results.¹¹⁷ It may be a matter of interest to find out whether another approach could have produced another result as he intimated when he stated that his work sought to open the debate about the subject.¹¹⁸ Notwithstanding the work contains a rich account derived from primary sources. Also, Touray’s work is limited to 1995. Since then a lot has happened in the Gambia, and its foreign policy might have changed like the actors, therefore new studies are required. Fatma Denton’s work on the subject covered a similar period with Touray’s.¹¹⁹

Matthew Gubb’s study on the other hand, selected the Gambia as one of four cases which he used to study the security vulnerability of micro states and their dependence on larger

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Fatma Denton’s thesis “*Foreign Policy Formulation in the Gambia, 1965-1994: Small Weak Developing States and their Foreign Policy Decisions and Choices*” has not been accessible to the researcher.

states.¹²⁰ His study argued that “a mix of typical microstate features heightened their vulnerability; these were colonial legacies, tendencies towards "exaggerated personalism", "leadership longevity", and unrestrained executive power; remote insularity; and extreme government resource constraints.”¹²¹ Gubb’s work like many others on the Gambia’s foreign policy focused on Senegambian relations where he argued “the relationship between the Gambia and Senegal was much more extensive and in the aftermath of the 1981 insurrection constituted an acute case of dependence arising from security needs.”¹²²

This is one of the only studies that have clearly used small state variables to explicitly study the relationship between the Gambia and Senegal. However, the study focused on a period when the two countries sought to establish formal alliance meaning that his hypothesis was more likely to be established. However, if conducted at a different period the results might have changed. There are many detailed studies regarding Senegal and the Gambia relations but most of them have focused on the early days of independence and the confederation like Gubb’s.¹²³

John Barry Bartman has also selected the Gambia as one of the cases (the two others are Bhutan and Kuwait) in his study “*Microstates in the International System: The Challenge of Sovereignty*”.¹²⁴ His study focused on three main issues namely legitimacy, diplomacy and self-reliant development to understand micro-states. Although he confirmed that micro-states faced vulnerabilities in these areas, they also have opportunities to overcome these vulnerabilities in the international system especially in the post 1990s.¹²⁵ In his observation of the Gambia and Senegal, he argued that Senegal had thought that even independence could not prevent a union but the Gambia’s sense of itself was enough to present a formidable challenge.¹²⁶ This is an implicit argument that gave credence of identity as an important factor influencing foreign policy. The author claimed that if Leopold Senghore, then Senegalese president had had been

¹²⁰ Gubb, Mathew. "Foreign Military Intervention in Response to Microstate Security Crises: a Study in Vulnerability and Dependence." Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations, Faculty of Social Studies, University of Oxford, 2000.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Senghore, Jeggan C. *The Politics of Senegambian Integration, 1958-1994*. Bern: Peter Lang AG, International Academic Publishers, 2008. This work is a notable example.

¹²⁴ Bartman, John Barry. *Micro-states in the International System: the Challenge of Sovereignty*. PhD Thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, London: ProQuest, 2014.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

determined, he would have taken the Gambia rather than wait for long.¹²⁷ Two other books on the country's foreign policy entirely focused on its relationship with Senegal. Fafa Mbai's book, *A Senegambian Insight* is a rich account on the institutionalization of the relationship with Senegal but his study is concerned with integration especially in Africa. Jeggan C. Senghore's work too is entirely about integration between Senegal and The Gambia.¹²⁸

The Gambia-Taiwanese and Chinese relations have featured in few works.¹²⁹ For instance, D.A. Brautigam's article on the Gambia gives valuable background information on ideas and Chinese foreign aid to the Gambia where he emphasized that Chinese domestic ideology influenced its relations with states like the Gambia.¹³⁰ While Brautigam's work is limited to 1994, Saine made a continuum on Gambia's general foreign policy until 1999 attributing policy directives to resource accumulation. He argued that the need for resource mobilization determined Gambia's relationship with Taiwan.¹³¹ However David Perfect's assessment of the APRC regime has implicitly treated the country's foreign policy in economic terms especially relations with Taiwan.

From the above, it is clear that there is a gap in foreign policy studies of the Gambia especially in the post-Cold War era. Where information exists, it has been implicitly or explicitly based on realists or liberal arguments of foreign policy choices. Moreover, none of these studies have explicitly explained the role of norms, ideas, identity, ideation and culture in the Gambia's role in regional and global organisations. Furthermore, none of the studies, had used discourse to analyze the Gambia's foreign policy. This is the gap that this research intends to fill.

Therefore, this research aims to contrast Constructivism against Realism and Liberalism for a better explanation of the Gambia's foreign policy in the post-Cold War Era. With the help of specific foreign policy scenarios, it explores whether dominant paradigms such as Realism and Liberalism used in explaining foreign policies fully explains Gambia's foreign policy.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Senghore, Jeggan C. *The Politics of Senegambian Integration, 1958-1994*. Bern: Peter Lang AG, International Academic Publishers, 2008.

¹²⁹ Brautigam., D.A. "Foreign Assistance and The Export of Ideas: Chinese Development Aid in The Gambia and Sierra Leone." *The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 32, no. 3 (1994): 324-348

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Saine, Abdoulaye. "The Gambia's Foreign Policy Since the Coup, 1994-99." *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 38, no. 2 (2000): 73-88.

Constructivist approach will be used to establish the role of norms, ideas, identity and culture in the formulation and implementation of the Gambia's foreign policy. The incorporation of norms, ideas, identity and culture will satisfy two main objectives, namely to explore the insufficiency or sufficiency of Realism and Liberalism in explaining the foreign policy of a small state, the Gambia; and to explore the need to incorporate the role of norms, ideas, identity and culture in understanding the foreign of small states particularly the Gambia.

This chapter began with a historical background of the Gambia from precolonial, colonial and independence. The chapter ended with a clear identification of the research problem. The next chapter will provide a detailed review of the literature on small states' studies.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter contains a general review of the literature on small states in international organizations, their foreign policies and the Gambia. It is divided into three main sections. The first section begins with a review of the meanings of small states and makes sense of the competing definitions by grouping them into clusters. Although the given strands of thought on the subject do not cover all definitions, it seeks to provide a summary of the main thoughts to serve as a representation of the different definitions. After a critical review of the definitions, a working definition is adopted for this work. In section II, the chapter provides an informative history of small states in international organizations by examining their perceived role and the views attached to them in the past, from the Greek city-state to the present day United Nations system. Section III, is a brief examination of how small states have been studied with a focus on theoretical paradigms. The chapter ends with section IV which reviewed approaches to the study of small states foreign policy. The following section focuses on definitions of small states.

What Are Small States?

One of the first challenges that one comes across in the study of small states is the lack of a universally accepted meaning of the term.¹³² In fact Walter Carlsnaes is of the view that the small state categorization has no conceptual validity since “conceptually all states today are defined in terms of the same formal criteria of statehood, and these have nothing to do with size.”¹³³ Similarly Prakash Sinha objected to the use of “mini-state” because it has no analytical value.¹³⁴ However unlike Carlsnaes, many of the scholars who work in the field do not dismiss the categorization of states into different ranks of great and small and the existence of the latter despite the problems associated with defining it.¹³⁵ For instance, Glazebrook argued that three categories of states can be given:

¹³² Neumann, Iver B., and Sieglinde Gstöhl. "Lilliputians in Gulliver's World? Small States in International Relations ." *Center for Small States Studies-Institute of International Affairs-University of Iceland* working paper 1 (May 2004): 1-25.

¹³³ Carlsnaes, Walter. "How Should We Study The Foreign Policies of Small European States?" *Uppsala & Institute of International Affairs*, no. 118-3.a serie (2007): 7-20.

¹³⁴ Roger Fisher, Moshen S. Esfandiary, Elizabeth Brown and Stanley De Smith, “The Participation of Microstates in International Affairs”, *The American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969)*, Vol. 62 (APRIL 25-27, 1968), Pp. 164-188

¹³⁵ Mohamed, Ali Nasser. "The Diplomacy of Micro-states." *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy-Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'*, no. 78 (no date): 1-37.

For practical purposes, the great powers at the present time are those which hold permanent seats on the security council...There are clearly also a number of smaller states which, because of limited resources or small population, or both, are commonly ranked as small powers. In between lie a number of countries which make no claim to the title of great power, but have been shown to be capable of exerting a degree of strength and influence not found in the small powers. These are the middle powers.¹³⁶

This clearly recognized the existence of three categories of states, which is a popular approach to the study of states in the international system.¹³⁷ However Joseph R. Harbert added a fourth group which he referred to as “mini-states” by which he meant states "having a population of one million or less" and low “human and economic resources.”¹³⁸ For this category of state, the names used varied; for instance Handel Mendelson referred to it as *diminutives*,¹³⁹ while Zbigniew Dumienki referred to it as *microstates*.¹⁴⁰ Therefore it can be concluded that four classes of states are familiar in the literature: great powers, small states, middle powers and mini-states.

Notwithstanding the acceptance of the existence of small states, some of the scholars who work in the field have avoided confronting the problems of defining it. This had been echoed in the proceedings of *The Seminar on Small Territories* organized by the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in 1962-1964.¹⁴¹ The editor of the proceedings stated that it is “impossible for the seminar to decide what smallness means with any precision...Whatever scales of magnitude are employed seemed arbitrary and it is difficult to pick out on them where

¹³⁶ Glazebrook, G. Det. "The Middle Powers in The United Nations System." , *International organization* I, no. 2 ((June 1947): 307-315.

¹³⁷ Oran, Baskin. op. cit.

¹³⁸ Harbert, Joseph R. "The Behavior of the Ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972." *International Organization* 30, no. 1 (Winter, 1976): 109-127.

¹³⁹ Mendelson, Maurice H. "Diminutive States in the United Nations." *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* (Cambridge University Press on behalf of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law) 21, no. 4 (October 1972): 609-630.

Mendelson argued that providing a "satisfactory criterion of diminutives" is difficult since they have many differences including population, economic and land size. However, except if one is concerned about their admission criterion in organizations, otherwise one should not worry much about "precise definitions". He chose one million as his threshold for diminutives (p609).

¹⁴⁰ Dumienki, Zbigniew. "Microstates as Modern Protected States: Towards a New Definition of Micro-Statehood." Occasional Papers, Center for Small States Studies, Institute of International Affairs-University of Iceland, Reykjavik, 2014, 1-36.

¹⁴¹ Benedict, Burton. *Problems of Smaller Territories*. London: The Athlone Press, 1967.

smallness begins and ends.”¹⁴² Similarly, the editors of “*Small States and Alliances*” have also skipped any definition of what is meant by “small states”.¹⁴³ Most of the reluctance to provide a definition partly results from the competing definitions on small states. To make sense of these competing and often contradictory definitions, they will be grouped into two, absolute or quantitative definitions and relative or qualitative definitions.

The relative or qualitative definitions usually focus on the distribution of power and capability between two or more states in defining small states. Amry Vandebosch stated that “[A] small state we may conclude, is a state which is unable to contend in war with the great powers on anything like equal terms.” He added that to understand inferiority one should measure the military capabilities of states.¹⁴⁴ Similarly, Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel stated that “typically small states are defined in terms of capabilities, i.e. the possession of or rather the lack of power resources in absolute or relative terms.”¹⁴⁵ Furthermore Olav F. Knudsen argued that “... a small state can be any state in a relationship of marked inferiority of power vis-à-vis another state.”¹⁴⁶

In addition, Herman Amersfoort and Wim Klinkert have adopted a militarist definition for convenience as their study was about small states during turbulent times (1900-1945).¹⁴⁷ Thus, they noted “the term ‘small states’ denotes those states that viewed themselves as such and that did not play an active role in the power political controversies of the European great powers”.¹⁴⁸ Steinmetz and Wivel defined a small state “as the weak part in an asymmetric relationship”; thus a state “may be weak in one relation, but simultaneously powerful in another”

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Erich Reiter, Heinz Gartner. *Small States and Alliances*. Berlin: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2001.

¹⁴⁴ Vandebosch, Amry. "The Small States in International Politics & Organizations." *The Journal of Politics* 26, no. 2 (May 1964): 293-312.

¹⁴⁵ Steinmetz, Robert, and Anders Wivel. *Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities*. Burlington: Asgate Publishers, 2010.

¹⁴⁶ Knudsen, Olav F. "Small states, Latent and Extant: Towards a General Perspective." *Journal of International Relations and Development (JIRD)*, June 2002: 182-189.

¹⁴⁷ Herman Amersfoort, Wim Klinkert. *Small Powers in the Age of Total War, 1900-1940*. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2011. p1.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

thereby making it contextual rather than permanent.¹⁴⁹ Laurent Goetschel said traditionally the small state is the state that is no danger to its neighbor.¹⁵⁰

In their emphasis of power and capability, these definitions embed fundamental problems which limits them. To start with, there is a huge difficulty in ascertaining the military capabilities of states because many engage in military secrecies either to exaggerate or downplay their military capability as a strategy which means one may only know the real capability of a state after it has gone to war. For example, what is North Korea's military capability today? What about Israel? The only value of this approach may be that it recognizes that the strength of a state changes depending on the states it is dealing with. Jeanne A.K Hey on the other hand noted that her definition was based on perception. "That is, if a state's peoples and institutions generally perceive themselves to be small, or if other states' peoples and institutions perceive that state as small, it shall be so considered."¹⁵¹ This brings a socio-psychological dimension into the definitions as it moves to perceptions.

Yet Bjol favoured classifying states on a triad whereby small states are differentiated from middle and great powers via relative capability and national interest but in consideration of their geographical conditions.¹⁵² Although his approach is a break from the former, he has not gone further to expand on what capability means nor on what constitutes the interest of small states. In recognition of the need to expand on the above, Robert L. Rothstein defined small state as "one which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capability, (and) must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutional processes and developments; small powers' general inability must be recognized by other states involved in the system."¹⁵³ Rothstein's definition clearly sums the views associated with small states' foreign policies. Yet in today's globalized world, there is no state which can rely on its self alone for

¹⁴⁹ Steinmetz, Robert, and Anders Wivel. op. cit.

¹⁵⁰ Goetschel, Laurent. *Small States Inside and Outside the European Union: Interest and Policies*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998.

¹⁵¹ Hey, Jeanne A.K. *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers Inc., 2003.

¹⁵² Erling Bjol, "The Small States in International Politics" in August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland, (eds.), *Small States in International Relations*, (Uppsala, Alnquist And Wiksells, 1971), pp. 29-30.

¹⁵³ Rothstein, Robert L. *Alliances and Small Powers*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. p.23-30.

security.¹⁵⁴ This is especially true, if one looks at the US entering alliances and security agreements with countries like Afghanistan.

Wivel and Steinmetz have noted that definitions based on capability has three fundamental benefits; it gives an insight about the ability of a state to respond to challenges, provides an “applicable definition of small states” and accessible literature on “great powers” and the “international system” for comparative study of foreign policies of great and small states.¹⁵⁵ Notwithstanding, these benefits are overshadowed by limitations. In recognizing these limitations, Steinmetz and Wivel noted that:

First, power is difficult to measure and its effects are almost impossible to distinguish from the calculations and perceptions of policy makers. Thus, the cut-off point between big and small states is rarely self-evident, and accordingly there is no consensus on what constitutes a small state in term of power possession. In contrast, the notion ‘small state’ is typically used to denote at least three different types of states: micro states, small states in the developed world and small states in the third world.¹⁵⁶

One can easily notice that the above-mentioned definitions are shrouded with realist measures, namely power, capability and security. However, there is a sizeable part of the literature that focuses on quantitative variables to measure smallness in absolute terms. For instance, Reid has stated that it is size that makes a state small,¹⁵⁷ while Azar has attributed GNP as the determinant of a small state.¹⁵⁸ Jones also moved away from power based definition of smallness when he wrote “...a country is small if it has a limited population or output. In economic terms, a country is small if it is depended upon access to world markets and yet unable to influence world market prices.”¹⁵⁹ But this definition is fundamentally limited especially regarding its emphasis on economics. In this era of globalization there are many factors that

¹⁵⁴ Karns, Margaret P., and Karen A. Mingst. *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

¹⁵⁵ Steinmetz, Robert, and Anders Wivel. op. cit. p.5.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Reid, George L. *The Impact of Very Small Size on the International Behaviour of Micro States*. London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1975.

¹⁵⁸ Azar, Edward E. *Probe for Peace: Small State Hostilities*. Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Company, 1973. p.29.

¹⁵⁹ Jones, Erik. *Economic Adjustment and Political Transformations in Small States*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. p.30

affect the prizes of goods and services often arising from countries that are poor. Also, having a small size of land and population is not the same as having small economic output, though Singapore and Kuwait can be regarded as small states per population, they still have a large economic output.

Definitions like Crowards' which is based on population, land area and total income of a country instead of using military capability or economic significance aims to provide clear cut off variables.¹⁶⁰ Notwithstanding, the fundamental challenge in this is the disagreement of what "smallness" means in quantitative terms. Often, the definition of what size constitutes a small state is contradictory. Whereas the World Bank defined small states as countries with a threshold of 1.5 million people, its list of small states also included countries with institutional weaknesses with large populations in millions.¹⁶¹

Croward in his study of 190 countries, found 79 countries to be "small" having used three parameters namely, population, land size and income. For him a country is small if it has a population of 2.7 million, land area of 40,000 to 7,000 or below.¹⁶² David Vital in his book, "*The Inequality of States*", adopted a dichotomy of definitions; one for small countries in the third world and the small countries in the developed world since the two are very different to warrant the same criterion. For him 10-15 million people qualifies a state as small in economically advanced countries while the figure is 20-30 million people for underdeveloped countries.¹⁶³ Although this partly solves the question of whether small states should be measured by the same criteria irrespective of their geography and economic development, Vital made no differentiation between small powers and what has been referred to as middle Powers. His absolute dual definitions have been attacked on the grounds that the latter's approach is a manifestation of the limitation of definitions based on material possession.¹⁶⁴ Also, his definition greatly differs with the previous ones in terms of the population size.

¹⁶⁰ Croward, Tom. op. cit.

¹⁶¹ World Bank. "Statistics for small states : a supplement to the World development indicators 2009 (English)." www.worldbank.org. January 01, 2009.

¹⁶² Croward, Toward. op. cit.

¹⁶³ Vital, David. *The Inequality of States: a Study of the Small in International Relations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1967, p.8.

¹⁶⁴ Steinmetz, Robert, and Anders Wivel. op. cit. p.5.

In an attempt to stress that such disagreement on definitions is healthy, Steinmetz and Wivel argued that difference is the rule rather than the exception in international relations and such provides researchers with the freedom to adopt working definitions.¹⁶⁵ In fact Jacques G. Rapoport argued that it is not necessary to have a fixed definition of small states except when one is interested about the condition for their admission in international organisations.¹⁶⁶

Therefore, this thesis will adopt a working definition by combining both qualitative and quantitative factors. Specifically, it will rely on data from Croward's study which used quantitative criteria and Jeanne K Hey's study which relied on perception for a working definition. Thus, a state may be considered small if it has a population starting from 1.5 million to 10 million inhabitants, a land area of 40,000 to 7,000;¹⁶⁷ and considers itself small while outsiders also consider it small.¹⁶⁸ At least two of these factors, one from the absolute and relative criteria should be met to be considered small. According to this working definition, the Gambia is a small country because it has a population of 1.9 million and a total land area of 11,000 KM² and is generally referred to as a small state and it considers itself as one.¹⁶⁹ It must be noted that some studies in the past have referred to the Gambia as a microstate/mini-state because during the periods under review it was less than a million or at most 1.5 million.¹⁷⁰

By adopting a definition based on population, land and perception, this work seeks to clearly distinguish between smallness and weakness. According to the *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World*, a weak state is a country:

lacking the capacity and/or will to foster an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; to establish and maintain legitimate, transparent, and

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Rapoport, Jacques G. "The Participation of Ministates in International Affairs." *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969)* (American Society of International Law) 62 (April 1968): 155-163.

For Rappart "determining smallness requires the combination of factors such as nature and size of territory, population and ability, industrialization, culture, national interest, moral temper of its inhabitants, political maturity etc"

¹⁶⁷ Croward, Tom. op. cit.

¹⁶⁸ Hey, Jeanne A.K. op. cit.

¹⁶⁹ <http://countrymeters.info/en/Gambia>

¹⁷⁰ See: Mohamed, Ali Nasser. op. cit., Touray, Omar. op. cit.; Gubb, Mathew. op. cit.

accountable political institutions; to secure their populations from violent conflict and to control their territory; and to meet the basic human needs of their population.¹⁷¹

In the Report, which employed 20 indicators grouped into political, security, social welfare and economic are used to measure weakness, the Gambia ranks 51 while Nigeria ranks 28. Thus, Nigeria may have a better military and capability to engage in wars and the use of force but it may be finding it more difficult to maintain law and order and provide basic services to its overall population than the Gambia.¹⁷² Based on that, this work argues that weakness has nothing to do with smallness. Jennifer J. Atiku-Abubakar and Yoku Shaw-Taylor's definition of a weak state "as having a prevalence of structural inequality, the components of which are economic differentiation, cultural (or social) inequality and political inequality"¹⁷³ lends credibility to the approach to differentiate between weak and small states.

Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Small States

The previous section has reviewed the literature on small states in international organizations. This section on the other hand will review the literature on the approaches to small states behavior. This is important because this work seeks to understand small states in both international organization and bilateral relations. Thus, this section will shed light on how small states have been studied.

Anyone seeking to study small states must also deal with the question of how to study their behavior. Walter Carlsnaes has credited Annette Baker Fox's *The Power of Small States* as a landmark for Small European States Studies where she argued that small states like Turkey, Spain, Switzerland were not drawn into the second World War because of skilled diplomacy.¹⁷⁴ The studies that followed were also concerned about how small states could survive in a world dominated by great powers.¹⁷⁵ Another body of literature argued that small states favoured

¹⁷¹ Rice, Susan E., and Steward Patrick. *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World*. Washington: The Brookings Institute, 2008. p.8.

¹⁷² Ibid., p.11.

¹⁷³ Atiku-Abubakar, Jennifer J., and Yoku Shaw-Taylor. "An Empirical Profile of Weak States in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Africa Development / Afrique et Développement* (CODESRIA) 28, no. 3/4 (2003): 168-185. For more definitions see Stuart E. Eizenstat, John Edward Porter and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Rebuilding Weak States", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2005), pp. 134-146.

¹⁷⁴ Carlsnaes, Walter. "How Should We Study The Foreign Policies of Small European States?" *Uppsala University & Institute of International Affairs*, no. 118-3.a serie (2007): 7-20.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

economic policies to other policies and their policy process differed from the larger countries.¹⁷⁶ These claims are said to have been falsified in the 1980s and 1990s after which the field was neglected.¹⁷⁷

Touray in his review of mini-states stated that their foreign policies had been largely treated as uniform whereby their size has restricted their capability as a result of lack of enough resources, therefore they have a “low level of participation in international relations” argued Touray.¹⁷⁸ In light of this, they rely on diplomacy instead of advocating for “revolution change” or the use of force. This is the reason for their promotion and adherence to international laws and norms.¹⁷⁹ Also, they mainly pursue economic policies and are more likely to engage in *multilateral diplomacy* which grants them systemic survival. Although, they take part in regional affairs, such happens only when the issue has a bearing on their survival. Due to their limited resources, they use multilateral organizations to interact with other states since they can have limited diplomatic missions.¹⁸⁰

However, they are also interested in *bilateral relations*. Usually they start by establishing bilateral relations with “former colonial masters” for security and economic benefits.¹⁸¹ They also establish relation with major powers, neighbours and countries that headquartered international organizations. Finally, the *foreign policy decision-making process* of these states are said to be individualized, personalized and authoritarian.¹⁸² However, Touray has argued that the literature has confused characteristics and consequences of underdevelopment to small size. He argued that most of the claims given in the literature would be a consequence and feature of low level of development rather than small size argued Touray.¹⁸³ Notwithstanding, there are some who prefer approaching the study of small states on thematic areas. In fact, Touray has preferred grouping the approaches to the study of micro-states’ foreign policy on the following themes: (i) foreign policy orientation (ii) multilateral diplomacy (iii) Bilateral relations and (iv)

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Touray, Omar. op. cit.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid

¹⁸³ Ibid.

foreign policy decision making process.¹⁸⁴ However most of the arguments produce in such studies would likely fall under one of the theories explained here. For this reason, this thesis will use Constructivism to study the Gambia as a small state.

Jeanne also has provided the following as summary of the behavior of small states in the literature. They (small states) are said to exhibit low level of participation in global affairs and a limited scope of foreign policy issues as they focus on their regions, rely on diplomatic and economic policies rather than military policies, promote and abide by international laws, morals and ideas, join international institutions and enter into multilateral agreements, aim to cooperate and avoid conflict with others, rely on superpowers for protection, security and survival and to gain resources, choose neutral positions, put so much resources on foreign policy that would ensure their political security and survival.¹⁸⁵

However, the list is so long and contradictory to be meaningful.¹⁸⁶ To make sense of the competing approaches to the study of small states and the results they produce, it may be helpful to review them under three main theoretical lenses; namely (neo)Realism, (neo)Liberalism and Constructivism. It is the submission of this work that this will help not only in making sense of the existing literature but also its problems. This approach had been adopted from Neumann and Gstöhl. The two argued that what could be referred to (neo)Realism in the literature focused on the capability of small states and how they seek to survive.¹⁸⁷

However before going further into some of the studies explicitly or implicitly conducted under these theoretical approaches, it is important to give a brief explanation of the theories. A theory “is a deductively connected set of laws”.¹⁸⁸ It consists several related statements that link causes to effects to provide an explanation for, and sometimes a prediction of a phenomenon. A paradigm on the other hand is “a larger frame of understanding shared by a wider community of

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Hey, Jeanne A.K. *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2003.

¹⁸⁶ For a similar list see, Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury, “Small States in UN System: Constraints, Concerns, and Contributions”. SAS working paper no 160, 24 October 2012.

¹⁸⁷ Neumann, Iver B., and Sieglinde Gstöhl. "Lilliputians in Gulliver's World? Small States in International Relations ." *Center for Small States Studies-Institute of International Affairs-University of Iceland* working paper 1 (May 2004): 1-25.

¹⁸⁸ Fregberg-Inan, Annette. *What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and its Judgement of Human Nature*. Albany. New York: State University of New York Press, 2004. p.1.

scientists, that organizes smaller-scale theories”.¹⁸⁹ As per the above, Realism can be generally considered to be a paradigm containing many different theories such as balance of power, game theory etc.¹⁹⁰

Realists Approaches to Small State Studies

The roots of Realism began to emerge in the 5th century BC in ancient Greece when Thucydides started to offer explanation of events in a secular form unlike his predecessors and contemporaries who were offering mythological explanations to war.¹⁹¹ Although Thucydides never proclaimed a theory of international politics, he is considered to have laid the foundation of Realism because his work emphasized three main assumptions that are core premises of the realist paradigm.¹⁹² The first assumption is that “phenomena exist independent of human behavior”; the second assumption is all events of nature can be explained by universal facts (cause-effect); the third assumption is that phenomena exist and can be independently observed (scientific observation of social phenomena).¹⁹³ This is what Thucydides did when he explained the causes of war.

Realism is not limited to political discourse or international relations alone, it is a term that has found its way into many other disciplines. When used in philosophy, it implies a “theory of ontology that is against idealism and nominalism”.¹⁹⁴ In cinema and literature, it is used in opposition to “romanticism”. Thus, it is a philosophy of science that favours “...empiricism, instrumentalism, verification and positivism” argued Jack Donnelly.¹⁹⁵ When used in international relations, that is “political Realism”, it refers to “analyses” or approaches that emphasize the “imperatives” or realities state face to pursue power politics of national interest.”¹⁹⁶

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid., p.20.

¹⁹⁴ Donnelly, Jack. *Realism and International Relation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid

Many texts on theories of international relations will distinguish between various strands of Realism namely: structural, classical, and the neo-strands.¹⁹⁷ Theories that emphasize anarchy due to the lack of “hierarchical political rule” fall under structural Realism while classical Realism emphasizes human nature as the basis of relations and the cause of anarchy; this is otherwise called “biological Realism”.¹⁹⁸ Hobbesian view is the bedrock of classical Realism due to his emphasis on human nature. In his *Leviathan*, three assumptions stand out: “men are equal,” “they interact in anarchy,” “they are driven by competition, diffidence and glory.”¹⁹⁹ Meanwhile Waltz work relates to structural Realism as his work mainly focused on the structure of the international system rather than human nature or behavior to explain state relations.²⁰⁰ Waltz argued that studying the internal behavior of states is defeating because it does not explain the system. According to him, “political structures are defined by their ordering principle, differentiation of functions and distribution of capabilities.”²⁰¹

Many studies on small states have been conducted through realist approaches. Studies that could be referred to (neo)Realism in the literature focused on the capability of small states and how they seek to survive.²⁰² For example David Vital would fit under Realism according to his argument that small states are deficient in their capabilities and are therefore less likely to use force or pursue high policy goals.²⁰³ Many of the definitions reviewed in the first part of this chapter would also fall under this category. Also, Mathew Gubb’s and Jeggan Senghore’s argument that the relationship between Gambia and Senegal was mainly dictated by security concerns falls under Realism.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.31.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ Hobbes, Thomas. *The Leviathan*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1660. paragraph 1.

²⁰⁰ Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Amsterdam. California. London. Massachusetts. Ontario. Sydney: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979. p.35.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

²⁰² Thohallson, Baldur. “What Features Determine Small States’ Activities in The International Arena? Iceland’s Approach to Foreign Relations Until the Mid-1990s”. *Stjornal og Stjornsysla Vefimarit*, 2005. 107-140.

²⁰³ Vital, David. *The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.

²⁰⁴ Senghore, Jeggan C. *The Politics of Senegambian Integration, 1958-1994*. Bern: Peter Lang AG, International Academic Publishers, 2008.

Gubb, Mathew. "Foreign Military Intervention in Response to Microstate Security Crises: a Study in Vulnerability and Dependence." Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations, Faculty of Social Studies, University of Oxford, 2000.

Liberalist Approaches to Small State Studies

According to Elias and Peter Sutch, “Liberalism is described in broad terms as relying on claims about the impact of interdependence, the benefits of free trade, collective security, and the existence of real harmony of interests between states.”²⁰⁵ In its emphasis on the role and importance of international law, human rights and cooperation, justice and morality, Liberalism dismisses the realist emphasis on power politics.²⁰⁶ Furthermore, according to John Locke, although there may be a state of nature, there is a “law of nature” that governs that state of nature.²⁰⁷ This law of nature, given by God, existed from the beginning, and for all, since everyone recognizes that it is wrong to kill another human being. This is the natural rights argument. However, Jeremy Bentham favoured measuring rights based on “benefits”. That everyone knows that the glory brought by war is less than the benefit it brings. Therefore, somehow all try to avoid it.²⁰⁸

Liberalism posits that the role of the state is to serve as an arbiter between different interest groups within the state and guarantee people’s liberties. It gives primary importance to the individual as a right holder and sometimes takes the individual as the primary “unit of analysis”.²⁰⁹ Jeremy Bentham’s essay emphasized that the individual is a calculative “rational being” who can decide for itself in the absence of government control. As competition among firms produce the “best goods” and services, so does divergent views. Therefore, public opinion provides the best ideas for state actors to pursue both domestic and foreign policies.²¹⁰ This implies that foreign policy is the work of different individuals and groups whose ideas become the defining rules of policies. Thus, foreign policy is not the ideas of political actors alone or a mechanical state guided by state of nature or systemic factors. That calculative man at the domestic level is the same one in the international system.²¹¹

Although, liberals do recognize that anarchy exists and it brings suspicion among states, they argue that states can harmonize their different interests and cooperate. In fact, four main

²⁰⁵ Sutch, Peter, and Juanita Elias. *International Relations: the Basics*. London. New York: Routledge , 2007. p.6.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid. p.65.

²⁰⁹ Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. *International Relations Theory*. 5. New York: Longman Publishers, 2012.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

arguments for the possibility and cause for cooperation have been given. “Commercial Liberalism” brought “economic dependence” which makes war between states “mutually destructive”, therefore states are more likely to cooperate. The free trade principle promoted at both domestic and international level brings development to all.²¹² Second, “democratic Liberalism” restrains “blood thirsty” leaders as legislators, local governments and interest groups have a say in foreign policy and war and public opinion restrains the choices of leaders.²¹³ Similarly foreign relations between liberal states are a direct product of the legitimate domestic political system that they share.²¹⁴ Since liberal governments respect human rights, guarantee freedom as universal and inalienable, states who respect this at home will respect them at the international system.²¹⁵

Third, “regulatory Liberalism” foresees international organizations and law as a regulation of the “rules of the game” for the common good of states.²¹⁶ International institutions allow an expanded view of interest, blurring sovereignty and thereby making cooperation inevitable.²¹⁷ Finally, “Western Civilization” had taught states the destructive effects of war and mankind has eventually learned to make peace. Considering the above, Kant argued that reason will be guiding principle of action rather than force.²¹⁸ It is these strands of thought that are extended or incorporated in small states studies. It is not that the authors who are presented below are confessed liberals, rather their thoughts are in line with liberals.

Among these studies there are some that purely focus on economic progress of small states. For instance, Alesina Alberto argued that although size has been said to affect prosperity, the evidence says otherwise. For instance, in 2003 only one (US) of the five largest countries (China, India, US, Indonesia and Brazil) was a rich country while just four countries (US, Switzerland, Norway, Singapore) out of the ten richest countries had a population over one million. Between 1960-1990, Singapore with a population of 3 million had the second highest

²¹² Burchill, Scott. "Liberalism." In *Theories of International Relations*, by Scott Burchill, et al., 55-83. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. p.63.

²¹³ Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. op. cit.

²¹⁴ Burchill, Scott. op. cit. p.62.

²¹⁵ Ibid. p.67.

²¹⁶ Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. op. cit.

²¹⁷ Burchill, Scott. op. cit. p.64.

²¹⁸ Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. op. cit.

growth rate while Botswana with one million inhabitants had the highest growth rate in Africa, yet Malta with 300, 000 people had the highest growth rate in Europe at the time.²¹⁹

The author concluded that small states prosper when they favor an open world trade regime. By respecting the international rules of cooperation and trade small states can prosper.²²⁰ Maurice East also argued that with the lack of the necessary resources and power, small states rely on multilateral diplomacy to pursue their foreign policies.²²¹ What these studies did was to focus on how domestic economic and political systems promote prosperity of states irrespective of size. For such studies size, may not be a determining factor of the status and role of states in the international system.

Constructivist Approaches to Small State Studies

During the 1980s, critical theorist attacked rationalist for their adherence to “scientific” studies of the world.²²² The critical theorists argued that theory should be “emancipatory” so that policy prescriptions focus on alternatives which allow actors to overcome existing power structure. It was in light of the above that Constructivism emerged as it was obvious that a gap existed between the two camps.²²³ According to A.B Phillips, Constructivists and Rationalists differ on three ontological issues:

First, constructivists are philosophical idealists rather than materialists...Second, constructivists posit mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structure...Finally, behavior through constructivist eyes is seen as essentially norm driven, with states seeking to ensure a correspondence between their own conduct and international prescriptions for legitimate behavior, that states have driven from their identities.²²⁴

²¹⁹ Alesina, Alberto. 2003. The size of countries: Does it matter? *Journal of the European Economic Association* 1, no. 2-3: 301-316.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Stringer, Kevin D. “Sovereign Liechtenstein: The Soft Power Projection of a Very Small State”. Center for Small State Studies-Institute of International Affairs, MMXIII.

²²² Phillips, Andrew Bradley. "Constructivism." In *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction*, by Martin Griffiths, 60-74. New York: Routledge, 2007.

²²³ Ibid. p.8.

²²⁴ Ibid.

These differences are reflected in their “epistemological and methodological approaches”.²²⁵ Constructivist on the one hand posits that culture and norms must be studied to understand states, rationalist on the other hand states must be “studied in like manner” without considering cultural differences. Furthermore, Rationalists on the one hand adopt “quantitative methods” while constructivists favor a flexible methodological approach that allows the use of a variety of approaches like “discourse analysis, comparative historical case studies, qualitative and quantitative content analysis” among others.²²⁶

Ian Hurd gave four features that distinguish Constructivism from others. First, “the original insight behind Constructivism is meaning is “socially constructed”...people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them”. Second, constructivist uphold that state interest is socially driven and constructed. Third, constructivists argue that there is a “mutual constitution of structures and agents...the actions of states contribute to making the institutions and norms of international life and these institutions and norms contribute to defining, socializing, and influencing states”. Finally, Constructivism posits that there are “multiple logics of anarchy”.²²⁷

Thus, in Wendt’s dictum, “an anarchy of friends differs from one of enemies”.²²⁸ Therefore, “Constructivism is a distinct approach to international relations that emphasizes the social, or intersubjective, dimension of world politics.”²²⁹ It is a recognition that international relations cannot be accounted through “material constraints” and opportunities alone neither can it be reduced to “institutional constraints” and opportunities alone.²³⁰ Hence Constructivism places emphasis on analyzing relationship between states through a social dimension.²³¹

Maria Nilans Tarp and Jens Ole Bach Hansen’s work relates to Constructivism to a large extend in their argument that small states have a huge influence in the UN which cannot to be

²²⁵ Griffiths, Martin. *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Routledge Publishers, 2007. p.63.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Hurd, Ian. "Constructivism." In *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, by Christine Reus-Smith and Duncan Snidal, 298-316. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. p.300-305.

²²⁸ Wendt, Alexander. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *The American Political Science Review* (American Political Science Association) 88, no. 2 (June, 1994): 384-396. p.388.

²²⁹ Griffiths, Martin. op. cit. p.50.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

confuse with power. They argued that small states can influence the policy process especially in non-security matters and where security is involved they become the best peacekeepers.²³² The key word for this has been provided by Alang Chong when he argued that the “soft power” of small states through diplomacy engineered in a humanitarian mission or good governance as seen in Singapore and the Vatican clearly shows that small states can use soft power to showcase their global presence. In fact, the Vatican has been able to successfully broker peace where the mighty US could not.²³³ Jeanne also observed that Ecuador has demonstrated behaviors that cannot be explained by anything other than the ideologies and preferences of the policy makers. Hey, added that the problem confronting the small states partly relates to the fact that most of the studies focus on security however this is no longer through especially after the second and cold war. Hence Realism may no longer continue to offer the best explanations.²³⁴

After a comprehensive review of the definitions of small states and the adoption of a working definition that distinguishes smallness from weakness, the work now shifts its attention to the origin of small states. This will be done by examining how small states emerged and how they have been viewed in international relations and international organizations.

Small States in the International System(s) and Organisations

Andreas Osiander argued that the theorization of international relations is constituted by the historical circumstances under which it emerged.²³⁵ Therefore, to understand the theorization of small states in the international system, their meaning(s), role and status, it is deemed necessary to accord some importance to their origin and the narratives that accompanied them. Thus, essential historical events and philosophical narratives that underpin the emergence of the small states will be analyzed in this section.

²³² Nilas Tarp, Maria, and Hansen, Jens Ole Bach. “*Size and Influence: How Small States Influence Policy Making in Multilateral Arenas*”, Working Paper 2012.

²³³ Chong, Alan. “The Foreign Policy Potential of Small State Soft Power Information Strategies”. National University of Singapore, 2 August 2007. p.1-34

²³⁴ Hey, Jeanne A.K. *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2003.

²³⁵ Osianders, Andreas. In *War, Peace and World Orders in European History*, by Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice Heuser, 14-24. London, New York: Routledge, 2001. p.14.

Although the modern state did not emerge until after the Thirty Years' War, political units existed and interacted.²³⁶ These political units whether they are called empires, kingdoms, cities and or chieftaincies were different in size and power.²³⁷ Therefore one may find in them the historical emergence of the small state. For this purpose, starting with the Greek City-states seems to be a logical endeavour. One fundamental reason for such an approach is that there is readily available documentation about the interrelationship between the Greek City-states in both peace and war time. Secondly, classical realist thinking (power and capability) in general which has a significant impact on the definition of small states has been attributed to views of Thucydides who had written about the Greek City-states.²³⁸ Therefore the following subsection focuses on perceptions and theorization of small states in the Greek City states system. But what is the city-state to be discussed?

In his categorization of states, Geoffrey Parker divided states into three categories where by the third category refers to the city-state. He defined a city-state as one that "...consists of those cities that are also themselves states and which are thus either completely independent or have secured a high measure of freedom in the transaction of their affairs."²³⁹ Records have shown that the Greek city-state had met this requirement since the "Greek *polis* never did mean just the city...From the outset it signified the city together with its surrounding territory" which happened by adjoining "smaller rural communities" to the bigger ones observed Parker.²⁴⁰ However one should bear in mind that the city-state didn't reached the status of a 'state' at the beginning; it was only at the onset of the 5th century (500 BC) that it reached a political maturity with a government worthy of being referred to as 'states'.²⁴¹ This section of the work intends not to give a long historical narrative of the Greek City-state, rather it would analyze the Melian Dialogue and provide a critique where necessary.

²³⁶ In fact, the idea that the modern state emerged after the 30 years' war is increasingly being challenged, and many authors put it at a much later date. Clomer, Joseph M. *Great Empires, Small Nations: The Uncertain Future of the Sovereign State*. London; New York, 2007. p.18.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Fregberg-Inan, Annette. *What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and its Judgement of Human Nature*. Albany. New York: State University of New York Press, 2004.

²³⁹ Parker, Geoffrey. *Sovereign City: The City-State Through History*. London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2004. p.11.

²⁴⁰ Ibid. p.32.

²⁴¹ Osianders, Andreas. op. cit.

The Peloponnesian War as narrated by Thucydides is of utmost importance for this work to understand the role and status of small states in the international system (intercity-states relations in the case of ancient Greece), because the Melian Dialogue found in the narration referred to the relationship between a ‘big’ and a ‘small state’ and how the former viewed the latter, views that have crept into modern day theorizing of small states. However, it is also important to note that ‘small state’ was not used in the dialogue; instead ‘weak’ was used to refer to Melos which was smaller.²⁴² Although, this work posits that the two are different, many authors including Thucydides have used them interchangeably.

The Greek system was made of states with different ranks and “...some were inevitably more powerful than others. The smallest...had territories of only a few square kilometers inhabited by perhaps a thousand people, while the largest covered several thousand square kilometers and housed up to a quarter of a million inhabitants.”²⁴³ Hence small and big states existed there. The dialogue is also important because it has been referred to as a basis of Realism, a dominant theory used in the study of international politics and small states.²⁴⁴

Athens had become one of the most powerful of the Greek City-states and had used that power to dominate, conquer and rule smaller territories per the narration in the Peloponnesian War. Melos, a smaller and relatively weaker city-state had been an independent state and remained neutral during the war between Athens and Sparta.²⁴⁵ However, after its war with Sparta, a more powerful and bigger Athens had great interest to extend its influence over Melos. Upon arrival at the Island of Melos, the Athenians gave the Melians an ultimatum and the discussion that ensued is referred to as the Melian Dialogue.²⁴⁶ The following is culled from Thucydides’ Book IV generally referred to as the Melian Dialogue:

For ourselves [Athenians], we shall not trouble you with specious pretences- either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking

²⁴² Thucydides. *History of the Peloponnesian War: Books I and II*. Translated by Charles Forster Smith. London: Harvard University Press, 1956.

Thucydides. *History of The Peloponnesian War*. Accessible in pdf format from <http://www.microbookstudio.com> supported by MBS Library.

²⁴³ Ibid. p.37.

²⁴⁴ Griffiths, Martin. op. cit.

²⁴⁵ Thucydides. op. cit.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

you because of wrong that you have done us- and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that *right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must* [italics are mine].²⁴⁷

The above statement (the last two lines to be precise) can be found in many realist texts. In fact, it would not be misleading to refer to it as the basis of arguments for power politics in both the international system and bilateral relations. It has also been referred to in small states studies as the basis of understanding their status and role.²⁴⁸ The last two lines imply that right belonged to states with the same size/capability as a recognized norm and the strong always prevailed over the weak. However, what has not been given due attention is the response of the Melians:

As we think, at any rate, it is expedient- we speak as we are obliged, since you enjoy us to let right alone and talk only of interest- *that you should not destroy what is our common protection, the privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right*, and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they can be got to pass current. *And you are as much interested in this as any, as your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to meditate upon* [italics are mine].²⁴⁹

However, if one agrees with Parker's observation that the city-states was characterized by 'no war – no peace' [emphasis in original],²⁵⁰ then it becomes hard to believe that the Melians would have hoped for help from the 'world' in such a system. The fact that they hoped for help suggests that the system was not barbaric as Athenians/Thucydides wanted to portray. If the dialogue is followed further, one finds that it seemed to be customary to help the weak, friends etc. This is evident when the Melians said: "But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their respect for expediency *to prevent them from betraying the Melians, their colonists, and*

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ If the arguments that small states are weak because of the international system is anarchic is a realist account, then this can be fairly regarded as the basis

²⁴⁹ Thucydides. op. cit.

²⁵⁰ Parker, Geoffrey. *Sovereign City: The City-State Through History*. London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2004. p.42.

thereby losing the confidence of their friends in Hellas and helping their enemies” [italics are mine].²⁵¹

Notwithstanding the Athenians thought that neutrality or alliance is only beneficial if a stronger power desires. Thus, when the Melians asked them to recognize their neutrality and treat them as friends, the Athenians declined arguing that if they do, others will see them as being weak.²⁵² Therefore, to show that they are a great power, they must have their wish fulfilled by force. If one just relies on Athens’ position, it appears that neutrality was not a virtue recognized, it was constantly violated and its validity was only true if a strong power desires. For small/weak states, they must adhere to the wishes of the big/strong powers to survive. The Athenians will add “the fact that you are islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the sea.”²⁵³ After their failure to convince the Melians to pay the tribute and surrender, the Athenians finally laid siege to the city and later captured the city, sold its women and children after all the adult males had been murdered.²⁵⁴

The usage of the dialogue as a starting point for analysis in international relations has found its way in both the definition and role attached to small states. For instance, Payne stated that small states are mostly acted upon by big powers.²⁵⁵ This narration and its adoption has led to the following theorization and/or hypothesis: that small states are the weak ones and by their weakness (militarily), they must obey big/stronger states to exist because their alliance with less powerful ones is just beneficial as far as a bigger power does not challenge them.²⁵⁶ Morality and right has no place in interstate relations. But how true is this? The first question that one needs to ask is whether neutrality existed during periods of conflict or not and under what circumstances it existed. Is it true that weak and/or small states could not remain neutral if they so desired? And could they pursue their foreign policy without the blessing of a bigger power?

²⁵¹ Thucydides. op. cit.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Jones, Erik. *Economic Adjustment and Political Transformations in Small States*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

²⁵⁶ Rapoport, Jacques G. "The Participation of Ministates in International Affairs." *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969)* (American Society of International Law) 62 (April 1968): 155-163.

To find answers to the above questions, other narrations about the Greek city-state must be examined. Robert Bauslaugh had stated that understanding neutrality in the classical period is difficult because most of the material that exist do not focus on the policies of nonparticipants as they were known rather it presents views that others have about the neutral state. This is further complicated by the lack of a vocabulary that suits our current diplomatic language; hence it was at the discretion of speakers to explain the status of state A/B.²⁵⁷ On his commentary on the state of Melos and its policy, he observed that when Melos referred to friendship, it meant formal diplomatic relations with other states.²⁵⁸ Thus, Melos as a state had its own foreign policy not dictated by anyone well before the war. Ancient Greece may not have had the word neutrality, but it was a policy available to states who did not want to join warring parties irrespective of their size and often this had yielded benefits for them.²⁵⁹

In his reexamination of the dialogue and the history in general, Bauslaugh is of the view that “Thucydides mentions neutral states only when their position is relevant to the military narrative of the war...the more secure and undisturbed the policy, the less frequently Thucydides mentions the state”. But this should not surprise anyone because Thucydides was interested in military narratives and his position was neutrality does not benefit anyone.²⁶⁰ On this, Hans van Wees observed that “Thucydides’ own accounts...were one sided” and it may be added that the Melian dialogue is just a book in the several books of Thucydides’ narrations.²⁶¹ Furthermore, evidence elsewhere “confirms that Greek international relations were much more complex and rather less brutal than he suggested” though there were frequent wars especially in the classical period.²⁶² In fact, In an attempt to proof that Thucydides accounts were one sided, Bauslaugh stated that there were many city-states such as Argos, Achaea, Acragas (all small city-states) who were neutral yet they didn’t suffer from their policies of not aligning to the great powers but Thucydides ignored them in his work.²⁶³ The reason for Thucydides extensive reliance on Melos is simply because it suited his proposition.

²⁵⁷ Bauslaugh, Robert, A. *The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece*. Berkeley. Los Angeles. Oxford: California University Press, 1991. p.7-9.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., p.19.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p.23-24.

²⁶¹ Wees, Hans van. "War and peace in ancient Greece." In *War, Peace and World Orders in European History*, by Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice Heuser, 33-47. London. New York: Routledge, 2001. p.31.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Bauslaugh, Robert, A. op. cit.

Perhaps one may argue that since the narration was during the war, it is obvious that small/weak states suffered most during such periods. Bauslaugh argued otherwise; war might had been constant but its customary regulation wasn't deniable and neutral states whether small or big, weak or strong had often relied on that customary regulation to prevent belligerents from using their harbours or letting troops passed on their land.²⁶⁴ There is no indication that this was a privilege that few big/strong states enjoyed. The evidence suggests that Greek states irrespective of their size enjoyed their freedoms without much encroachment from bigger cities. For Van Wees (2001), Greeks had seen themselves as the same people who could not harm one another since they were mythically from the same ancestor. Although other races could be subjugated, the enslavement or mere attack on one state especially by an outsider was considered an abomination. Therefore, it was not "...purely anarchic political system."²⁶⁵ From this, one can add that it was identity rather than size which was the main determinant of who could or could not be subjugated.

To finalize on the small state in the Greek city-state, it is important to note that the states were made of different sizes yet they "were bound together by kinship-friendship and alliances on the basis of notional equality."²⁶⁶ Wees further stated that unlike Thucydides wanted us to believe, before starting war, Greek states used all means possible to find a legitimate cause and the case of Melos might have been just an exception.²⁶⁷ Once it is recognized that "right" never belonged to the strong and there were laws that guided interactions, then it becomes evident that the small states too enjoyed their statehood, pursued their policies without a big power's blessing. In this regard, those who rely on the dialogue to define small states and their policies need to review the dialogue with other narrations.

In the above subsection, the perceived role of small states in the Greek City-state system where polis of different sizes in population and land existed has been analyzed. It has been stated that Thucydides' narration of the Peloponnesian War regarded small states as weak entities surviving at the mercy of big powers. However, this has been criticized based on other works who made use of ancient records to prove that small and weak states had their own foreign

²⁶⁴ Ibid., p.73.

²⁶⁵ Wees, Hans van. "War and Peace in Ancient Greece." op. cit. p.34.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., p.39.

policies and were not observers in the Greek City-state system. In the following subsection, the effect of the Treaty of Westphalia on small states will be traced and explained.

The Impact of Westphalia Treaty on Small States

Since the attempt is to trace the origin of the small state and the role attached to it, it becomes a necessity to trace the origin of the modern state especially if Carlsnaes' dismissal of the small state categorization as useless because all "states are sovereign" is taken into consideration. Although this researcher has argued that the small state was not trampled upon in the Greek city-state system as often portrayed, that state is different from the state of today in many ways, most importantly in its sovereignty, the modern sovereign state is said to have emerged much later.

It was those series of wars between 1618 and 1648, the Thirty Years' War which served as the most "critical development of the sovereign state..."²⁶⁸ The causes of the conflict were varied, however, it was the violation of a truce reached in 1609 that precipitated the series of wars known as the Thirty Years War.²⁶⁹ The war involved England, Spain, United Provinces, Denmark, Sweden, northern Italy, France, Germany and of course Bohemia; and it has been divided into four phases, namely "the Bohemian Revolt and Conquest of the Palatinate, 1618-23; the Danish period, 1624-9; the Swedish period 1630-4; and the French period, 1635-48" while the negotiations took place between 1644-1648. The negotiations that ensued ended the war with the Westphalia Treaty.²⁷⁰

Many scholars in the field of politics and international relations see the Treaty of Westphalia as the beginning of a new international system starting in the 17th century and continued to exist until the French Revolution. For instance, Barry Buzan and Richard Little wrote that it is debatable whether the treaty and its essence for the territorial sovereign state had been exaggerated by political scientists or not but there is no doubt that "the treaties of Westphalia mark one of the key stages in this".²⁷¹ Similarly, Anja argued that its outcome has

²⁶⁸ Cooper, J.P. *The New Cambridge Modern History: The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years War, 1609-48/59*. Vol. IV. London: Cambridge University Press, 1971. p.306.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Buzan, Barry, and Richard Little. "Beyond Westphalia? Capitalism after the 'Fall'." *Review of International Studies* 25 (December 1999): 89-104.

been largely regarded as one of the most important events that laid the foundation of the modern state. Even if the state system is not an immediate result of the changes brought by the Westphalia treaties, there is no doubt that it altered the Holy Empire and led to the sovereignty of states added Anja.²⁷² Richard Mansbach too argued that the treaty of Westphalia was the most “...critical moment...for the development of the sovereign state...”²⁷³

However, Jeremy Larkins disagreed and dismissed the importance attached to Westphalia. He referred to the importance attached to the treaties as the “Westphalia myth”, arguing that realist authors and biased European scholars are guilty of catapulting this thought into modern international thought.²⁷⁴ Larkins added that the Roman Empire did not lose its status and even continued to exist well after 1648 while many territories and city states in medieval Italy enjoyed what could be referred to as territorial sovereignty well before the treaty of Westphalia.²⁷⁵

Buzan on the other hand offered an argument for the importance attached to Westphalia when he stated “the Westphalia state differed in two substantial ways from both the very diverse primary units of the medieval world...First the Westphalia state had hard and precisely defined boundaries, and second, it consolidated into a single centre all the powers of self-government.”²⁷⁶ For Richard Mansbach, “each gained the right to govern his own territory and make independent decisions about war and peace”.²⁷⁷ In this way, Europe’s states acquired sovereignty even if it meant sovereignty in a limited sense. While this work has no interest in settling this debate, it is interested in both the process and results of the negotiations in relation to small states. Article LXIV of the treaty stated:

In the Politick State, all and every one of the Electors, Princes and States of the Roman Empire, are so establish'd and confirm'd in their antient Rights, Prerogatives, Libertys, Privileges, free exercise of Territorial Right...by virtue of this present Transaction: that

²⁷² Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice Heuser. *War, Peace and World Orders in European History*, London. New York: Routledge, 2001.

²⁷³ Mansbach, Richard W., and Kirsten L. Rafferty. *Introduction to Global Politics*. New York: Routledge, 2008. p63

²⁷⁴ Larkins, Jeremy. *From Hierarchy to Anarchy: Territory and Politics before Westphalia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Buzan, Barry, and Little, Richard. op. cit.

²⁷⁷ Mansbach, Richard W., and Kirsten L. Rafferty. op. cit.

they never can or ought to be molested therein by any whomsoever upon any manner of pretence.²⁷⁸

Legally, since the states were given territorial rights, this must be understood to mean both internal and external sovereignty. Article LXV may be understood to have given the states internal sovereignty to impose taxes, raise armies, make and interpret laws while for external sovereignty it gave them the power to enter alliances and treaties with other states. Thus “Westphalia states constructed a diplomacy based on mutual acceptance of each other as legal equals, a practice in sharp contrast to the norm of unequal relations that prevailed in both classical and medieval international system.”²⁷⁹ Therefore, it can be assumed that legally and diplomatically all states became equal.

Furthermore, the process that led to the outcome had some significance for small states. In the discussions that ensued, each state sought to address its plight amicably and it is clear from the treaty that princes or queens who wielded less power and smaller territories had their wishes respected. While some were compensated financially, others whose territories were seized got it back through the treaties. Thus, during the negotiations and afterwards, most if not all states were treated as equals. Mansbach and Rafferty summed this aptly: “It played an important role in the development of international law *between* [in original] rather than *above* [italics in original] states [irrespective of size].”²⁸⁰ At this point, one may add that Thucydides conception that the weak always followed the desire of big powers do not hold true in the lead to and during the war which led to the adoption of the Westphalia Treaty.

Although Bohemia’s right was violated, it fought a war and lost but in the treaty which emerged, it gained all it had wanted; the freedom to worship and govern its affairs. If as realist claims that political reality is always the same, then this case was an exception. In fact, the war was not one of power politics, it was a war about identity to a large extend. “Obviously patterns of identity and issues of mentality played an important role in the thirty years war. The people as well as soldiers, officers, diplomats, rulers and statesmen all repeatedly referred to different

²⁷⁸ I have maintained the original spellings without alteration as provided in the Yale University Translation

²⁷⁹ Buzan, Barry, and Little, Richard. op. cit.

²⁸⁰ Mansbach, Richard W., and Kirsten L. Rafferty. op. cit. p.69.

schemes of identity to justify their conduct in war.”²⁸¹ Therefore it was not size that made a state to suffer but religious identity. If this is recognized, then one can conclude that it was not size and power that determined one’s status rather identity was the determining factor leading to the war.

Regarding the small states, Heinz Duchhardt’s observation in the post war era is worth noting; “the rationalization of interstate relations...increased the chances of survival for polities, as the annexation of less powerful polity by one more powerful would have provoked immediate reaction.”²⁸² Many realist²⁸³ strands of thought would see this because of the need for balance of power but Heinz disagreed:

Such attempt had to face the lofty hurdle of diplomatic interactions between states [in particular the smaller ones]. In fact, no one questioned the right of any state to exist “regardless of whether it met the standards typical of the period or whether it was able to protect itself. The ‘world order’...was based on the conviction that a state order-similar to a social order-was...something harmonious and natural, and not to be jeopardized lightly.”²⁸⁴

Clearly size was not important in the lead to the war and the treaties brought formal recognition of all states as equal but by the 18th century this begun to change as “a small number of great powers (pentarchy), operating as a form of a ‘cartel’, determined and controlled changes in state structure, and increasing became the driving forces in interstate dynamics.”²⁸⁵ This resulted from the Vienna Congress and the Concert System in Europe. Since the concert of Europe was for and by European states,²⁸⁶ much would not be said about it here. However, it is

²⁸¹ Hartmann, Anja V., and Beatrice Heuser. *War, Peace and World Orders in European History*. London. New York: Routledge, 2001. p.189.

²⁸² Duchhardt, Heinz. "Interstate war and peace in Early Modern Europe." In *War, Peace and Orders in European History*, by Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice Heuser, 185-196. London and New York:

²⁸³ I have referred to studies that emphasize power politics in small states studies as realist strands of thought. Refer to the section on definitions.

²⁸⁴ Duchhardt, Heinz. op. cit. p.189.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., p.193.

²⁸⁶ For more about the Concert, see: Alcock, Antony. *A Short History of Europe: From the Greeks and Romans to the Present Day*. 2. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Clark, Ian. *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

enough to state that the congress system ended unilateral decisions of the Napoleonic Era and laid the foundation for multilateralism among European states.²⁸⁷

However, "...concert diplomacy actively cultivated the conception of the great powers as a unique and special peer group...The great powers retained the exclusive prerogative of decision making."²⁸⁸ But a word of caution is necessary because the concert was a European system. It must be noted that the present international system is quite different from the 19th century European system. In Elrod's narration, one sees something of essence, although he notes that it was power politics, powerful nations often restricted their desires to conform to the standards that were established.²⁸⁹

In the above subsection, the impact of the treaties of Westphalia has been detailed. The literature shows that the war was not an issue of power but identity. Consequently, it led to the formal recognition of all states as equal. However, the concert of Europe which gave so much privilege to strong states was a violation of the principles that had been laid down by Westphalia system. The following subsection will focus on small states in the League of Nation.

Small States and the League of Nations

With the collapse of the congress system, the first modern international organization, the League of Nations emerged in 1914 after the First World War. The foundation of the League of Nation made it first of its kind in both scope and mode of operation.²⁹⁰ The Annex of the Covenant adopted at the Paris Peace Conference listed 45 states as the original members but in the first General Assembly held in Geneva in 1920 it had 42 countries in attendance as US, China and Ecuador did not join.²⁹¹ The League is regarded as an international organization because in 1927, 49% were European states while the rest of the states were from different

²⁸⁷ Richard B. Elrod uses the term in his paper "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System" p.161.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., p.167.

²⁸⁹ Elrod, Richard B. op. cit. p.170.

²⁹⁰ Rappard, William E. "The Evolution of the League of Nations." *The American Political Science Review* (American Political Science Association) 21, no. 4 (November 1927): 792-826.

²⁹¹ Ibid., p.794.

At the time, Rappard argued that the greatest danger to the League of Nations was America's refusal to join the organization.

regions of the world.²⁹² The League had a Council and the General Assembly, the former being the most powerful body of the organization. It is deemed important to review the status and role of the different categories of states in the first international organization to understand the status and role of small states.

A year before the League came into existence, three small states, San Marino, Monaco and Liechtenstein had applied for membership admission to the League but San Marina and Monaco withdrew their applications and only Liechtenstein continued with its application.²⁹³ The observation of the *Admissions Commission* was that although Liechtenstein was juridically sovereign, “by reason of her limited area, small population, and her geographical position, she has chosen to depute to others some of the attributes of sovereignty”.²⁹⁴ Gunter upheld that it was not admitted because of its small size and this is evident in the recommendation.²⁹⁵ In its recommendation after rejecting the application, the Commission stated that the League must decide its relationship with such “small states” that could not be admitted due to their size.²⁹⁶ Notwithstanding Liechtenstein is the only entity of its size that applied for admission.

While Liechtenstein’s application was rejected, the statesmen at the time came with different proposals as to how the organization would function and these ideas are of great interest to anyone who wish to understand small states in the League of Nations. General Smut proposed that there should be permanent members made up by “the great powers” and “four additional members” two from “important intermediate powers below the rank of Great powers” and two from “all the minor state.”²⁹⁷ One thing to note from Smut’s statement is a hierarchy of states, namely Great Powers who must be the permanent members, Intermediate Powers and then Small States. Lord Robert Cecil of Great Britain on the other hand called for a yearly meeting of the Great Powers. Also, the American delegates’ draft received by the League’s Commission stated

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Gunter, Michael M. "Liechtenstein and the League of Nations: A Precedent for the United Nation's MinistateProblem?" *The American Journal of International Law* (American Society of International Law) 68, no. 3 (1974): 496-501.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., p.499.

²⁹⁷ Rappard, William E. "The Evolution of the League of Nations." op. cit. p.1927.

that everything within the League shall be considered to affect the Great Powers namely France, US, Great Britain, Italy and Japan.²⁹⁸

Therefore, what is evident here is the proposals made, recognized that at least two categories of states existed, great and small states but the former ought to be the main player. In the original draft of 1919, the Council was to be constituted by the five Principal Allies only.²⁹⁹ Arthur K. Kuhn who wrote about the League of Nations barely after it came into existence argued that since the World War was fought to save two small states who had been wronged, small states should be empowered and given a greater role among the great powers. For him, this could be done by grouping the small states into panels where seats will be rotationally held in order to address their underrepresentation in the Council without altering the covenant in itself.³⁰⁰

However, through the efforts of small states like Argentina who asked for the distinction between great and small to be squashed so that Council seats would be competed based on voting, it was agreed that small states would have two representatives which was increased to four (Belgium, Brazil, Greece, and Spain) who would be chosen by all members. Thus, the Permanent members (great powers) had a majority by one but became the minority by four after the Council was enlarged to accommodate more small states in 1926.³⁰¹ This shows a struggle for representation between small states and great powers in the Council which was understood to be the most powerful arm of the organization. Subsequently small and middle powers had a majority in the Council. In his assessment of this increase, Rappard, argued that it was due to the work of “men of exceptional courage and ability” and the help of great powers.³⁰² In simple terms a small state must align with a great power to succeed. But in 1926, Brazil and Spain informed the League of their intention to withdraw from the organization in protest which shows that small states do show defiance in organizations.³⁰³

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., p.550

³⁰⁰ Kuhn, Arthur K. "Proportional Representation in the League of Nations ." *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York* (The Academy of Political Science) 8, no. 3 (July 1919): 41-45.

³⁰¹ Rappard, William E. op. cit. p.1927

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Rappard, William E. op. cit.

Rappard was very cautious about the small states in the council as can be adduced from his argument that the Council could only function if great powers held what he called “real power”.³⁰⁴ Elsewhere he rightly argued that belligerency and neutrality are not specific criterion of small states, but he went on to state that small states are seen as such because they were not “militarily dominant” in the 19th and 20th century. In light of this he deemed Spain, Poland, India, Australia, Canada, Sweden, Holland, Luxembourg, Albania, Belgium, Hungary, Denmark, Switzerland, Liberia and Panama as “small members of the League”. Perhaps to escape the definitional problem of small states, he concluded that small states were the nonpermanent members of the League and that was the only commonality that they shared.³⁰⁵

It can be understood from this that small states do often challenge great powers when they feel that they are not being represented. But Rappard argued, small states as militarily weak states ceded their theoretical equality to the organisation due to three main factors namely; its interest in global law and order, its influence through the league and its leadership in international commissions. By joining the League, they became the “mediators, arbitrators and conciliators”.³⁰⁶ For him, small states had one of two options. The first was to challenge the great power dominance which would allow the League to fail as the great powers would withdraw. The second option was to simply allow the great powers to dominate the League and they the small states be observers.³⁰⁷ Although this is true to some extent, it is false to assume that small states that joined the League completely ceded their sovereignty to the big states. Their resistance was so much successful that Lord Robert Cecil remarked that the call for equality is “...incompatible with the conception of a League of Nations.”³⁰⁸

Although the small states successfully fought for equal representation in the Council, they faced many problems in other fields or played a minimal role. This is true in the field of disarmament where small states recognized that they had a limited role in it and it was up to the great powers to abide by the rules.³⁰⁹ But one should be wary about taking small states as a

³⁰⁴ Ibid., p.802.

³⁰⁵ Rappard, William E. "Small States in the League of Nations." *Political Science Quarterly* (The Academy of Political Science) 49, no. 4 (December 1934): 544-575.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., p.568.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., p.553.

³⁰⁹ Ibid. p.568.

whole since they did not have a common policy that distinguished them from the great powers other than their “general conception of the League itself.”³¹⁰ For Eduard Benes the main failure of the League was that the great powers of Europe often failed to subordinate their policies to the rules of the organization against their internal policies. But one should not see this as a character of great powers only. When Brazil thought that the status/role it was to play does not suit its domestic image, it withdrew from the League. Benes added that the League had found it difficult to accommodate the relationship between the “Great Powers with small or medium sized Powers...”³¹¹ as Great powers resent being subjected to votes of small countries while the latter also did not want to be under the control of big countries with aggressive policies.

After the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy, Colonel Power of the Committee for Imperial Defense declared “People who rely on them [article 10 and 16] for safety will be let down as Abyssinia...Thus the small nations are...saying...We know pretty well where we stand...”. Thus, it became evident that the organization could not provide security to small states and by 1936, “small states looked elsewhere for security” as neutrals in the case of Belgium.³¹² Beck’s narration is that the failure of the League can be reduced to one fact, that it failed to provide security to small states hence all of them decided to seek it elsewhere. However, the failure of the League cannot be reduced to small and big power relations. At the time of its invasion of Ethiopia, Italy was the weakest great power in the organization. Italy relied on the technicality of the Covenant of the League to pursue its goals rather than its power.³¹³ The importance of discourse is evident here.

When pressed about its goal in Ethiopia, Italy argued that “an undeclared war in the material sense was no war therefore such used of armed force did not constitute a resort to war”.³¹⁴ Leland is of the view that the League was so much concern with peace settlement that it could not enforce the peace.³¹⁵ This is evident when Article 2 of the Covenant is observed with

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Beneš, Eduard. "The League of Nations: Successes and Failures." *Foreign Affairs* (Council on Foreign Relations) 11, no. 1 (October 1932): 66-80. p75.

³¹² Beck, Peter J. "The League of Nations and the Great Powers, 1936-1940." *World Affairs* (SagePublications, Inc.) 157, no. 4, Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations: PartOne (Spring1995): 175-189.p175

³¹³ Goodrich, Leland M. "From League of Nations to United Nations." *International Organization* (University of Wisconsin Press) 11 (February 1947): 3-21.

³¹⁴ Ibid., p.10.

³¹⁵ Ibid., p.6.

the Council's practice. In law, all states were equal and decision in the Council was based on unanimity, thus without any power's consent, action could not be taken. Japanese incursion in Manchuria, Italian occupation of Abyssinia are cases that arose from the above factor.³¹⁶ On 1st August 1946, the properties and assets of the League of Nations were finally transferred to the United Nations Organization in Geneva thus formally bringing an end to the first modern international organization.³¹⁷

This subsection has made a thorough review of small states and the perception that accompanied them in the League of Nations. The following subsection will focus on small states in the UN.

Small States in the United Nations

In 1945, Kaeckenbeeck wrote that discussing the role of small and great powers in international organizations is a difficult task as no world order existed; the existing system was one of power politics "which in itself contains no principle of organization."³¹⁸ However there is a functioning world order now. Kaeckenbeeck like his predecessors who wrote about small states in the League envisaged a privileged role for the great powers in the maintenance of peace and order because they were the only ones with the technology, capacity, financial resources to prevent the spread of conflicts and end them.³¹⁹

However, that has been falsified by the leading role of Nordic states in peacekeeping and conflict prevention. Regarding the small states, Kaeckenbeeck thought that they were "of necessity lovers of the law, which is rightly considered the friend of the weak. Insufficient unto themselves in many economic respects, they will easily become cooperative and appreciative of a fair lead."³²⁰ In this manner, he expected them to be cooperative in the organization about to emerge. This was written at a time, when power was at the fore front of global politics.

³¹⁶ Ibid., p.9.

³¹⁷ Ibid., p.3.

³¹⁸ Kaeckenbeeck, Georges. "The Function of Great and Small Powers in the International Organization." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* (Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs) 21, no. 3 (July 1945): 306-312.

³¹⁹ Ibid., p.306.

³²⁰ Ibid., p.307.

The United Nations has played a very important role in the emergence of many small states as it offered to guarantee them the right to sovereignty and to take part in international affairs. For example, Resolution 1514 of the General Assembly (15 December 1960) recognized the right to independence of all peoples irrespective of “inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness.”³²¹ However, in 1965, the then secretary general of the UN noted that the emergence of very small states raised questions as “their limited size and resources can pose a difficult problem as to the role they should try to play in international life.”³²² In fact, Rappard was very pessimistic that mini-states would sought to join the UN and therefore he called for people not to worry about them.³²³ However, all small states had join the UN. The Gambia with a population of 365000 (1965 estimates) became a member in 1965 as one of the smallest countries.

To understand the behavior of small states in the UN, Harbert conducted a study to understand their voting behavior. His study found that mini-states voted similarly on “colonial and economic” issues while voting differently on socio-cultural and humanitarian issues. On colonial issues, they voted similarly with USSR while they voted similarly with US and colonial powers on socio-cultural and humanitarian issues. On political issues, they differed so much that they could not be regarded as a “bloc” or “client” of super powers. Their voting followed “African, Asian grouping in the UN” which shows that their voting pattern may have been determined by their geography and cultural history than their size. He observed that “the existence of shifting alignments and majorities in different sect, issue-areas underscores the sophistication and relative independence from large power pressure of mini-states voting in the UN.”³²⁴ From the above it is clear that small states are not dictated by big or great powers, neither does the organization serves the interest of big or great powers alone.

Harbert argued that the small states have affected the operation of the UN and this is more evident in the General Assembly where all states are equal. In fact, the small states’

³²¹ Rappard, William E. "Small States in the League of Nations." op. cit.

³²² Ibid., p.159.

³²³ Ibid., p.161.

³²⁴ Harbert, Joseph R. "The Behavior of the Ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972." *International Organization* (University of Wisconsin Press) 30, no. 1 (Winter, 1976): 109-127.

contribution has increased and changed the core areas of concern in the UN.³²⁵ However, he found that (1) the average size of the permanent mission for ministries was 3.3 compared to 9.2 for all other member states (2) the mini-states were better represented at the assembly than in the mission. In 1971-1972 roll call of “votes on whole resolutions”, the Gambia recorded extremely high rates of absence (60.2%).³²⁶ There is no shortage of small states in the United Nations. At least 100 countries of the member states belonged to Forum of Small States, a global coalition of small states headed by Singapore.³²⁷

The end of the cold war on the other hand has provided the nonpermanent states of the UN with new opportunities to solve global security problems.³²⁸ Small states in the Security Council and as general members of the UN are playing a leading role in peacekeeping operations. While wealthy small nations continue to be great financial and material contributors to peacekeeping operations, poor small states continue to provide man power for such operations. Moreover, with the emergence of new nonmilitary issues such as climate change, food insecurity, human trafficking and human rights issues, small states have emerged as norm entrepreneurs in advocating and providing solutions to these global crises.³²⁹

This section has reviewed major works which relates to small states and international organization. It has been argued that Thucydides is responsible for catapulting a negative view of small states in interstate relations although much of his assumptions have been found to be one sided and exaggerated. Also, it has been argued that the Treaty of Westphalia has accorded formal equality to all states including small states in law and practice. Furthermore, small states

³²⁵ His studied covered 23 states including the Gambia, which had 375000 at the time (p111). It was the voting behavior of these countries in the 26th and 27th assemblies that he studied. According to him, studying voting behavior is important because "if one views resolutions as the ultimate output of the Un political process then each nation's vote is its final instrument of influence within the system and is therefore quite important" (p.111). However, studying voting outcome behavior alone could be very limited because it reveals the final point of the political process and tells us little about the process, thus it may not reflect the real issues. Therefore, to supplement this limitation, he also focused on the "size of delegation and permanent missions....and absenteeism from voting". This is because nations with large delegations could easily participate in the seven main committees (p.113). (Harbert, Joseph R. "The Behavior of the Ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972." *International Organization* (University of Wisconsin Press) 30, no. 1 (Winter, 1976): 109-127.)

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ The United Nations Security Council: Options for Small States Reykjavik, Iceland 16 June 2008 Colin Keating: Executive Director, Security Council Report, New York.

³²⁸ Balik, Peter. Role of Small States in International Organizations: The Case Of Slovakia In The United Nations Security Council. Central European University, Budapest Hungary 2008, Masters Thesis Department of Political Science.

³²⁹ Ibid.

in the League of Nations have been discussed regarding what role great powers wanted them to play and how this was challenged by small states. Finally, the role of small states in the UN has been discussed at length. This section was meant to review the role attached to small states especially in international organizations so that a better understanding of small states can be gain.

This chapter has made an extensive review of the different definitions of small states. It has also made a thorough review of the history of the small states and their perceived role in different systems and organizations. The chapter proceeded to review the different approaches used in studying small states. The chapter ended with a brief review of the literature on The Gambia's foreign policy. In this review, it has been argued that weaknesses and smallness are two different things and smallness in size does not necessarily lead to weakness. Although many authors used the two, there is need to separate the two. Furthermore, it was argued that the negative view attached to small states have originated from Thucydides although there is evidence that countered his views. According to literature review here, the minimal role attached to small states emerged from the Concert of Europe. The chapter has ended with a section on the literature on Gambia's foreign policy. From the available literature, there is a huge gap to be filled in order to better comprehend The Gambia's foreign policy especially on the role of norms, ideas etc. The next chapter will focus on the theoretical framework and the methodology for this work.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

This chapter outlines the research method selected, from its conception to operationalization. The data collection, processing and reporting of the results are clearly stated. Also clarified is the inherent assumptions that informed the methods selected and how philosophy in the social sciences affected this choice. The chapter begins with a brief problem statement, aims, significance and scope of the research. It goes on to provide a clarification of method and methodology and proceeds to outline how the researcher's philosophy informed the method and methodology. The chapter further details the selection of the sources of data and how the analysis of the data will be done. The final subsection deals with the validity of the research, ethical considerations and the limitations of the research.

Problem Statement

The research problem has been explained in detail in the first chapter, hence a brief statement of the research problem is given here. Small states have been mainly seen as observers or being acted upon by big states or great powers in the international system because they have been studied through realist and liberalist lenses. Although recent studies have used Constructivism to study small states, most of those studies focused on small, rich Scandinavian or Gulf states.³³⁰ Therefore, the foreign policies of small, poor countries have not been included in those studies. This is manifested in the Gambia's case whose foreign policy does not attract much attention and when it does it is done through realist and liberalist lens.

Therefore, there is a huge gap in the literature on the Gambia's foreign policy especially in the role that non-material factors play in its policy.³³¹ The primary aim of this research is to fill the gap in the literature on the Gambia's foreign policy by studying its foreign policy through a constructivist perspective.

Significance and Scope

This research has at least two main significance. First, it fills the gap that exists in the literature on The Gambia's foreign policy. Second, it has made a significant contribution to the

³³⁰ See the chapter on literature review for more details or the introduction for a summary

³³¹ More details on the review on the Gambia at the Literature Review Chapter

literature for both small states' foreign policy and constructivist perspectives on The Gambia's foreign policy.

This is important for both academics and policy makers and experts. For students and academics alike, it provides a source of information on The Gambia's major foreign policy choices with its main partners for the period under study. Also, it will add to the understanding of students about the role that nonmaterial factors played in foreign policy decisions. It will serve the same purpose for policy makers and experts. It also opens and lays a foundation for the study of the role of non-material factors in the Gambia's foreign policy through discourse analysis.

It is important to note that this is not a chronology of all events related to the Gambia's foreign policy, nor does it seek to address all the policy issues that the country faced. It is a study limited to the period 1990-2016 and its main aim is to focus on nonmaterial factors.

Method and Methodology

While method and methodology are sometimes used interchangeably, the two are quite different. Methods are the specific techniques for obtaining the data that will be used to provide evidence based knowledge while methodology refers to all the methods used in the research and the rationale for their selection, hence the methodology constitutes the method.³³² This can be related to ontology and epistemology. While ontology is about "the existence of a real and objective world", epistemology is "the possibility of knowing this world and the forms this knowledge would take."³³³ The methodology begins at the conception of the research and extends to the evaluation of research findings.

Making the methodology clear is important because it clarifies all the stages of the research at practical and philosophical levels. It also provides information to those who may be interested about the rationale of the research choices and how those choices were implemented. This also helps to give an idea about the philosophical strengths and limits of the approaches and techniques used in all stages of the research. Furthermore, it helps the researcher to be aware of how beliefs and perceptions have the potential to affect the whole research process.³³⁴ Thus,

³³² Kothari, C.R. *Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques*. Jaipur: New Age International Publishers, 1990.

³³³ Porta, Donatella della, and Michael Keating. *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University press, 2008. p.21.

³³⁴ Strauss, Anselm. *Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

reflexivity is required so that the researcher will be “critically conscious through personal accounting of how...location...position, and interests influence all stages of the research process.”³³⁵ Wellington et al also has stated that a researcher’s discipline, interests and beliefs affects the method and methodology chosen, hence it is important to make his or her position clear at the onset of the research.³³⁶

Considering the above, the position of the researcher is hereby made explicit. The research strategy is informed by a philosophical tradition, ontology and epistemology. Whether stated or not all researches are embedded within an ontology and epistemology.³³⁷ Ontologically, this researcher upholds that reality is socially constructed. The world which is characterized by interactions between persons and groups create institutions and these institutions also interact among themselves. This is the reality of the social world.³³⁸ Therefore, any understanding of it requires an understanding of the non-material forces such as beliefs, norms, identity and culture which make people to act in certain ways. This philosophy informs social Constructivism.

As clarified in the theoretical framework, Constructivism is not a theory of international relations alone but a paradigm about how to view the world that fits in almost all fields.³³⁹ However, when used in international relations or policy analysis, it means that beliefs, ideas, ideologies, and perceptions of actors or agents impact, influence and could determine the choices they make. This is in sharp contrast to other paradigms like Realism which sees the world as separate from individual beliefs, perceptions and culture. Yet it is also in contrasts to Neoliberalism which accepts human nature but contends that knowing that through cooperation states can survive, they should cooperate.³⁴⁰ Constructivism often referred to as the middle ground, argues that the calculations for the maximization of power or survival and the relative

³³⁵ Pillow, Wanda. "Confession, Catharsis, or Cure? Rethinking the Uses of Reflexivity as Methodological Power in Quantitative Research." *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education* 16, no. 2 (2003): 175–196.

³³⁶ Wellington, Jerry, Ann-Marie Bathmaker, Cheryl Hunt, Gary McCulloch, and Pat Sikes. *Succeeding with Your Doctorate*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2005. p.97.

³³⁷ Lamont, Christopher. *Research Methods in International Relations*. London: SAGE Publications, 2015. p19

³³⁸ Neuman, W. Lawrence. *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. 7. Edinburg: Pearson Education Limited, 2014.

³³⁹ Kratochwil, Friedrich. "Constructivism: What It Is (not) and How It Matters." In *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Approach*, by Michael Keating and Donatella Della Porta, 80-98. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

³⁴⁰ Lamont, Christopher. op. cit.

gains postulated by neoliberalist all depend on the beliefs, ideas, identity and culture of the decision makers.³⁴¹

Therefore, one must interpret the policies of states through their ideas, ideologies, identity, norms, beliefs and culture to understand their policies rather than adopting a uniformed model of human nature, or system analysis. This is the interpretive paradigm which is in sharp contrast to positivism which advocates that a scientific objective knowledge exists out there and it must be sought through scientific means of testing hypothesis or causal laws.³⁴² In line with the interpretive paradigm, this researcher maintains that human beings are not objects that can be taken in a lab and analyzed. Thus, their actions cannot be measured as objects in the physical sciences. They must be studied in their social settings. Interpretivism thus means that the knowledge generated from social research is one that depicts a social reality informed by the subject's belief system and that of the researcher.³⁴³ Therefore, in the context of this research, the researcher seeks to understand what the policy makers and actors think and belief from their speeches and documents. Thus, all results found by this study emanates from interpretation of the words and actions of the actors. This philosophy of interpretivism is suited to this research since the aim is to understand the role of ideas, beliefs, identity, culture in Gambia's foreign policy.

This study lays a foundation for such an approach to the Gambia's foreign policy analysis and offer a better understanding about foreign policy. Nonetheless, the philosophical tradition has a limitation. The results generated are subjective because they are based on social meanings derived from the data (discourse). They come from a cultural setting and a specific time. Thus, the knowledge generated here may differ from other cases. Considering the above, the philosophical tradition is limited and its results cannot be generalized. Nevertheless, the same strategy may be replicated elsewhere. It is important to make the positionality explicit because absolute neutrality does not exist in social research.³⁴⁴ The following subsection explains the rationale of the chosen research strategy.

³⁴¹ Hurd, Ian. "Constructivism." In *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, by Christine Reus-Smith and Duncan Snidal, 298-316. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

³⁴² Lamont, Christopher. op. cit. p.18.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Brian, Bourke. "Positionality: Reflecting on the Research Process." *The Qualitative Report* 19, no. 33 (2014): 1-9.

Choice of Research Strategy

As there are multiple research strategies available, it is up to the researcher to select one or a combination of approaches that are well suited to his or her philosophy, the case at hand and in consideration of time and resources.³⁴⁵ Broadly speaking, research methods are divided into two: qualitative and quantitative research approach and the two can be distinguished on either a focus on numerical or non-numerical data argued Earl Babbie.³⁴⁶ However, this distinction can be very blurred because a research that uses numerical data can report the findings in narrative style while nonnumerical data can be processed in numerical data. If the strategy as whole from the conception to the operationalization tends to favor one approach, it becomes identified to that approach, notwithstanding, a combination of both is acceptable stated Neuman.³⁴⁷ Henninke made a further clarification, that a distinction can be made based on the role of theory, the epistemological and ontological leanings. Quantitative approaches favor theory testing while qualitative approaches emphasize theory building. Furthermore, qualitative researches favor interpretivism while quantitative research values positivism.³⁴⁸ Considering the above, this research being informed by Constructivism and interpretivism, is a qualitative research ontologically and epistemologically.

In this research, the case study is chosen as the research design. The case study is defined by Bruce Lawrence as methods that “involve systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how it operates or functions.”³⁴⁹ One thing to clarify is that a case study is not a technique for gathering data, but constitutes many techniques mainly focusing on what to study.³⁵⁰ The case deals with what is to be studied and not how it is to be studied. Thus, a case study focuses on the nature of a case, its historical background, how it is interrelated with other cases and the context in which it took place. It is for this reason that cases are applauded for providing rich detailed explanation of phenomena.

³⁴⁵ Lamont, Christopher. *Research Methods in International Relations*. op. cit. p.21.

³⁴⁶ Babbie, Earl. *The Basics of Social Research*. 6. Wadsworth, Cengage Learning. Boston: Cengage Learning, 2011.

³⁴⁷ Neuman, W. Lawrence. *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. op. cit.

³⁴⁸ Hennink, Monique, Inge Hutter, and Ajay Bailey. *Qualitative Research Methods*. 1. London: SAGE, 2011.

³⁴⁹ Berg, Bruce L. *Qualitative Method for the Social Sciences*. 4. Boston: Pearson Education Company, 2001.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.225.

Therefore, in adopting a case study design to the Gambia's foreign policy, it is expected that this will allow for a detailed analysis and explanation of the country's foreign policy by looking at its discourse in international organisations. Although the case study design has been criticized for representing the meanings attached to the study by researchers, researchers have adopted process tracing as a control mechanism to test alternative interpretation of phenomena and adopting the most suitable one. In both the data collection and analysis, the research makes use of qualitative techniques. The research relies on written documents and speeches to collect data and make analysis. The study of the documents provides for the study of the materials in their original form and helps in understanding perceptions and beliefs of actors.³⁵¹

Case Selection

When one conducts a purposive sampling to observe units, it is done in consideration of the main questions that he or she seeks to answer.³⁵² Therefore, to answer the questions, one needs data that is responsive to the questions. Hence the sites selection is done in consideration of the main research questions. Considering the significant changes in the international system after the post-Cold War period especially in the number and type of actors, this study focuses on the Gambia's relations with intergovernmental organizations. Thus, the Gambia's foreign policy of EU, ECOWAS, AU and UN has been selected. Unlike Finnemore's approach in his book "*National Interest in International Society*" which wholly concentrated on how norms of non-state actors became part of the policy of states,³⁵³ this study seeks to find out whether states challenge norms and seek to bring new ones to organizations they deal with. Thus, for this study, norms and identities at both international level and domestic level are important.

The organizations have been purposely selected because of their relationship and the unanswered questions that arise during their relationships with the Gambia. The selection of organizations represented regional and economic and cultural differences. This criterion will allow the study of policy at different levels sub regional, continental and universal.

³⁵¹ Berg, Bruce L. op. cit.

³⁵² Babbie, Earl. op. cit.

³⁵³ Finnemore, Martha. *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996.

Sampling

Sampling is choosing a part of a whole for study in a research. Earl Babbie simplified it as the selection of “observations”.³⁵⁴ Since there are hundreds, maybe thousands of speeches and documents about foreign policy and countless government representatives in different capacities, it is important to clearly state whose speeches and what speeches will be analyzed. Generally, there are two main sampling techniques which are probability and nonprobability sampling.³⁵⁵ Probability sampling relies on statistical information and is depended on a selection of a part of a population or event, or subject that will be representative of the whole. This is usually done for the findings to be generalizable.³⁵⁶ Nonprobability sampling on the other hand, is usually done based on the judgement of the researcher about the best sources that could provide the needed response without regard to the generalizability of the findings.³⁵⁷

In this case study, a list of all the statements, documents, speeches, interviews, and joint communiques of the government of the Gambia on foreign policy from 1990 to 2016 from where a sampling frame for probability sampling techniques could be drawn does not exist. Therefore, nonprobability sampling is the most appropriate sampling technique for this research.³⁵⁸ The advantage of the approach is that it focuses on units that can provide the needed information rather than randomly select cases that may not contain the needed information. Creswell has warned that such kind of studies must not be used for generalizations, however if detailed analysis is made they can be used to elucidate new findings.³⁵⁹

For this research, speeches, statements and interviews of government representatives from the head of state(s) to the ministers were part of the documents analyzed. The only criteria used for determining the limit for collecting data was the “saturation point”. The saturation point is when no new patterns are emerging and all the data shows the same results as the previously analyzed ones.³⁶⁰ At this point one is advised to stop going after new documents for analysis. It is difficult to precisely state how many documents or interviews are necessary to reach the

³⁵⁴ Babbie, Earl. op. cit.

³⁵⁵ Kothari, C.R. *Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques*. op. cit.

³⁵⁶ Babbie, Earl. op. cit.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Bryman, Alan. *Social Research Methods*. London: Oxford University Press, 2008.

³⁵⁹ Creswell, John W. *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. Los Angeles. London. New Delhi. Singapore: SAGE Publications, 2009.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

saturation point and the number can vary from different cases but Wellington recommended between 12-25 interviews or documents.³⁶¹ Notwithstanding, this researcher has analyzed a total of 79 interviews, statements, press release, policy documents, joint communiques, etc mainly from the government of the Gambia, through its official website or newspapers and the official sites of the UN amongst others after which it was concluded that the saturation point was reached as new findings were not being made.

Data Collection and Recording

Creswell has identified four main types of data collection,³⁶² two of which will be used here. These are data from documents and audio/visual materials. Since this research heavily relies on a theoretical approach, its main source of data comes from this secondary data. The data is collected from newspapers, policy documents, speeches and statements on foreign policy of the Gambia from 1990-2016. The Daily Observer which has been a pro-government newspaper publishing speeches and statements verbatim is used (<https://observergm.com/>) and the independent Point Newspaper (<http://thepoint.gm/>) serves as an important source for statements. The statehouse website is another great source of information that is relied on as it contains major speeches of the president and vice president from 2001-2016 (<http://qanet.gm/statehouse/speeches.html>). The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) of the Gambia (<http://www.mofa.gov.gm/>) has been also used but it has been down since the beginning of 2017.

Data Analysis: Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis which is increasingly being used as one of the main approaches in constructivist research in international relations,³⁶³ is used as the technique for data analysis. First it is important to note that in this work, discourse analysis is different from critical discourse analysis as the latter is an interdisciplinary study that mainly addresses social change with a focus on how language is used for the oppression or bias treatment of ‘other’ ethnic,

³⁶¹ Wellington, Jerry, Ann-Marie Bathmaker, Cheryl Hunt, Gary McCulloch, and Pat Sikes. *Succeeding with Your Doctorate*.

³⁶² Creswell, John W. *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*

³⁶³ Checkel, Jeffrey T. "Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics: A Review Essay." *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004): 229-44.

religious, sex and racial groups.³⁶⁴ Christopher Hart summed critical discourse analysis as the study of how language produced identity-based inequality. Discourse here means both a language and practice as postulated by Michael Foucault, it is not a linguistic concept alone.³⁶⁵ Thus DA is broader because it does not just focus on the functions of text but also on its contradictions, patterns and context.³⁶⁶

Although it is difficult to precisely define discourse analysis, it denotes that language takes “different patterns” and the study of discourse focuses on analyzing those “patterns”. The starting point of discourse analysis is that reality is accessible through language because it is language that creates and represents reality. Even whereas physical objects and material reality do exist, it is language that gives them meaning.³⁶⁷ This postulation is in line with the theoretical framework and the methodological approach of the work. According to Wodak: “All actors display their individuality, their self –otherwise, every professional in a specific field would have to act in the same way due to their position in the field and their acquired symbolic capital. Hence, the identity, the self of the actor influences the performance as well.”³⁶⁸

James Gee also stated that ‘we use language to get recognized as taking on a certain identity or role, that is, to build an identity here and now.’³⁶⁹ It is through language that man, groups and institutions portray an identity of themselves, it is through language that they express their values, beliefs and ideas yet it is through language that their actions are also understood. It is the study of this language that is known as discourse analysis.³⁷⁰ Such a study can be conducted for different purposes including foreign policy, because this study of language is not words alone but includes actions, and identity stated Gee.³⁷¹ Therefore, when discourse analysis is done, it is words and the context in which they were uttered, and how it portrayed action and

³⁶⁴ Dijk, Teun A. van. *Discourse and Power: Contributions to Critical Discourse Studies*. Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

³⁶⁵ Hall, Stuart. "Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse ." In *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader*, by Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J Yates, 72-81. London: SAGE Publications, 2001.

³⁶⁶ Parker, Ian. "Discourse Analysis." In *A Companion to Qualitative Research*, by Uwe Flick, Ernst von Kardoff and Ines Steinke, translated by Bryan Jenner, 308-312. London. Thousand Oaks. New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2004.

³⁶⁷ Fairclough, Norman. *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. London: Routledge, 2003.

³⁶⁸ Wodak, Ruth. *The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics as Usual*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.p. 12

³⁶⁹ Gee, James P. *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method* . New York: Taylor & Francis, 2010.

p.18

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

the distinctiveness of the beholder that is being studied.³⁷² Yet Discourse analysis goes beyond content analysis as the former seeks to establish the relationship between the words/statement, the context and action.³⁷³

Furthermore, if Michael Foucault's is invoked, it becomes clear that discourse analysis is about the interpretation of a particular topic, action or 'being' through written or unwritten language.³⁷⁴ Therefore anyone who is interested in discourse analysis must look at the material (documents), the context in which they emerged, and how that portrayed self-perception and informed action. Discourses analysis is being used because it will help to establish the relationship between the speeches and context and the actions taken by the government of the government. This will reveal how speeches reflected an identity informed by beliefs, values ideas and a distinct culture. The use of discourse analysis is important and appropriate for policy analysis because foreign policy is best understood through the "structures of meaning".³⁷⁵ Furthermore, "the framework of meaning within which foreign policy takes place is seen as the basis of the way in which interest and goals are constructed."³⁷⁶ Therefore, using discourse analysis will help to establish the role of nonmaterial factors, especially identity in the Gambia's foreign policy.

Discourse Analysis has no single framework or steps for analysis. In fact, scholars in the field argue that it is against the general philosophy of Discourse Analysis to 'systematize' a single approach. Instead it is better to allow researchers to come up with their own approaches if they are sensitive to the text.³⁷⁷ However some authors have given methodological steps or approaches to serve as general guides.³⁷⁸ For instance, Gee stated that "...discourse analyst can ask seven different questions about any piece of language-in-use."³⁷⁹ They are:

³⁷² Wodak, Ruth. *The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics as Usual*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. p.14.

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Hall, Stuart. *Representation*: op. cit.

³⁷⁵ Wæver, Ole. "Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy." In *European integration and national identity: the challenge of the Nordic States*, by Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver, 20-50. London: Routledge, 2001. p.26.

³⁷⁶ Larsen, Henrik. "British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s: A Discourse Approach." *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 4 (1999): 451-483.

³⁷⁷ Parker, Ian. "Discourse Analysis." op. cit.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Gee, James P. *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method*. op. cit.

Significance: “How is this piece of language being used is used to make certain things significant or not and in what ways?”

Activities: “What activity or activities is this piece of language being used to enact (i.e., get others to recognize as going on)?”

Identities: “What identity or identities is this piece of language used to enact (i.e. to get others to recognize as operative)?”

Relationship: “What sort of relationship or relationships is this piece of language seeking to enact with others (present or not)?”

Politics: “What perspective on social goods is this piece of language communicating (i.e., what is being communicated as to what is taken to be “normal,” “right,” “good,” “correct,” “proper,” “appropriate,” “valuable,” “the ways things are,” “the way things ought to be,” “high status or low status,” “like me or not like me,” and so forth?”

Connections: “How does this piece of language connect or disconnect things; how does it make one thing relevant or irrelevant to another?”

Sign system and knowledge: “How does this piece of language privilege or disprivilege specific sign systems...or different ways of knowing and believing or claims to knowledge and beliefs?”

All the above questions are taken from Gee’s work,³⁸⁰ and they will serve as analytical steps for analyzing the data in this wok. The first question will help to unveil which organizations were considered significant, in which areas and why. It will also reveal the issues or areas that were regarded as significant or otherwise. The second question will help to explain the actions of the government as it focuses on the construction of the policy action. The third question on the other hand will help in understanding whether and how a distinct “identity” was portrayed by the government of the Gambia in its speeches and how organisations were portrayed. Meanwhile the fourth question helps in understanding how an organisation is seen, whether as a friend or enemy and in what circumstances. Does the construction of the policy reveal a dichotomy of friends or allies and enemies or foes?

Question five on the other hand, will help to reveal the norms, beliefs and values that were acclaimed by the government of the Gambia in its relationship with other countries while

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

question six will help in understanding how the government used language to make a particular organisation a significant or insignificant ally and how economic issues were ideated. The final question will help to explain how the government of the Gambia used language in discrediting certain belief systems through rhetoric, speeches, social actions etc. These questions are kept in mind in analyzing the discourse(s).³⁸¹ In a nutshell, the above questions, taken together as analytical cycle steps help in answering the main question of this research: What is the role of nonmaterial factors in the construction of Gambia's foreign policy? Since values, beliefs, ideas and culture together give one an identity, the main exercise is to understand how identity was used to construct policy during the period under study.

Process Tracing

There is process tracing to validate the findings.³⁸² Process tracing is a form of verifier as it enables a researcher to crosscheck or countercheck the accuracy of his or her explanation through other variables in order to establish the relation between the variables.³⁸³ Although process tracing is mainly used by positivists, it is still very useful for interpretivists studies. "In an interpretivist perspective, process tracing allows the researcher to look for the ways in which [the links] manifest itself and the context in which it happened."³⁸⁴ Therefore process tracing will help to study the relationship between beliefs as espoused by actors and their behaviors. Also, it is suitable since in "document analysis [it] helps to understand the meaning and role of established regularities and help to suggest ways to uncover previously unknown relations between factors."³⁸⁵ Generally, it will help to critically study the stated behavior, beliefs and cultures and how these beliefs related with the behaviors of the actors. In a non-positivist way, process tracing helps to establish the validity of findings. In the analysis, nonmaterial factors are tested against material factors like economic interest to confirm or disprove the role of nonmaterial factors.

³⁸¹ See appendix 8 for an illustration on page 160.

³⁸² Venesson, Pascal. op. cit.

³⁸³ Bennett, Andrew, and Colin Elman. "Case Study Methods." In *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, 499-517. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

³⁸⁴ Venesson, Pascal. Op.cit..p.233.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

Reporting of the Results

As Bill Gillham stated, “the basic way of presenting a case study report is a narrative” one.³⁸⁶ In line with the above, the results of the findings will be presented in a narrative way that is descriptive and analytical. The aim is not just to narrate the original accounts of the actors but to also relate it to theoretical paradigms because one of the aims of this work is a theoretical discussion. While explaining the theoretical underpinnings of the findings, the research endeavors to narrate the results through actors’ words. This is not in contrast to the theoretical framework, because Constructivism seeks to understand the actors through their own lenses and not some upper knowledge that may not relate to the experience of the actors or subjects under study.

Evaluation of the Quality of the Findings

Bruce notes that evaluating qualitative research is a very “elusive” task.³⁸⁷ It involves measuring validity and reliability. Validity is “measuring” what is intended to be studied while reliability lies in the strength of the methods chosen.³⁸⁸ Babbie has stated that the two are very positivist and sometime social scientists substitute validity with the word credibility while reliability is changed with applicability. Because, social research approaches cannot be measured or controlled as in the physical or natural sciences, social scientists want to look at the credibility of the study and its applicability rather than talking about scientific constructs.³⁸⁹ Similarly, Auerbach and Silverstein stated that reliability, validity and generalizability are quantitative techniques; because qualitative approaches must take into consideration subjectivity, context and interpretation of phenomena, it is better to talk about justifiability of interpretations instead of validity and transferability instead of generalizability.³⁹⁰ Therefore, in the paragraphs below justifiability and transferability of the research method and methodology that has been used is discussed. Any evaluation of the research must take these two into context.

³⁸⁶ Gillham, Bill. *Case Study Research Methods*,. London/New York: Paston Press Ltd, 2000.

³⁸⁷ Berg, Bruce L. op. cit. p. 231.

³⁸⁸ Babbie, Earl. op. cit.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Auerbach, Carl F., and Louise Silverstein. *Qualitative Data: An Introduction into Coding and Analysis*. New York: New York University Press, 2003.

Two main criteria are given by Guba and Lincoln for judging the quality of an inquiry rooted in Constructivism; they are trustworthiness and authenticity. The first criteria of trustworthiness constitute four main dimensions which are “credibility (paralleling internal validity), transferability (paralleling external validity), dependability (paralleling reliability), and confirmability (paralleling objectivity)”³⁹¹; while the second criteria of authenticity constitute fairness, ontological authenticity (enlarges personal constructions), educative authenticity (leads to improved understanding of constructions of others), catalytic authenticity (stimulates to action), and tactical authenticity (empowers action).³⁹¹ In line with the above, the quality of this research is to be determined by its consistency or inconsistency with these criteria. Outlined below is how this research seeks to satisfy the criteria.

1. Trustworthiness: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability.

The credibility of the research can be judged on the appropriateness of the research topic and strategy, the data collection and reporting. The documents analyzed are public documents hence the chances of deliberate misquoting are expelled. Also, a thorough description of the research design has been made so that it is open for scrutiny to all those interested.

For transferability to be determined, there must be detailed explanation of the method and holistic description of the sites/cases. This helps to explain whether the study can be replicated elsewhere or not. Regarding this dimension, a thorough historical account of the Gambia from its colonization and how its small status affected it has been given. Also, a detailed history of small states and the paradigms that have been used to study them is given. These together, provide enough information about the setting/context of the research. Moreover, sufficient information about the research strategy has been given. Thus, there is enough information for anyone to consider the transferability of the study. This is what objectivity means in case studies.³⁹²

Dependability on the other hand requires that enough information is provided about the research process for the evaluation of the procedures used. Again, this has been done in this

³⁹¹ Guba, Egon G., and Yvonna S. Lincoln. "Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research" In Denzin and Lincoln (eds.) In *The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues*, by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 105-117. London: SAGE Publications Inc., 1998.

³⁹² Berg, Bruce L. op. cit. p.232.

chapter so that anyone can evaluate the technique of discourse analysis used. The researcher has also presented this research methodology at the Seminars for International Graduate Students of Trakya University at Yurtdışı ve Türk Akrabalar Bakanlığı (The Ministry for Turks and Relatives Abroad) Trakya Regional Bureau where students and three lecturers were present to evaluate the approach in December 2016. Therefore, the methodology has been made available for scrutiny at an early stage. This makes it possible for anyone to evaluate the methodology and the results generated to determine the confirmability or otherwise of the research.

2. Authenticity: fairness, ontological authenticity, educative authenticity, catalytic authenticity and tactical authenticity

According to Guba and Lincoln, the authenticity of a research can be measured on four main criteria; its fairness, ontological strengths and tactical authenticity.³⁹³ Since the primary goal of the research is to explore the role of nonmaterial factors in foreign policy, and not how good or bad they were, fairness is not a big concern. Therefore, one can see that there is no reason to be unfair in presenting the facts. The use of documents and discourse analysis further allows for maintaining the speeches in their original form. To meet this criterion, direct quotations were made for fairness.

Being rooted in Constructivism, the ontological authenticity of the research is maintained. Throughout the process, there is a theoretical guide in analyzing the data and reporting the results in consideration of the interpretive and constructivist paradigms. The detailed explanation of the approach and the theoretical framework, make its ontology rooted in established social science paradigms. Being first of its kind regarding the paradigmatic approach in the Gambia's foreign policy, this research will help people to understand the 'construction' of the Gambia's foreign policy during the period under study. Therefore, this research meets the criteria of educative authenticity.

Regarding the catalytic and tactical authenticity, it must be restated that the primary aim of this research is to offer a better understanding of the Gambia's foreign policy and no policy

³⁹³ Guba, Egon G., and Yvonna S. Lincoln. "Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research" In Denzin and Lincoln . " In *The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues*, by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 105-117. London: SAGE Publications Inc., 1998.

prescription is given. If its accepted that policy is an outcome of identity, then actors would only implement policies which are in line with their identity. Therefore, this researcher can neither guarantee its catalytic nor its tactical authenticity. Notwithstanding, it still have the potential to do so. All it has emphasized is the role identities played in foreign policy construction. Thus, the type of policy depends on the identity of the actors.

Methodological Limitations

Like all works, this one too has methodological limitations. First, the use of interpretivism has meant that the work cannot be generalized. The use of one type of data collection technique has also limited the sources and types of data to some extent. Perhaps a combination may have provided diverse information. One fundamental challenge that limited the analysis on the identity of a developing country within AU and ECOWAS especially between 1990-1993, is inaccessibility to major speeches relating to the matter. This is because digitization of official speeches is something new in the Gambia and those speeches could not be accessed. Nonetheless, secondary sources were used to get inferences.

There has been no contact between the researcher and source of data since documents were used hence, participants and researcher ethical issue is not a concern here. Also, the data treated were all public documents hence no confidentiality has been violated. It is the researcher's submission that so far, the research has been done in line with general ethics in academic research.

The chapter started with a problem statement, aims, scope and potential strengths of the research. It went on to outline the research methodology by explaining the researcher's position on philosophy of knowledge and the world. The researcher upholds that reality is socially constructed. Furthermore, explained is the research choice, the factors that influenced its selection and the rationale for choosing it among others. In this regard, it has been stated that this work is a case study design, that it is entirely qualitative. Moreover, it was also stated that the sampling method is nonprobability and the technique to be used is purposive sampling for reasons explained in detail. Meanwhile, the sites and sample size has been explained at length. On the other hand, it has been explained that discourse analysis will be used to analyze the data and the methodological steps in the form of questions have been stated. Finally, a detailed

explanation about how to establish the quality of the research has been given; this has been followed about the limitations and ethical considerations of the research.

CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS, DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the foreign policy of the Gambia in international organisations. It does by using discourse analysis as an analytical tool to examine major speeches made by the government of the Gambia during the period under study. Also, it relies on Constructivism as a theoretical framework to understand the role of nonmaterial factors in the Gambia's foreign policy from 1990-2016. After a brief review of the constitutional provision on foreign policy, the chapter discusses the Gambia's foreign policy in international organizations, namely the UN, AU, ECOWAS, and its foreign policy of the EU while the final part of this chapter gives a summary and conclusion of the findings.

The Foreign Policy Setting of The Gambia

The 1997 Constitution of the Gambia, section 79 gives the president the responsibility for:

(a) the conduct of relations with other states and international organisations; (b) the reception of envoys accredited to The Gambia and the appointment of the principal representatives of The Gambia abroad; (c) the negotiation and, subject to ratification by the National Assembly, the conclusion of treaties and other international agreements; (d) subject to the prior approval of the National assembly, the declaration of war and the making of peace.³⁹⁴

Therefore, it is the president who has the duty of designing and implementing the foreign policy of the country. Hence, the beliefs, ideas and identity of the president plays a significant role in the country's foreign policy. However, subsection (2) states that:

The Gambia shall not- (a) enter into any engagement with any other country which causes it to lose its sovereignty without the matter first being put to a referendum and passed by such majority as may be prescribed by an Act of the National assembly; (b) become a member of any international organisation unless the National assembly is satisfied that it is in the interest of The Gambia and that membership does not derogate from its sovereignty.³⁹⁵

³⁹⁴ "The 1997 Constitution of The Gambia." 1997.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

Thus, the role of the president could only be limited in the conduct of his or her foreign policy if it would cost the Gambia its sovereignty whereby he or she would need approval through a referendum in the case of bilateral relations, and satisfying the National Assembly that joining an international organization is in the national interest of the Gambia. The president is responsible for appointing secretaries of state to assist him to fulfil his executive duties, thus he or she appoints a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Gambians Abroad to help him or her in the conduct of foreign affairs. From 1965 to 2016, the country has had 25 ministers for foreign affairs, nineteen of whom served between 1990-2016.³⁹⁶ The ministry of foreign affairs is headed by the minister who is assisted by two permanent secretaries, one for technical affairs and the other for administrative purposes, each of these permanent secretaries have several directorates and units under his or her purview. (See appendix 7 for the organogram).³⁹⁷

The ministry helps in the implementation of the country's foreign policy whose main goal is to "enhance the security and international status of The Gambia, ensure the country's appropriate and dignified position in the system of international relations, and promote the interests of the country in an increasingly globalized world".³⁹⁸ The foreign policy is based on Vision 2020 and the president's vision.³⁹⁹ Thus, the Gambia's foreign policy for most of the period under study was informed by the beliefs and ideas of the president. Since the president appoints the minister, mostly the minister is someone who shares the ideas of the president.

The Gambia in International Organizations

An international organization is one whose jurisdiction is not limited within a state rather it operates in the international arena within many states.⁴⁰⁰ The Gambia is part of and participates in the affairs of several international organizations including the United Nations,

³⁹⁶ Sanneh, A. "Former Ministers." *www.mofa.gov.gm*. May 11, 2014. From <http://www.mofa.gov.gm/former-minister> (accessed October 28, 2017). (See appendix 6 on page 159).

³⁹⁷ Sanneh, A. "Organizational Structure." *www.mofa.gov.gm*. June 3, 2016. From <http://www.mofa.gov.gm/organization-chart> (accessed October 28, 2016). (See appendix 7 on page 158).

³⁹⁸ Sanneh, A. "Vision, Mission, Values." *www.mofa.gov.gm*. October 28, 2014. <http://www.mofa.gov.gm/Vision-Mission-Values> (accessed June 3, 2016).

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁰ Heywood, Andrew. *Politics*. 3. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

AU, ECOWAS etc.⁴⁰¹ Since its independence, the Gambia has continued to play a significant role in these organizations and this section will look at the construction of its policy in four of these organizations. Since its independence, the Gambia has continued to play a significant role in these organizations and this section will look at the construction of its policy in four of these organizations. To understand the foreign policy of a country is to understand its identity which guides behavior and the pursuing of interest. The analysis is structured along the following lines. Being steadfast to the goal of this work, a discourse analysis with a constructivist perspective of the Gambia's foreign policy, the work investigates how Identity divided into Regime Type, Africanism/regional culture and development status were used to construct the foreign policy of the Gambia.

It must be reemphasized that here identity do not exist a priori, it is constructed, and seeking to understand it requires a discourse analysis. "Collective identity is not out there, waiting to be discovered. What is 'out there' is identity discourse on the part of political leaders, intellectuals and countless others...constructing, negotiating, manipulating or affirming a response to the demand..."⁴⁰² But defining identity is very difficult that attempts for comprehensive definition is almost impossible, hence adopting an Operation definition is a viable option.⁴⁰³ Alexander Wendt divided identity into two, namely social and corporate identity. "Corporate identity refers to the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute actor individuality...for organizations, it means their constituent individuals, physical resources, and the shared beliefs and institutions in virtue of which individuals function as a "we" (Douglas

⁴⁰¹ The Gambia is a member and/or participates in the following organizations: Africa Caribbean and Pacific Countries, African Development Bank, African Union and its affiliated agencies, Commonwealth of Nations, Economic Community of West Africa, Food and Agricultural Organisation, Group of 77, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Chamber of Commerce, International Criminal Court, International Development Association, Islamic Development Bank, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, International Fund for Agricultural Development, International Finance Corporation, International Labour Organization, International Monetary Fund, International Maritime Organization, Interpol, International Olympic Committee, International Organization for Migration, International Organization for Standardization, International Telecommunication Union, Nonaligned Movement, Organization of the Islamic Conference, Universal Postal Union, World Customs Organization, World Federation of Trade Unions (NGOs), World Intellectual Property Organization, World Meteorological Organization, World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, United Nations and its specialized agencies like United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel. Note that there are a few not included here. (Central Intelligence Agency-US. "The World Factbook, Africa: The Gambia." World Factbook, n.d.)

⁴⁰² McSweeney, Bill. *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

1986).⁴⁰⁴ Social identities on the other hand “are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object.”⁴⁰⁵

Thenceforth states do not engage in competition as often assumed by realists because of systemic nature or the anarchical nature of the system. When competition exists, it is because states have developed an identity and constructed such a system that enhances competition. Thus, the beginning of the study of foreign policy must be preceded by an understanding of the Identity of states.⁴⁰⁶ Hence, the analysis traces and establishes the construction of identity and foreign policy of the Gambia.

Analysis I: The United Nations

Upon the recommendation of the General Assembly, the Gambia was admitted to the UN as a member during the 20th session of the UN General Assembly on 21st September 1965.⁴⁰⁷ After the adoption of the draft resolution, the President of the Assembly stated, “I declare the Gambia admitted to membership in the United Nations.”⁴⁰⁸ The Prime Minister of the Gambia on the other hand stated that, “I take pride in the thought that, without ever departing from the path of peaceful and orderly progress, the Gambia has taken its rightful place in the family of nations.”⁴⁰⁹ Thus, for him, the attainment of independence and admission into the UN, has made the Gambia to be part of the comity of nations. In other words, the admission into UN was an affirmation of the statehood of the Gambia. Jawara further stated that:

But I am all humility when I reflect that, in terms of size, population and resources, the Gambia is one of the smallest countries to achieve national sovereignty and a place in the international community. This presents very special problems when a country like the Gambia finds that it is expected to contribute to the expenses of the United Nations on the basis of a minimum contribution which is out of proportion to its resources, and to join

⁴⁰⁴ Wendt, Alexander. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *The American Political Science Review* (American Political Science Association) 88, no. 2 (June, 1994): 384-396.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ Jawara, Dawda K. "United Nations General Assembly, Twentieth Session, 1332 Plenary Meetings: Address by the Prime Minister of The Gambia." New York: United Nations Library, 1965. p.11-12.

⁴⁰⁸ Fanfani, Amintore. "United Nations General Assembly, Twentieth Session - 1332 Plenary Meetings." New York: United Nations Library, 21 September 1965. p.4.

⁴⁰⁹ Jawara, Dawda K. op. cit.

specialized agencies which intend to assess the country's contribution on the basis of the same minimum rates. This problem has been explained to the Secretary-General and, unless a solution can be found, it may well mean that my country may not be able to participate in the affairs of the United Nations to the extent which we would wish. The Gambia, as you may know, is a very small country which, in material terms, has little to offer this Organization.⁴¹⁰

For this work, two important variables all relating to what Alexander Wendt referred to corporate identity of states, namely development status identity and the size as an identity, are discernable from the from Jawara's first speech. According to Wendt, states have features related to their corporate identity for instance geography, population size, development needs etc. and such features are always in place well before states enter relationship with other states.⁴¹¹ Hence Jawara's first speech focused on that corporate identity, namely size and development needs. But the existence of such features need to be articulated, defined, classified and labelled to qualify them and give them meaning, thus the first speech was not about articulating the Gambia's interest per se, it was about defining the Gambia.

As a new state in the international system, it had to define itself. For the prime minister at the time, the definition was its size. Jawara interpreted the size of the country characterized by a small population and resources as constraints to the Gambia's role in the UN. Thus, the speech portrayed what the Gambia's policy in the UN would looked like. With its small size and resources, it would maintain a low profile participating in a few activities as its resources would not let it take part in many activities. In terms of identity, Jawara only portrayed the corporate identity of Gambia as a small state and its development status as a poor country. Due to this corporate identity, Jawara constructed a policy on need basis and placed a high value on assistance from Britain. "With a population of just over 300.000 and a one-crop economy, our circumstances cannot be said to be exactly comfortable; and in this regard my people and I are certainly grateful to the British Government for the assistance which we have received in the past and are still receiving from it" Jawara remarked.⁴¹²

⁴¹⁰ Ibid

⁴¹¹ Wendt, Alexander. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *The American Political Science Review* (American Political Science Association) 88, no. 2 (June, 1994): 384-396.

⁴¹² Ibid

Also, the first speech was not about articulating the Gambia's interests; it was about defining the Gambia. With its small size and resources, it would maintain a low profile participating in few activities as its resources would not let it take part in many activities. In terms of identity, the government only portrayed the corporate identity of the Gambia as a small state.

The admission speech further placed emphasis on the needs for social goods and thanked partners especially the UK who have been helping the country. Other than the portrayal of the Gambia as a small state who would need substantial assistance to survive, a distinct identity of "self" and "other" based on identity and beliefs was not portrayed in the speech. This is understandable, as a new state, the leadership of the country had not probably developed a distinct identity of itself. This may have resulted from the way the Gambia attained independence. If it had gained it through an armed struggle and depending on its relationship with the outside world, it might have developed a distinct identity of itself.

However, as time passed by, the Gambia developed a distinct social identity of itself in the international system and policy activities in the UN were constructed on that social identity. In its speeches and actions, the government defined that social identity rather than defending its interest of wealth and power, as realists would posit. This can be noticed in the speeches and activities taken during the period under study: 1990-2016. Between 1990-1993, the Gambia's foreign policy was informed by three components of its identity and beliefs. The first relates to its value as a democratic state. The second relates to its belief in Africanism, and finally its development status. These are discussed below.

Regime Type I: Democratic Identity

Between the period 1990-1993, the PPP government led by Jawara portrayed the Gambia as an undisputed "democratic entrepreneur" whose government extended those values and beliefs in the international system. Democratic entrepreneur is used here to mean one who uses soft power to promote democracy. In the UN, the Gambia aimed to define itself and create an identity and its activities where informed by that identity. For instance, in his address to the UN Generally Assembly session in 1990, Omar Sey-the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time, stated that "Gambia has always been deeply rooted in our declared commitment to the promotion

of human rights and fundamental freedoms". Considering this belief, the minister advocated that "...a worldwide campaign should be mounted with the support of the appropriate United Nations machinery...specific steps within each region should be encouraged towards the institutionalization of the observance and enforcement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms".⁴¹³ Similarly, in 1991, Sey stated that "political pluralism and respect for human rights constitute the cardinal principles of our domestic and foreign policies"⁴¹⁴ while in 1992, he echoed similar sentiments: "the Gambia continues to advocate the promotion and adherence to human rights practices all over the world".⁴¹⁵

Furthermore, in what would be his final appearance at the UN for the PPP government, Minister Sey, maintained that the World Conference on Human Rights (1992) was welcomed as the Gambia is known for "our long-established tradition in the protection and promotion of human rights."⁴¹⁶ Therefore, what is evident in the Gambia's foreign policy between 1990-1993 is the portrayal of a social identity of a state characterized by the ideals and values of democracy and human rights. Having defined an identity of itself as a "democratic entrepreneur", and accepted as such by many governments, because identities are formed based on collective recognition, the recognition of one as an actor,⁴¹⁷ regime type in the case of the Gambia, led to the adoption of specific roles of expectation, hence the Gambia constructed a foreign policy based on the belief that it must promote those ideals it upholds.

In line with the construction of that social identity, it supported conferences and resolutions that were believed to be in promotion of democracy and respect for human rights. The promotion of this foreign policy was given prominence within the UN system. Having perception of its size and limited resources as its identity and constrain, Jawara advocated for the promotion of his ideals through the UN to reach a wider audience and build and maintain an

⁴¹³ Sey, Omar. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Twenty-fifth Meeting of the General Assembly, Forty-fifth Session, General Debate: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." Edited by United Nations. New York: United Nations Library, October 8, 1990. p.24-30.

⁴¹⁴ Sey, Omar. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Twenty-fifth Meeting of the General Assembly, Forty-Sixth Session, General Debate: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1991. p.86-90.

⁴¹⁵ Sey, Omar. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Forty-Seventh Meeting of the General Assembly: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1992. p.121-136.

⁴¹⁶ Sey, Omar. "United Nations General Assembly, Forty Eight Session, 19th Plenary Meeting: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1993. p.15-18.

⁴¹⁷ Wendt, Alexander. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *The American Political Science Review* (American Political Science Association) 88, no. 2 (June, 1994): 384-396.

image of a democrat. For example, between 1990-1993, the Jawara led government condemned the “brutal and unprovoked invasion by Iraq of the small state of Kuwait”.⁴¹⁸ Minister Sey emphasized that the act was against democratic norms and it was a remnant of politics of the “dark ages”.⁴¹⁹ Between 1990-1993, the Gambia consistently maintained that Iraq must abide by all UN Security Council resolutions and respect the territorial integrity of Kuwait.⁴²⁰ The support of Kuwait by the Gambia was based on Gambia’s perception of itself as a small state as well as its beliefs and ideals of territorial sovereignty and respect for human rights. The construction of a corporate identity of a small state and the social identity of a democratic government by the PPP brought expectations and roles such as promotion of small state’s interest, peaceful coexistence and respect for human rights and sovereignty. It is this role expectation that led to the condemnation of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.

However, if realist perspective is to be invoked, all that can be unveiled from the Jawara led government’s policy is one of two arguments. Since the international system is an anarchic one,⁴²¹ strong and big powers impose their will on small and weak states, hence the invasion of Kuwait. The Gambia knowing this, must therefore condemn the invasion to prevent a similar fate. Also, realist perspective may posit that since big and strong states like the US were against the invasions, the best option for the Gambia and for its interest to survive was to condemn the invasion. Although this is a powerful explanation, it is very deficient as it does not unveil the origin of the interest of the Gambia to condemn the invasion. However, constructivist perspective would agree with realist position that the Gambia was a small state and must have been against the invasion of a small state, Kuwait by Iraq, it would go further than this to reveal that smallness is a making of states. A state is only small in as much as it sees itself as such and is seen by others as such.

Once a stable construction of “smallness” is established, it comes with expected roles and responsibilities, not least of solidarity with nations of similitude. Also, the regime type has a lot to do with how the policy construction and discourse is structured. Because the Jawara

⁴¹⁸ Sey, Omar. "United Nations General Assembly, Forty Eight Session, 19th Plenary Meeting: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1993. p.15-18.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

⁴²¹ Donnelly, Jack. *Realism and International Relation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

government, had constructed an identity of itself as a democracy, even whereas it was to condemn the invasion, it must do it through a discourse of democracy, rights, sovereignty amongst others. This is what Alexander Wendt referred to as “expectations about self.”⁴²² Meanwhile, a neoliberal perspective may have either drawn on institutional setting of the UN which enables states to cooperate for mutual benefit or the power of rules to guide behavior.⁴²³ Thus, the UN gave the Gambia an opportunity to cooperate with other states to call for an end to the undemocratic invasion. But this also leaves the question of for what reason did the Gambia cooperated with other states unanswered. And the probable answer that neoliberals may come up with is that man is a cooperative being.⁴²⁴ Yet such an explanation is at best tautologous.

It would be wrong to assume that the Gambia condemned the Iraqi invasion simply because big powers like the US did. Similarly, it would be wrong to assume that it was out of fear of a similar fate that the Gambia condemned Iraq. In fact, during the period there was no apparent threat that Senegal, its bigger neighbor will invade the country. One needs to look at other policy statements of the Gambia during the period to understand that the construction of interest was guided by the belief system and identity of the government. For instance, although the US stood by Israel during the period under review, the Gambia did not side by US and Israel. Instead, the Gambia regularly called on and condemned Israel for “denying the Palestinians their rights” and “defying the international community.”⁴²⁵

A similar policy was taken on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the Gambia faced no threat from the Serbs, neither did it had any benefit from the Bosnian Muslims, the Gambia constantly condemned the “summary execution of civilian members” calling it a “Nazi practice”.⁴²⁶ In fact, in 1992, Sey called on the UN to “use force to stop Serbian aggression” in accordance with article 42.⁴²⁷ In 1993, invoking article 51, he argued that since the international

⁴²² Wendt, Alexander. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *The American Political Science Review* (American Political Science Association) 88, no. 2 (June, 1994): 384-396.

⁴²³ Heywood, Andrew. *Politics*. 3. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁵ Sey, Omar. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Forty-Seventh Meeting of the General Assembly: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1992. p.121-136.

⁴²⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*

community has failed to protect the Bosnians, the Muslims must be allowed to protect themselves.⁴²⁸

Therefore, throughout 1990-1993, one can see how human rights and democracy were invoked in all the policy statements of the Jawara led government of the Gambia. Even whereas there was neither material benefit for the Gambia, nor any threat for remaining neutral, it went to argue for the respect of rights and democracy. The support of the Bosnian Muslims was not entirely because of their Muslim identity but largely because the aggression of the Serbs was against democracy and human rights. If the Gambia's foreign policy in the UN was informed entirely by the Muslim card, it would not have had condemned Iraq because they were Muslims too. Similarly, it would not have condemned the apartheid regime and UNITA in Angola for aggression because those atrocities were not directed towards Muslim.⁴²⁹

Regime Type II: Non-democratic Identity (Military/Revolutionary)

In 1994, the Jawara led government was overthrown in a military coup d'état.⁴³⁰ A review of the first speech of the new government of the Gambia in the UN that toppled Jawara's government reminds one of Finnermore's postulation that states focus much on "defining rather than defending national interest". The military regime dedicated at least half of its speech in defining itself and "the Gambia" it would create rather than defending "national interest". Bolong Sonko, Minister of Foreign Affairs who headed the delegation in 1994 informed the assembly about the military takeover and the factors which necessitated it:

There is no political system that is perfect. We take the view that when a democratic political system is under attack by some unscrupulous individuals holding public office through corrupt practices and other selfish acts, in open violation of the moral tenets of honesty, commitment, discipline and hard work, it becomes necessary to institute corrective measures to stop and prevent that system's decay and instability. The privilege

⁴²⁸ Sey, Omar. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Forty-Seventh Meeting of the General Assembly: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1992. p.121-136.

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ Saine, Abdoulaye. "The Gambia's Foreign Policy Since the Coup, 1994-99." *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 38, no. 2 (2000): 73-88.

of being the people's representatives does not confer any rights that entitle those representatives to do anything other than the people's business.⁴³¹

When the Junta came to power, it was condemned by many countries including the US and UK for overthrowing the democratic government of the Gambia.⁴³² At a time when military regimes were increasingly being shunned,⁴³³ there could not have been a better opportunity to construct an identity of itself and challenge the identity it had been given and that of its predecessor. In the above quotations, the military did not only argue for a duty to correct the imbalances but also portrayed the former government as a corrupt government which acted against the interest of the Gambia. But in constructing this discourse, the minister portrayed the new regime as a revolutionary government whose action was necessitated by the corrupt practices of the Jawara led government. Knowing that the identity of the former government was constructed on democracy, it relied on moral grounds to construct a discourse of its identity and the former government. Minister Sonko went on to state that although many claimed that Jawara's government was a democracy, they have confused older democracies with new democracies. In constructing a differentiation of the two, he argued that efficiency:

...in the older democracies is an institutionalized process that has acquired value and stability. The mechanisms that protect the State and allow for a peaceful and acceptable mode of restoration of public trust and confidence have been tested and proved effective over time. That action is reinforced by the fact that the strength of democratic societies lies with the people, who freely participate in the political process and select or elect their representatives. The legitimacy of government derives, therefore, from the expressed will of the people to have a government that will promote and protect their rights as well as the collective interest of society. In the newer democracies, however, where there are no mechanisms or institutions that can protect and preserve the essence of the democratic process, there has been a tendency, in response to a moral imperative, to take radical

⁴³¹ Sonko, Bolong L. "United Nations General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, 27th Meeting: Address by The Gambia's Minister of External Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1994. p.13-18.

⁴³² Fox, Gregory H., and Brad R. Roth. *Democratic Governance and International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

⁴³³ Saine, Abdoulie. *The Paradox of Third-Wave Democratization in Africa: The Gambia Under AFPRC-APRC Rule, 1994-2008*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009.

measures that are intended to arrest the abuse of political power and the misuse of executive authority in the interest of society as a whole.⁴³⁴

Sonko sought to create a distinct identity of the new regime differentiating it from the previous regime which was hailed as a democracy. Since the Jawara regime had identified itself as a democracy and it was on this basis that it portrayed itself and was perceived in the international system, there were two possibilities for the new government. First, to identify itself as a democratic entrepreneur just like the former one or to develop its identity of itself. The new government being constituted by military officers, and not accepted as a democracy by other states, shunned the former democratic regime and sought to construct a new identity for itself, a revolutionary government or “military with a difference”. Also, identity is relational, Wendt argued.⁴³⁵ For one to be a democrat means being recognized as one by peers. But since the democracies did not recognize it as one, it must create a new identity or at least convince them that the new regime was not antidemocratic.

Sonko created a dichotomy of democracies, old democracies and new democracies. He argued that in old democracy there is no need for coups because there are institutions that guarantee accountability and transparency while in new democracies such institutions are nonexistent. For this reason, corrective measures are necessary to introduce real democracy in new ones. It is because of such, that the former PPP regime was toppled.⁴³⁶ Here, one can see the construction of a new identity in progress. It was a challenge to the old identity of the Gambia. He further argued that the duty of any government is to respect and promote all rights but not be selective, therefore the government announced that it would respect all rights. To show that it was different from other military regimes, it stated that impartial judges would be brought in and no military tribunal would be established. This was meant to tell the UN that it was a military government with a difference. Here, one can easily see the definition of a “self” rather than “interest”.

⁴³⁴ Sonko, Bolong L. "United Nations General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, 27th Meeting: Address by The Gambia's Minister of External Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1994. p.13-18.

⁴³⁵ Wendt, Alexander. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *The American Political Science Review* (American Political Science Association) 88, no. 2 (June, 1994): 384-396.

⁴³⁶ Sonko, Bolong L. "United Nations General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, 27th Meeting: Address by The Gambia's Minister of External Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1994. p.13-18.

The government further maintained that the coup was directed at internal anomalies and not against any foreign government. The regime would ensure “the balanced promotion and protection of Human rights”. In his own words:

We wish to emphasize that the events that took place in the Gambia in July this year must be understood as politically necessary to allow for corrective measures to be put in place and to usher in a new and equitable democratic political system. In this connection, the present provisional Government’s overriding objective is to set up those institutions that would provide the necessary checks and balances and thus enhance the democratic process in the Gambia and the right of the people to elect a government of their choice.⁴³⁷

Here one sees that the government was echoing the same sentiments as the former government but in a different way. It was a creation of a new identity that sought to replace the old identity. The identity of the old government was a corrupt democracy and the new one was a real democracy. With this creation of an identity of itself as a military government and a “revolutionary one”, the government took many policies within the UN that were shaped by its identities and beliefs in itself as militarist and revolutionary rather than national interest as realists understand it.

From 1994-2001, the government spent a great deal of time in the UN introducing, defining and defending its identity rather than an interest that existed a priori. If interest of small states exists throughout and are the same, in that they all pursue national interest as realist claim, there would not have been any need to create a new identity different from the former regime. But it is evident the AFPRC regime’s role in the UN was to construct an identity that would make it acceptable in the comity of nations while maintaining its revolutionary tone and being part of the club of revolutionary states. Between 1994-1996, the government constantly argued that it was not engaging in extrajudicial matters and the rule of law was being implemented along with necessary constitutional review. The constant argument of these activities was not only meant to attract funds but were meant to make the regime an acceptable and respectable member

⁴³⁷ Ibid.

of the international community. As military regimes had been tainted with being the worst, AFPRC called itself “soldiers with a difference”.⁴³⁸

Having constructed an identity of itself as a revolutionary government, the AFPRC pursued policies that were constructed on the love for comradeship, morality and justice rather than democracy or interest. A manifestation of this was its policy regarding the embargo on Cuba imposed by the United States. While the Jawara regime maintained relations with US and Cuba with a policy of noninterference, the AFPRC-APRC aligned with Cuba. From 1995-2014, the government of the Gambia did not only consistently call for lifting the embargo but kept on lambasting the US for its arrogance towards Cuba.

For instance, in 1998, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Momodou Lamin Sedat Jobe, stated that: “...the people of Cuba have an inalienable right to determine their destiny...unilateral imposition of sanctions...should end with the demise of the cold war...all States should be committed to shaping a better world...wherein all States, big or small, are equal, a world in which relations...are based on mutual respect and strict observance of international law.”⁴³⁹ Similarly in 2006, Minister Lamin Kaba Bajo noted that “the illegal and extrajudicial measures...against Cuba, a small, friendly and democratic nation...will not work.”⁴⁴⁰ In 2009 also, Yahya Jammeh called the sanctions a violation of children right because of its impact on children. “My delegation also hereby calls on the UN to urge the United States of America to immediately and unconditionally lift the embargo on Cuba...This trade embargo continues to hurt Cuban Women and children. The Cuban children that are born into these extreme hardships have committed no crime.”⁴⁴¹

What the constructivist perspective reveals from the discourse is that when Jammeh came to power through a coup d'état he was tagged a military regime by the US and other states. He was seen as an enemy of democratic progress in the Third World and often, he was seen as one

⁴³⁸ Edie, Carlene J. "Democracy in The Gambia: Past Present and Prospects for the Future." *Africa Development* XXV, no. 3 & 4 (2000): 161-198.

⁴³⁹ Jobe, Momodou Lamin Sedat. "United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, 18th Plenary Meeting: Address of The Gambia's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1998. p.23-29.

⁴⁴⁰ Bajo, Lamin Kaba. "United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, 19th Plenary Meeting: Address of The Gambia's Secretary of State for Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 2006. p.25-29.

⁴⁴¹ Jammeh, Yahya A.J.J. "United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, 6th Plenary Meeting: Address by the of The Gambia." New York: United Nations Library, 2009. p.27-30.

inflicting pain on his own people. Therefore, to show the world that the US was also violating other's right, it has to come with this policy of condemnation and the best place was within the UN. Realist explanation would expect a small country like the Gambia to support the US embargo because international organizations are meant for big powers, or at least remain neutral but the Gambia went against the embargo. Although a neoliberal explanation may attribute this stance to economic reasons as the Gambia was receiving substantial medical aid from Cuba, that explanation would not be sufficient.

In the first place, the Gambia was tagged as a military regime which meant that its identity changed. With that changed identity came sanctions from the West calling for a return to civilian rule. Thus, the Gambia needed aid. Cuba has been known for supporting military regimes and revolutions especially in Africa. Also, Cuba found a regime which toppled a corrupt democracy like it did with the Batista regime, hence it could easily identify with the AFPRC-APRC regime. Therefore, the two had constructed and shared a common identity of being revolutionary governments which overthrow "corrupt governments" while the US shunned the two. Thus, the Gambia found it prudent to show its support to comradeship and morality in the UN by calling on the UN to stop the belligerent of US against Cuba.

Culture: African Identity and Muslim Identity

I consider the African identity to be a corporate one because on the one hand, geographic location makes one an African, yet Africanism can be a component of social identity. In other words, being an African comes with a cultural tag, a discourse on the meaning of Africanism and the expected roles and duties that accompany it. Being an African is not just a physical but a social reality too. It is an identity that comes with expected obligations. "[T]here were those identities which Ali Mazrui summed up as 'the concept of "We are all Africans"...the sense of being African had an impact which went beyond the merely rhetorical level. Derived from commonalities of race and historical experience, this imposed on African rulers a sense that, at any rate, they *ought* to act in harmony."⁴⁴² The three years of the Jawara led PPP regime reviewed, that is from 1990-1993 witnessed the promotion of African matters and African solidarity in the UN.

⁴⁴² Clapham, Christopher. *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. p.107.

However, the construction and counter construction of the discourse on Africanism was not as intense as the twenty-one years of the Jammeh's rule. Although the APRC continued the policy of the PPP, the intensity was greater especially in the 2000s than ever before. It has become an established practice-norms which developed out of ideas and beliefs, that African governments must advocate for African interests in the United Nations. The shared meaning of Africanism by the African states made them to cooperate on this basis. In fact, in 1998, Minister Sedat Jobe stated that "The Gambia's foreign policy is directed by its national interest and that of the continent, as well as by the quest for peace and justice in the world."⁴⁴³ Thereby aligning the two as the core interests of the country.

However, what have not been seen from 1990-1993 is an explicit ideation and discourse on Africanism by the Jawara led government. Thus, Africanism was more of a corporate identity from 1990-1993. Nonetheless Starting from 2008 the APRC's Jammeh led government's Africanism in the UN was constructed on the basis of a social identity delineating "us" versus "them". For instance, in 2009, Jammeh told the UN that although Africa supplies the North 90% of minerals yet it is the poorest continent. He stated that Africa's poverty was a problem caused by "the perennial locust invasion and...presence in Africa". The second cause was drought. He went on to state that the "locust...are the western Multi National Companies...The drought is the debt burden".⁴⁴⁴ Jammeh asked the UN to intervene in the exploitation of Africa lest it shall be stopped forcefully. He further added that "instead of being respected, we are called...names...Dictators, Corrupt Leaders, Failed States and even Rogue States." This must end "...by force if need be."⁴⁴⁵

Thus, the African identity informed Gambia's policy in the UN. This identity did not exist a priori, it was constructed by the Jammeh led government. This identity led to the construction of the West as an enemy of Africa in the UN. The Jammeh led government constructed a discourse about the West and Africa in the UN which pelted the two as culturally different. For Jammeh, Africa had a culture of its own different from the West but the West was imposing its culture on Africa by using some groups to "...misguide African people in accepting

⁴⁴³ Jobe, Momodou Lamin Sedat. "United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, 18th Plenary Meeting: Address of The Gambia's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1998. p.23-29.

⁴⁴⁴ Jammeh, Yahya A.J.J. "United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, 6th Plenary Meeting: Address by the of The Gambia." New York: United Nations Library, 2009. p.27-30.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

alien precepts that apparent contradict our political culture”. And it was for this cultural difference that there had been a “continuous target and humiliation of [African] leaders...”⁴⁴⁶ In 2013 Jammeh argued it is unfathomable that “Today, after fighting for our freedom and liberating our continent, we are being prescribe a religion-DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS and GOOD GOVERNANCE-by descendants of the same colonial powers”. He informed them that Africans would “defend their dignity and natural resources at any cost...”⁴⁴⁷

In 2006, he asked for the recognition of diversity in culture, beliefs and norms.⁴⁴⁸ Here one could easily see that the Jammeh led government was speaking against the calls for democratization and respect for human rights. Whenever issues of democracy and human rights were raised Jammeh would ideate on the difference between Western and African cultures. Jammeh saw democratization as a challenge to his rule and it was a policy to dismiss calls for democratization based on cultural difference because he has a different identity and belief about politics and society. Neoliberals would be deficient in explaining this policy statement because for them, rules, laws and democracy are vital for cooperation. In other words, Neoliberalism believes in the universality of rights.⁴⁴⁹ Yet Jammeh shunned that argument. Although realists see that right is only for the mighty, they would not address the matter sufficiently. They may even blame Jammeh for being folly. But as Wendt has argued, once an ideation of identity has been structured, certain roles must be played in line with that identity, that is to develop a pattern of behavior to serve as a testimony to that identity. Thus, the construction of an African identity and the ideation on Africanism became the basis of policies within the UN.

Between 1991-1993, During Jawara’s era too, the Gambia sided with the African Group in the UN and other countries advocating for the restructuring of the United Nations system. In 1991, Omar Sey emphasized the need to give more powers to the General Assembly and the

⁴⁴⁶ Tangara, Momodou. "United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-fifth Session, 20th Plenary Meeting: Address of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gambians Abroad and International Cooperation." New York: United Nations Library, 2010. p.39-43.

⁴⁴⁷ Jammeh, Yahya A.J.J. "United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-eight Session, 15th Plenary Session: Address of the President of The Gambia." New York: United Nations Library, 2013. p.1-5.

⁴⁴⁸ Bajo, Lamin Kaba. "United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, 19th Plenary Meeting: Address of The Gambia's Secretary of State for Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 2006. p.25-29.

⁴⁴⁹ Burchill, Scott. "Liberalism." In *Theories of International Relations*, by Scott Burchill, et al., 55-83. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

need for “equitable geographic representation” in the United Nations Security Council.⁴⁵⁰ This position was informed by the belief that Africa needed to be represented in the Security Council. If as realist postulation suggest that small states need only to align with big states for security is true, then why did the Gambia take this position? Liberalism may foresee the cooperation of states but it would still miss the point for the Gambia’s insistence on representing the African states. With Constructivist perspective, one can see that the Security Council at the time had a group of countries which were friends to the Gambia: the SU, USA, China, and England. The Gambia being in good relationship with England could have had England to represent its interests if the need arose but due to identity of being an African state, the Gambia wanted one or more African countries in the Security Council. It could not abandon its brethren on the world stage for “outsiders”. Here, the matter was entirely identity driven reveals the constructivist perspective.

Similarly, from 1996 to 2016, the Gambia government led by Jammeh consistently asked for reforms within the security country. In fact, 1995, the Jammeh led government had argued that “Africa must be represented permanently on the security Council,”⁴⁵¹ and from 2002, the Jammeh led government started to argue that “Africa should have a minimum of two permanent seats.”⁴⁵² This was informed by the AU’s position on reforms of the security council. The government argued that the structure of the security council was undemocratic and unfair because of the lack of a permanent seat occupied by African states. Once it has an African permanent member, it would become democratic. The discourse was constructed as such: all continents have permanent seats in the UN except Africa. China represents Asia, USA represents America, France and England represents Europe. Also, this distribution represented all races except Africa.

⁴⁵⁰ Sey, Omar. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Twenty-fifth Meeting of the General Assembly, Forty-Sixth Session, General Debate: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1991. p.86-90.

⁴⁵¹ Jange, Baboucarr Blaise. "United Nations General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, 22nd Plenary Meeting: Address by the Minister of External Affairs of The Gambia." New York: United Nations Library, 1995. p.11-16.

⁴⁵² Jammeh, Yahya A.J.J. "United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-seven Session, 18th Plenary Meeting: Address by the President of The Gambia." New York: United Nations Library, 2002. p.4-5.

In 2009, Jammeh announced that without having a permanent representative at the security council, Africa will not be bound by resolutions taken by the UNSC.⁴⁵³ This was a rare extreme position which was informed not by the African identity alone but also by Jammeh's ideals and beliefs. This reinforced the point made earlier that sometimes policies and actions could be informed by more than one non-material factors.

Furthermore, the Gambia cooperated with other African countries to end the apartheid regime in South Africa and this policy was promoted at the UN even though many countries, donors of the Gambia like the UK were not very anti-apartheid. However, the corporate identity of being an African country who see Africa as for Africans which included self-government, meant that the government went for the campaign against apartheid at a time when its donors and sustainers were pro-apartheid regime. Minister Sey made the position of the Gambia clear in 1991, when he stated that: "The Abuja Declaration on South Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its twenty-seventh ordinary session spells out clearly the African position on the issue."⁴⁵⁴

Debt Cancellation also prominently featured on the speeches of the Gambia in the UN from 1996 to 2016. In 1993, Omar Sey stated that "As of today, one third of Africa's total export earning is paid to the developed countries in the North to service its debts. This situation cannot be allowed to continue."⁴⁵⁵ Similarly in 1994 the Gambia attributed the poverty of Africa to debt and ask for debt cancellation to eradicate poverty. Bolong Sonko also stated: "for sub-Saharan Africa the annual debt growth rate has been estimated to be as high as 7.7 per cent...therefore, the ratios of debt to gross national product and debt to export are almost three times the registered average for all developing countries...There is more than ever before an urgent need for the international community to find a lasting solution to this problem."⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵³ Jammeh, Yahya A.J.J. "United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, 6th Plenary Meeting: Address of President of The Gambia." New York: United Nations Library, 2009. p.27-30.

⁴⁵⁴ Sey, Omar. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Twenty-fifth Meeting of the General Assembly, Forty-Sixth Session, General Debate: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1991. p.86-90.

⁴⁵⁵ Sey, Omar. "United Nations General Assembly, Forty Eight Session, 19th Plenary Meeting: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1993. p.15-18.

⁴⁵⁶ Sonko, Bolong L. "United Nations General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, 27th Meeting: Address by The Gambia's Minister of External Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1994. p.13-18.

This position was informed by both Africanism and the identity of a developing country. Realists may claim that this position was informed by the interest of the Gambia to overcome debt, yet the Gambia constructed a discourse that emphasized the nature of Africa's debt. Although Africa was not the only continent affected with the debt crisis, the government placed emphasis on the need to cancel debt in Africa due to its devastating impact on the continent. Liberalism may see internationalization of economies, debt, aid and funding as a means of mending ties, but constructivist perspective shows that aid and trade sometimes do divide nations and regions, as seen above.

In 2016, the vice president of the Gambia, Isatou Njie Saidu, announced in the UN that a colloquium on slavery and reparation had been held in Banjul and that a resolution would be tabled by the African group at the assembly. She argued that the effects of slavery were still noticeable in Africa, while other races had gained reparation it is Africa alone that did not. "Why then should Africans and people of African descent be ineligible for reparations, after suffering the historic injustices of slavery, the slave trade and colonialism?"⁴⁵⁷

Therefore, there were many instances when the Gambia's foreign policy was constructed on its belief and ideation on Africanism. This included its position on the apartheid regime. Sometimes it is possible for two or more social factors to influence a country's decision on a matter, and on apartheid it seemed as if both the African identity and democratic ideal determined Gambia's role. Nonetheless the government argued that its position on the issue was informed by the African position as outlined in the Abuja Declaration. In 1992, it condemned the South African apartheid government and declared that it would be held accountable for the killings.⁴⁵⁸ Moreover, the Gambia constantly hailed and lobbied for more support for the African Union and ECOWAS in their effort to build a lasting peace at sub regional and regional level.

However, interests do not exist a priori, it is developed through social interactions,⁴⁵⁹ and what was regarded as interest emerged from the African identity and subsequently ended as a

⁴⁵⁷ Jammeh, Yahya A.J.J "United Nations General Assembly, Seventy-first Session: 13th Plenary Meeting, Address of the President of The Gambia, Delivered by Vice President Isatou Njie-Saidu." New York: United Nations Library, 2016. p.9-12.

⁴⁵⁸ Sey, Omar. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Forty-Seventh Meeting of the General Assembly: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1992. p.121-136.

⁴⁵⁹ Hurd, Ian. "Constructivism." In *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, by Christine Reus-Smith and Duncan Snidal, 298-316. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

norm. For instance, in 1993, Sey called for more direct foreign investment to Africa. Although Africa is poor, it is not the only continent with poverty.⁴⁶⁰ However, here a clear case for Africa was presented and not the developing countries. In this case, the policy for asking for more Foreign Direct Investment for Africa was not based on development needs as a start, rather it was informed by an African identity and the belief that Africa needed more FDI. With time, it became a norm for the Gambia to always called for more FDI to Africa.

By 2013, a discourse on Islam and Muslims was in construction in the UN by Yahya Jammeh. "We need renewed and genuine global partnerships and commitments that are binding and based on respect for the sovereign right of each individual State to choose a way of life that is based on its religious and cultural values, as no administrative system is better than the way prescribed by the almighty Allah."⁴⁶¹ This was the first time Jammeh attached a superior status to theocratic (Islamic) system. And for him global peace would be attained once states, Muslim states can practice the system they desire. Yet, Jammeh was quick to differentiate his theocratic state which he praised from terrorism:

...the world has been witnessing the bloodiest and most heinous form of terrorism, unleashed by satanic and sadistic human vermin disguised as Islamic militants, who are acting ostensibly in the name of Islamic purity. In reality, those sons of infamy and their shameless and deceitful claims of devotion to the peaceful and noble religion of Islam are, in fact, an insult not only to all true Muslims, but to our Prophet and humankind in general. Before the emergence of the mujahideen in Iran and later in Afghanistan in the 1980s, which was a movement subsequently associated with Islamic terrorism by the Western mainstream media in total disregard for its creation and sponsorship by the Western Powers to fight proxy wars against the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviets in Afghanistan, there existed no Islamic terrorism.⁴⁶²

⁴⁶⁰ Sey, Omar. "United Nations General Assembly, Forty Eight Session, 19th Plenary Meeting: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1993. p.15-18.

⁴⁶¹ Jammeh, Yahya A.J.J. "United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-eight Session, 15th Plenary Session: Address of the President of The Gambia." New York: United Nations Library, 2013. p.1-5.

⁴⁶² Jammeh, Yayya A.J.J. "United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-Ninth Session, 10th Plenary Meeting: Address by the Gambia's President." New York: United Nations Library, 2014. 4-11." New York: United Nations Library, 25th September. p.1-5.

Jammeh added that to argue that “Islam in its entire history has never been associated with violence or terrorism, as those activities are haram, or forbidden, for a Muslim. Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance and has nothing to do with the activities of those anti-Islamic bands of dangerous criminals...”⁴⁶³ He went on to challenge the discourse on classifying Muslims into sub groups arguing “therefore be classified into varying degrees such as moderate Islam, democratic Islam, extreme Islam or violent Islam. Simply put, Islam is a pure religion that encourages the best of human behaviour and interpersonal relationships, among other virtues, as prescribed by Allah, the almighty creator.”⁴⁶⁴ Elsewhere he stated that the discourse on clash of Islam and the West is bogus: “We are also greatly concerned that certain rogue politicians and pseudo-intellectuals with nefarious intentions are using the terrorism card to revive and propagate the notion of a clash of civilizations in which Islam is at war with the West.”⁴⁶⁵ After a discourse on what Islam “means” and what terrorism “means”, Jammeh lambasted the Western Media for: “growing propagation of disinformation and misrepresentation...about Islam in general and the application of sharia law, particularly in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”⁴⁶⁶

Jammeh condemned the condemnation of Saudi Arabia by the western media and governments for applying Sharia Law. According to him “Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam, and sharia is the legal system in Islam and the only divine Constitution for...all Islamic States. Therefore, the incessant criticisms and misrepresentations of the application of sharia law in Saudi Arabia or anywhere else are disrespectful and abhorrent...is an insult to all true Muslims...As a matter of fact, the most barbaric laws are those that are not based on any divine teachings...and we will apply it [sharia] to the letter.”⁴⁶⁷ A year later, Jammeh declared the Gambia as an Islamic state. Assuming an identity of a Muslim and spokesperson of Muslims comes with expected behavior and hence it is not surprising that, Jammeh declared the Gambia an Islamic state. But as the discourse was being newly construct (from 2013), much has not been seen in terms of actions relating to the discourse on Islam in the UN.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ Jammeh, Yayya A.J.J. "United Nations General Assembly, Seventy-first Session: 13th Plenary Meeting, Address of the President of The Gambia, Delivered by Vice President Isatou Njie-Saidy." New York: United Nations Library, 2016. p.9-12.

⁴⁶⁶ Jammeh, Yayya A.J.J. "United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-Ninth Session, 10th Plenary Meeting: Address by the Gambia's President." New York: United Nations Library, 2014. 4-11." New York: United Nations Library, 25th September. p.1-5

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

Development Status: Developing Country Identity

From its first day in the UN, the Gambia, identified itself as a resource constraint country and believed that it would need substantial support to overcome some of its challenges as a new independent state. For the period that the PPP government was at the helm of affairs, 1990-1993 it continuously defined what constituted being a developing country and the constraints that accompany it. Furthermore, it assumed a role of advocating the interests of developing countries. In 1991, Sey stated that:

In the last forty years, during the cold war and its prevailing East-West tension, the most difficult and urgent task before the United Nation was the maintenance of international peace and security. While this is still the main objective of the United Nations, we believe that in a changed international environment, the United Nations can make itself the major forum for promoting global economic and racial development through greater self-help and North-South Cooperation. The most formidable problem before the world Community is the widening gulf between the rich and poor countries.⁴⁶⁸

Similarly, the APRC maintained the same discourse on the development status and identity of the country. This identity led to the construction of a policy that requires the promotion of least developing countries in the UN. For example, in 2011 the vice president of the Gambia, Isatou Njie Saidy stated that:

As a developing country, we have our eyes widely set on the countdown to 2015. The Gambia and the entire international community have only a few more years before we can tell how many of the MDGs we have met...We know for certain that the critical element towards achieving all MDGs on the target date will remain international donor support. We have just embarked upon our new Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment (PAGE) which we earnestly believe will be generously supported by our partners.⁴⁶⁹

⁴⁶⁸ Sey, Omar. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Twenty-fifth Meeting of the General Assembly, Forty-Sixth Session, General Debate: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1991. p.86-90.

⁴⁶⁹ Njie-Saidy, Isatou. "United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-Sixth Session, 25th Plenary Meeting: Address by The Gambia's Vice President and Minister of Women's Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 2011. p.14-17.

Earlier in 2010, in a statement delivered by Omar Touray on behalf of Yahya Jammeh, it was stated that: “For many years, I have called for greater voice for developing countries in international and financial economic... As developing countries, we believe that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) should be the leading platform for the discussion and formulation of global policies in the economic and social fields.”⁴⁷⁰ Thus, while Africanism was used to promote the development of countries in the region, the same discourse was constructed to argue for the promotion of trade and development within the developing world. This is something that the constructivist perspective can explain with ease, states can and do exhibit many social identities in different contexts. “In contrast to the singular quality of corporate identity, actors normally have multiple social identities that vary in salience.”⁴⁷¹ This is evident when the state is personalized, as a being that thinks, ideates, adopts and constructs an identity. As a male teacher can be professor in a university, a father to his children at home, a husband to his wife, a state’s leader can ideate and construct multiple identities or discourses simultaneously.

What have been done here is to show that unlike Realism or Liberalism would portray interests and motives for actions, interests did not exist in the void, they existed out of social interactions and definitions of what constituted a developing country; that is an identity which led to the development of ideas as interest. That which was regarded as interest and the policy of the Gambia of arguing for better policies for those countries became a norm upheld by the Gambia as well as other countries. This is what Finnemore meant when he stated that “interests are not just “out there” waiting to be discovered; they are constructed through social interactions”.⁴⁷²

For instance, the Gambia submitted that trade relations and the economic system were not favorable to developing countries, hence a need for a fair trade to benefit developing countries. It does not mean that interests do not exist and that the Gambia was not acting in line with its interest. No, the argument is that interest is shaped by norms, beliefs and identity as argued by

⁴⁷⁰ Touray, Omar. "United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, 13th Plenary Meeting: Address by The Gambia's." New York: United Nations Library, 2008. p.28-31.

⁴⁷¹ Wendt, Alexander. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *The American Political Science Review* (American Political Science Association) 88, no. 2 (June, 1994): 384-396.

⁴⁷² Finnemore, Martha. *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996.

Finnemore.⁴⁷³ The Gambia's interests for fairer trade was shaped by its identity of itself as a developing country and a norm that entailed demanding for fairer relationship between the developed and developing world. During the period, the government also called for debt cancellation for developing countries. The Gambia's position was guided by its interest to be debt free informed by its belief that it is wrong to make poor countries devote much of their budget to debt servicing when they could not provide essential services to their people. 1994-2016.

It is argued here that the government that took over in 1994-1996 shared the corporate identity of a belief in Africanism with the former regime. Its Africanism was more defiant than the former though. Also, they all shared the corporate value of developing countries. However, the new government challenged the democratic identity of the former government through discourse and consequently replaced it with a militarist/revolutionary value. Muslim and Islamic values also featured very well especially in post 2000 in the Gambia's policy in the UN. And finally, smallness and bigness were constructed in a new manner.

Analysis II: The African Union

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established on 25th May 1963 in Addis Ababa with 32 countries in attendance.⁴⁷⁴ Its main purpose was to help all African states achieve independence, cooperate amongst themselves for the promotion of African interest and to ensure peace and stability.⁴⁷⁵ After the wave of independence, the role of the OAU grew and many reforms were instituted to address emerging issues within the continent. Such issues included economic growth, democracy and governance, however its principle of "noninterference" limited it in many ways.⁴⁷⁶ In 1999, an extraordinary session was convened at Sirte in Libya by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African to discuss how to build a more powerful union suitable for the time. In 2000, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted and the AU became the successor of the OAU in 2002.⁴⁷⁷ The Gambia has had a fruitful relationship with the AU. Wherever it has been, it has promoted the African cause.

⁴⁷³ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁴ Hasgüler, Mehmet, and Mehmet Uludağ. *Devletlerarası ve Hükümetler Dışı-Uluslararası Örgütler: Tarihçe, Organlar, Belgeler, Politikalar*. Istanbul: ALFA Basım Yayım, 2007.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid.

However, that does not mean that the Gambia had agreed with all policies of the organization. There were times when it disagreed. Yet, it can be fairly stated that the role of the Gambia in the AU has shown that size may not really matter in international and regional relations.

The previous section has shown how the African identity determined some of the policy positions taken by the Gambia in the UN. In this section, the aim is to show how its African identity, regime type and development status influenced its policies and perceptions about the AU and within the AU.

Regime Type I: Democratic Identity

Between 1990-1993, in addition to supporting the AU policies in the UN, the PPP government which acclaimed itself as a democracy norm entrepreneur promoted many human rights related policies in the organization. Among this was the need to establish the African Center for Human and People's Right.⁴⁷⁸

Regime Type II: Non-democratic Identity (Military/Revolutionary)

Although the Gambia had supported many policies in the AU, it challenged many resolutions that were against its military/revolutionary ideation/value. Most of these were those that had to do with human rights promotion and regime change. For instance, in 2016, Jammeh stated that "They had used the AU against Gbagbo in Cote d'Ivoire but I will make sure this will not happen in Burundi because it is not an African agenda. The AU Peace and Security Council is not meant to declare war on sovereign states but to maintain peace and security in the continent. Burundi has contributed the largest contingent (6,000 troops) apart from Ethiopia, to fight Al Shabab in Somalia."⁴⁷⁹ Jammeh argued that some African countries were being used to promote western agendas. Jammeh was one of few leaders who opposed AU's proposal for the deployment of a 5000 troop to Burundi. Dersso observed that "Gambia's President Yahya Jammeh, who was the only head of state present by the time the debate on Burundi started...by saying that there was no need to talk about deployment in the absence of Burundi's consent...In

⁴⁷⁸ Touray, Omar A. *The Gambia and The World: A History of The Foreign Policy of Africa's Smallest State, 1965-1995*. Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 2000.

⁴⁷⁹ State House. *President Jammeh Returns From AU Summit*. Banjul, February 16, 2016.

an emphatic rejection of the proposal...he said that, "Gambia totally opposes to the deployment of troops by force and will fight it tooth and nail."⁴⁸⁰

Jammeh's definition of sovereignty, his regime type, his long stay in power and his belief that term limits are an imposition on Africans made him to reject the proposal. He further argued that the West was interested in Burundi's natural resources but he would make sure it Burundi is not destroyed.⁴⁸¹ Jammeh who had stayed for more than two decades in power during the proposal on Burundi was not interested in regime change agendas, this probable explanation of a realist perspective would tell little about the construction of interests. Yet, if Neoliberalism is invoked, Jammeh acted within the AU regulations which required consensus for implementation of policies,⁴⁸² this explanation is still deficient to explain the construction and ideation of rules and regulations. If the resolution was passed from the EU or UN, Jammeh might have labeled it as a foreign imposition, but since it was from within, it had to be ideated in a different way. If Jammeh had not assumed an identity of a military and/or "revolutionary government" who resented regime changes, he may have aligned with other continental leaders to support the resolution. Therefore, the construction of the policy reveals that it was ideated on the identity of the regime of Jammeh which was against most of resolutions on democracy and regime change in the continent. As Wendt argued, actors act based on their identity.⁴⁸³ As a military regime which was transformed into a political party, with his two decades rule, Jammeh identified well with regimes that have stayed long in power.

Another example that would buttress the point made above is Jammeh government's position on the election crisis in Ivory Coast in 2010-2011. In 2010, Secretary General and Head of Civil Service, Njogu Bah stated that:

The Gambia stands ready to support any...steps being taken to find a peaceful solution to the crisis but would also hold both leaders Laurent Gbagbo and Alassan Ouattara and their supporters responsible for any negative consequence...It is high time that foreign

⁴⁸⁰ Dersso, Solomon. "To Intervene or Not to Intervene? An Inside View of the AU's Decision-making on Article 4(h) and Burundi." *World Peace Foundation*, February 26, 2016: p.1-15.

⁴⁸¹ State House. President Jammeh Returns From AU Summit. Banjul, February 16, 2016.

⁴⁸² Hoste, Jean-Christophe, and Andrew Anderson. "Conference Report, Dynamics of Decision Making in Africa." Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 8-9 November 2010.

⁴⁸³ Wendt, Alexander. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *The American Political Science Review* (American Political Science Association) 88, no. 2 (June, 1994): 384-396.

powers respect the independence and sovereignty of African countries and stop interfering in their internal electoral processes. After all, former colonial masters cannot and should not be lecturers in democracy in Africa as they have never allowed Africans to vote during the colonial period to select who they wanted to lead them.⁴⁸⁴

The regime identity of Jammeh, his firm belief in ruling for life as he once intimated made him to reject most proposals on regime change even whereas regional countries supported it. In the beginning of the crisis in Ivory Coast, the Jammeh government issued a statement blaming Western governments for promoting regime change of non democracies to install puppets. For Jammeh, his problem with the West was this and it extended to the region for anyone who supported regime change. In fact at the height of the crisis, Jammeh's government came with a more blatant statement arguing that:

events in Ivory coast have vindicated us in our earlier assertion that western neocolonialist sponsored agents in Africa that owe allegiance only to themselves and their western masters are ready to walk on thousands of dead bodies to the presidency. This is what is happening in Ivory coast. Africans should not only wake up but should stand up to the new attempt to recolonize africa through socalled elections that are organized just to fool the people since the true verdict of the people would not be respected if it doesn't go infavor of the western backed candidate as has happened in Cote divorie and elsewhere. What is really sinister and dangerous about the the neocolonialist threat is that they are ready to use brute force or carry out outrageous massacre to neutralise any form of resistance to western selected president as has happened in Ivory Coast.⁴⁸⁵

Jammeh argued that the Gbagbo government was being overthrown by the western countries in the name of democracy just to have Ouattara installed as a puppet to serve the West. The empathy shown to Gbagbo by Jammeh resulted from their commonality of regime type. For Ouattara, although he is an Africa, he was a western puppet in Jammeh's eyes because he was being supported by West to install democracy. However, the government supported the regime change movement in Libya by asking Ghaddafi to respect the rights of his people even though

⁴⁸⁴ Bah, Njogu. "Gambia's Position on Ivory Coast, Others." Banjul: Daily News, December 13, 2010.

⁴⁸⁵ Gambia, Government of The. *Statement on the Gambia Government's Position on the Tragedy in Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)*. Banjul: Gambia Radio and Television Services (GRTS), April 16, 2011.

most of the AU countries were against the invasion of Libya. The government froze and closed assets of the Ghadaffy regime and asked diplomatic staff of the Libya embassy to leave the country. The statement of the government reads: “this move is taken on account of the heinous atrocities that are being carried out by the Gaddafi regime against innocent citizens and which has seen to date, massive loss of lives and wanton destruction of properties in Libya...”⁴⁸⁶ It also followed from the Government’s expressed position...calling on Colonel Gaddafi to step down as the only solution to ending the unrest and bringing peace, tranquility and stability in Libya.⁴⁸⁷

Now, how does constructivist perspective explain this apparent double standard? This has been answered by Wendt when he argued that enmity is what states make of it, the possession of nuclear weapons alone does not make one state to be an enemy of another, it depends on how that state is perceived.⁴⁸⁸ In other words, because Jammeh had seen Ghadaffy as an enemy, he would support a change of his regime.

Culture: African Identity and Muslim Identity

Article II of the OAU Charter laid down the purposes of the organisation as: “(a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; (b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; (c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;” among others.⁴⁸⁹ Thus, the founding of the OAU was in recognition of a common regional identity as well as to contribute to the construction of their identity. In recognition of this, “Member States shall coordinate and harmonize their general policies, especially in the following fields: (a) Political and diplomatic cooperation;” among others. Therefore, the charter of the OAU laid the foundation for a common position on international issues and foreign policies.⁴⁹⁰

The African identity which the government of the Gambia shared with most of the African states had made it to support most of the AU positions on matters of regional and international importance. For instance, in 1991, Minister Sey stated that the Gambia’s position

⁴⁸⁶ The Point Newspaper. *Gambia 'recognizes Libya Rebel Council'*. Banjul: The Point Newspaper, 26 April, 2011.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁸ Wendt, Alexander. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *The American Political Science Review* (American Political Science Association) 88, no. 2 (June, 1994): 384-396.

⁴⁸⁹ Organisation of African Union. "OAU Charter." Addis Ababa, 25th May 1963. p.1-10.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

on South Africa had been informed by the AU position contained in the Abuja Declaration. “The Abuja Declaration on South Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its twenty-seventh ordinary session spells out clearly the African position on the issue.”⁴⁹¹ The above shows that the position of the Gambia government led by Jawara was constructed based on the resolution of the OAU, now AU. However, a further look at Mr. Sey’s speech would reveal that, the Jawara led government’s position was also influenced by its regional or differently put, its identity with the people of South Africa. In this regard, it was argued that “We also fervently hope that our brothers and sisters in South Africa will close their ranks and stop the senseless bloodshed that threatens to derail the vital negotiation process.”⁴⁹² Thus it is evident that the discourse on South Africa and the apartheid regime was not one of either national interest or economic interests and cooperation as neoliberals would want to argue, rather it was one of identity.

Another example which demonstrates that the Gambia was mainly influenced by its African identity and regional setting in the body was its policy on the conflict in Burundi in the 1990s. This was clearly stated by Mr. Ebrima Ceesay, then Communication Minister under the Jammeh led government. According to Ceesay, “we...strongly support the OAU peace initiatives, in particular the Mwanza peace process and the Arusha peace initiative, aimed at guaranteeing security and democracy for all people in Burundi.”⁴⁹³ Ceesay recalled the Rwandan genocide and argued that everything must be done to ensure that the scenes in Rwanda were not repeated. It would be wrong to argue that as a small state, the Gambia was just acting in line with the wishes of big regional powers. Instead, it must be noted that the decision-making process of the AU required consensus rather than majority votes. This would also fall within the constructivist argumentation on the role of rules and norms within organizations. Yet, the rule of consensus for decision making to be binding, in itself is seen as an African ideal.

Likewise, in 1997, Yusupha Njie announced that the Gambia supported the position of OAU on the dispute between Libya and some western countries as a result of the Lockerbie

⁴⁹¹ Sey, Omar. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Twenty-fifth Meeting of the General Assembly, Forty-Sixth Session, General Debate: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1991. p.86-90.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

⁴⁹³ Ceesay, Ebrima. "United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, 25th Plenary Meeting: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Works, Communication and Information." New York: United Nations library, 1996. p.16-21.

bombing. In his own words, “Concerning the legal dispute surrounding the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, the Gambia supports the resolution on the matter adopted by the OAU Heads of State or Government in Harare last May as providing a viable framework for resolving the present impasse.”⁴⁹⁴ Similarly, in 1998 Minister Jobe argued that the Gambia supported the OAU position that there must be justice in the Lockerbie bombing but there must be sufficient proof for the suspects to be tried. Moreover, Libya must be given a greater role in the discussions he argued. “My country firmly believes that Libya should have a greater input into the final arrangements regarding the hand-over of the two Lockerbie suspects and... This would be in the spirit of the decision taken in Ouagadougou by the heads of State of the Organization of African Unity at their last summit.”⁴⁹⁵

Thus, all along, the Gambia supported the positions taken by the AU not just in the UN but also at continental level. Although Jammeh and Ghadaffy were friends, his support for Libya on the Lockerbie bombing was informed by the African position taken by the AU. This resulted from the belief that as countries of the same origin, to have voice in the international system, they must act with one voice. And to have one voice, there was a need to take decisions based on consensus. But above all, this was informed by the identity of being Africans in the same region.

Although many big states including the US and France adopted a tough measure on the Lockerbie bombing, the new regime in Banjul rebuked them for this. Realists’ explanations will fall short to reveal the real determinant of this construction, because of their disregard of small states’ capabilities to challenge big and strong states. Furthermore, it is evident that the Gambia may have benefitted materially from those states than Ghadaffy. Although Jammeh was a friend to Ghaddafi, that is just one part of the whole story. The Gambia constructed its disagreement with the rest of the big powers due to the AU position. This was informed by the desire to act in unison with the brethren. And after all Ghaddafi was a self-acclaimed neo pan African. Therefore, he deserved the support of pan Africans. And Jammeh claiming to be a young pan African, such occasions were appropriate conditions to ideate on African solidarity. In 2010, Momodou Tangara remarked that Africa was solving its own problem through the AU.

⁴⁹⁴ Njie, Omar Yusupha. "United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-second Session, 25th Plenary Meeting: Address by The Gambia's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1997. p.21-26.

⁴⁹⁵ Jobe, Momodou Lamin Sedat. "United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, 18th Plenary Meeting: Address of The Gambia's Secreatry of State for Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1998. 23-29.

It goes without saying that Africa has been the perpetual target of exploitation and a specimen or subject of marginalisation. Africa has been isolated in global trade, technology and cooperation, and African leaders have been targeted and humiliated in unfair proportions. Yet, Africans have much more to offer than their resources. Africa still bears the hallmarks of dialogue, democracy and sound governance structures whose roots can be traced to her olden days of glory. In spite of this, there are persistent cunning attempts to misguide the African people into accepting alien precepts that apparently contradict our political culture.⁴⁹⁶

From the above, it becomes evident that the ideation was to place emphasis on the role of the AU, African culture and customs, their role in modern politics and international relations, and the policy of Africa on international matters must be guided by the African political and economic systems. In 2011, vice president, Njie Saidu observed that mediation worked and commended regional and African leaders for their role in Sudan and thanked the Sudanese government for implementing the comprehensive peace accord which led to the independence of South Sudan. “For us in Africa, mediation of conflicts with a view to amicably solving them, has always been part and parcel of our rich cultural heritage and customary law. We must revive those time-honoured dispute resolution traditions of our forefathers.”⁴⁹⁷ In 2013 Jammeh said, the Gambia continues to promote peace through the AU and expressed hope about AU’s role in Egypt.⁴⁹⁸ Thus, the African identity has meant that the government rarely clashed with the AU.

Without a constructivist perspective, it would be difficult to unveil the role of the African identity on the construction of the Gambia’s foreign policy. Realism and Neoliberalism may all reveal that it was either economic or security interest which determined the relationship, but adopting a constructivist perspective further shows the way interest was constructed as a result of identity.

⁴⁹⁶ Tangara, Momodou. "United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-fifth Session, 20th Plenary Meeting: Address of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gambians Abroad and International Cooperation." New York: United Nations Library, 2010. p.39-43.

⁴⁹⁷ Njie-Saidu, Isatou. "United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-sixth Session, 25th Plenary Meeting: Address by The Gambia's Vice President and Minister of Women's Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 2011. p.14-17.

⁴⁹⁸ "United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-eight Session, 15th Plenary Session: Address of the President of The Gambia." New York: United Nations Library, 2013. p.1-5.

Development Status: Developing Country Identity

Although documents about the Gambia's discourse on development within the AU has not been accessed, policy documents within the AU which Gambia supported shows that the identity of the Gambia as a developing country influenced its some policies in the AU. One of those policies is NEPAD.

NEPAD is a merger of the Millennium Partnership for Africa's Recovery Programme (MAP) and the Omega Plan. The merger was finalized on 3 July 2001. Out of the merger, the New Africa Initiative (NAI) was born. NAI was then approved by Organization of African Union's Heads of State and Government Summit on 11 July 2001. Its policy framework was finalized on 23 October 2001, forming NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa's Development.⁴⁹⁹

It is impossible to state how far did the developing country identity featured in the discourse of the Gambia in the AU but it is discernable that issues of development featured well in its goals as attested by its approval of NEPAD. NEPAD focuses on promoting development within member states and the Gambia is part of it.⁵⁰⁰ In fact, the country has benefitted from projects financed through NEPAD which included National Programme for Food Security.⁵⁰¹ Cooperations in these areas suggest that the identity of a developing country played an important role in the Gambia's policy within the AU. In fact, the discourse within the UN shows the role that the development identity played in the construction of the Gambia's foreign. The next section will focus on ECOWAS.

Analysis III: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The founding of ECOWAS was spearheaded by Nigeria and Togo to establish a community that would promote socio-economic cooperation in the region. It was founded in May 1975 in Lagos and it has 15-member states.⁵⁰² In ECOWAS and the sub region, the Gambia

⁴⁹⁹ <https://www.afdb.org>. n.d. <https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/nepad/> (accessed May 20, 2017).

⁵⁰⁰ <http://www.nepad.org>. n.d. <http://www.nepad.org/content/about-nepad> (accessed May 20, 2011).

⁵⁰¹ Food and Agriculture Organization, Investment Centre Division ; New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).

⁵⁰² Hasgüler, Mehmet, and Mehmet Uludağ. *Devletlerarası ve Hükümetler Dışı-Uluslararası Örgütler: Tarihçe, Organlar, Belgeler, Politikalar*. Istanbul: ALFA Basım Yayım, 2007. The member states are: Benin, Burkina Faso,

had constructed an identity of a noninterventionist and nonhegemonic power, and a peace entrepreneur in the sub region. Where eyebrows have been raised against some states, while others could not proceed for varied reasons, the Gambia succeeded in mediating between warring factions and worked with ECOWAS on peacekeeping and peace building missions in the sub region. The Gambia's small size, and its policy of peace entrepreneurship for both regimes had enabled it to be welcomed by war loads and governments seeking solutions to their conflicts in the sub region. This has happened most prominently in Liberia, and Guinea Bissau. In this section, the regime type, development status, and regional identity is used to analyze the construction and discourse of the Gambia's foreign policy with regards to ECOWAS.

Regime Type I: Democratic Identity

Throughout the conflict in Liberia which started in 1989 after Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia launched a rebellion to topple Samuel Doe's government,⁵⁰³ the Gambia played a significant role to ensure that peace is restored. This was mainly done through ECOWAS in recognition of rules including UN Chapter IV which recognizes the role of regional arrangements and institutions in conflict resolution. The Gambian president Dawda Jawara was the chairman of the ECOWAS Commission and the Standing Committee of Mediation which was created later. Although ECOWAS was to operate as an institution guided by laws, the ECOWAS charter was deficient for the type of conflict that arose in Liberia. Therefore, ECOWAS would have to be innovative in finding a probable solution.⁵⁰⁴

ECOWAS Mediation Committee's initial proposal for Samuel Doe to resign and the sending of a peacekeeping force was refused by the warring parties of Doe and Taylor. Therefore, in August 1990, the Standing Mediation Committee held a summit in Banjul—The Gambia where it was agreed to deploy a peacekeeping force of 2500 to be drawn from The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo and Mali (the five members of the Standing Committee) as well as Guinea and Sierra Leone.⁵⁰⁵ The Gambia was the smallest country in the group and was to

Cabo Verde (Cape Verde), Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. See Appendix 4 for the map on page 157.

⁵⁰³ Ero, Comfort. "ECOWAS and the Subregional Peacekeeping in Liberia." *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, SEPTEMBER 1995.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁵ Touray, Omar A. *The Gambia and The World: A History of The Foreign Policy of Africa's Smallest State, 1965-1995*. Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 2000.

contribute forces to a country where the rebel leader had already declared the peacekeeping force an invading one. The Gambian leader visited several leaders to convince them to support the peacekeeping troops and most of the regional leaders excluding Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast welcomed the idea. The success was attributed to Jawara's statesmanship.⁵⁰⁶ In October, a ministerial conference was held in the Gambia and the government of Doe and Johnson signed a truce while Charles Taylor declined to attend. In November, Jawara chaired a conference in Bamako which managed to broker a truce between all factions.⁵⁰⁷

Norms and Rules in Regional Policies

There is no shortage of accounts of the Liberian Conflict and the aim of this researcher is to explain the role of the Gambia from a constructivist perspective and not the conflict itself. What is evident is a leader of a small state, the Gambia, was given the task of leading a sub-regional organisation of 15 states, ECOWAS. If small states were observers in international issues, the Gambia as the smallest state in the grouping would not have been given the leadership role.⁵⁰⁸ The current system of regional and international politics has accepted sovereignty as a norm and this norm requires that states agree to the equality of members in duties and status.⁵⁰⁹ Therefore, conferring the chairmanship on the Gambian leader was in recognition of this norm.

Furthermore, the effective role played by the Gambian president in convening meetings and summits and rallying support for the cause of ECOWAS which was subsequently accepted by the UN Security Council was done in line with rules and norms governing the operation of organizations. Jawara as the chairman was not acting on behalf of the Gambia alone but the whole region, therefore he must act big to serve as a chairman. Simply put, Jawara and by extension the Gambia was fulfilling the role of a chairman of the ECOWAS. Moreover, from a constructivist perspective, Jawara has portrayed himself as a democrat within the region, and had enjoyed a good rating in terms of democratic practice, thus his reputation was to be maintained if he could easily solve the conflict. The position of the Gambia's president who was the head of

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁹ Carlsnaes, Walter. "How Should We Study The Foreign Policies of Small European States?" *Uppsala University & Institute of International Affairs*, no. 118-3.a serie (2007): 7-20.

ECOWAS clearly shows the role that identity played in the conflict resolution. In 1991, Sey stated that:

I should therefore like to pay attribute to the members of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee and the Committee of five on Liberia for their wisdom and determination to resolve the crisis through dialogue and negotiation, in the unswerving conviction that the conflict can be resolved only through the democratic process of free and fair elections under international supervision. In this connection, my delegation once again appeals to the parties in the Liberian conflict to continue to observe the cease-fire agreement and to work under the aegis of the ECOWAS peace plan for the restoration of peace and normalcy in Liberia.⁵¹⁰

While in 1993, Sey stated that “With the conclusion of the Cotonou Peace Accord and the installation of a five-man Council of State to lead Liberia to democratic elections after six months, there is renewed hope of a peaceful and lasting solution to the Liberian conflict.”⁵¹¹ In all of these statements one can see the desire to act in line with rules and regulations as well as to work towards free and fair elections for democracy, that identity which was the basis of Jawara’s construction of many of his policies.

Peace Entrepreneur

The Gambia lacked material resources, finance and military capability to curb the civil war but it had a reputation of being a small peaceful and friendly country within the sub region. The Gambia was not threatening by speech or action to any of its neighbours which meant that they have trust in the Gambia of not holding any hegemonic ambition. The bigger country of Nigeria may not have been very trusted if it were the one at the leadership role due to its size and its leading role in the sub region.⁵¹² Therefore, the Gambia’s leadership of ECOWAS was an unforeseen blessing. Furthermore, Jawara’s image of the Gambia and himself as a peacemaker compelled him to take extraordinary measures in finding solution for the conflict. In 1992, Sey

⁵¹⁰ Sey, Omar. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Twenty-fifth Meeting of the General Assembly, Forty-Sixth Session, General Debate: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1991. 86-90.

⁵¹¹ Sey, Omar. "United Nations General Assembly, Forty Eight Session, 19th Plenary Meeting: Address by The Gambia's Minister of Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1993. 15-18.

⁵¹² Touray, Omar A. *The Gambia and The World: A History of The Foreign Policy of Africa's Smallest State, 1965-1995*. Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 2000.

asked the UN to support ECOWAS in order to bring peace in Liberia.⁵¹³ Generally, the role played by the Gambia shows the role of nonmaterial factors, but Jawara's identity as a democrat from a small country contributed immensely in creating the momentum for the ECOWAS forces in Liberia.

Regime Type II: Non-democratic Identity (Military/Revolutionary)

On the other hand, the peaceful coup d'état that took place without any recorded death would give Jammeh's regime an acceptable reason to be a mediator. Furthermore, Jammeh and his party had portrayed themselves as a new generation of problem solvers within the continent, this with their military/revolutionary ideal of building a populist identity nationally and internationally motivated the government to take extraordinary peace measures to find a lasting solution to the crisis in Liberia.

For example, Jammeh is reported to have spent 16 hours negotiating with the Liberian war lords to convince them to talk to one another directly in order to end the suffering of the Liberian civilians. The progovernment *Daily Observer Newspaper* reported that "Battle hardened Liberian Generals broke down in tears on that day".⁵¹⁴ The meeting is said to have led to the embracement of one another by the warlords. Although it is impossible to verify that account, what concerns this researcher is the peace entrepreneurship role played by the junta as head of state of a small state, the Gambia in a conflict that shocked the world.⁵¹⁵

It is important to reiterate that most of the warring factions in Liberia were critical of Jawara and his policy in the war. Charles Taylor had earlier called the peacekeeping operation an invasion while Doe had refused to accept the terms of Mediation Committee to step down.⁵¹⁶ Thus, Jammeh would be more welcoming for the warring factions because he had toppled the regime which ensured that ECOMOG forces were deployed. It is also probable that Charles Taylor could easily identify himself with Jammeh because like he attempted, the former came to power through a military coup d'état amid allegations of massive corruption and negligence of responsibility by the government. What is evident here is that when actors change, the image of a particular country may change in some respects. This could be the probable explanation of the

⁵¹³ Sey, Omar. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Forty-Seventh Meeting of the General Assembly. 1991

⁵¹⁴ Ndow, Musa. *Gambia Today as Jammeh Celebrates 50*. Banjul: Daily Observer, May 28, 2015.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

⁵¹⁶ Ero, Comfort. op. cit.

acceptance of Jammeh's role to mediate by the warring factions. Notwithstanding the change of actors in the Gambia, the culture of peace entrepreneur continued. In 2001, Jammeh hosted Charles Taylor where he convinced Taylor to settle his differences between Sierra Leone and Liberia after their ambassadors were expelled from Liberia.⁵¹⁷

Throughout the period of the war, the Gambia made it a policy in the UN to ask for more support for the ECOWAS mission in Liberia. For example, in 1995 Jange hailed ECOWAS for its role in the conflict in Liberia and argued that the case of Liberia has shown that regional settings do work in finding solutions to conflicts.⁵¹⁸ In 1996 too, Ceesay expressed hope despite some setback in the peace process. With the UN's support, gains would not be retarded. He argued that the Abuja Declaration brokered by ECOWAS was the best settlement which could be reached, hence the need to support it.⁵¹⁹ And in 1998, Sedat Jobe made special commendation to ECOWAS for its role in restoring "the legitimate and constitutionally elected government of Sierra Leone".⁵²⁰ This shows the active policy pursued by the Gambia in Sierra Leone not just because of interest as understood by realist or liberals but based on nonmaterial factors.

One of the most pronounced actions taken by the Jammeh led government which shows how his regime identify influenced his policies within ECOWAS took place in 2015 when "West African leaders...rejected a proposal to impose a region-wide limit to the number of terms presidents can serve, after opposition to the idea from Togo and Gambia, Ghana's foreign minister said...This dissenting view (from Togo and the Gambia) became the majority view at the end of the day."⁵²¹ Sharing both regional identity and development identity with the other states, the only difference between the states was regime types, hence Jammeh vetoed the proposal. In West Africa, the Gambia and Togo are the only countries without a term limit. Therefore, the two united to veto the proposal.

⁵¹⁷ Ndow, Musa. *op. cit.*

⁵¹⁸ Jange, Baboucarr Blaise. "United Nations General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, 22nd Plenary Meeting: Address by the Minister of External Affairs of The Gambia." New York: United Nations Library, 1995. p.11-16.

⁵¹⁹ Ceesay, Ebrima. *op. cit.*

⁵²⁰ Jobe, Momodou Lamin Sedat. "United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, 18th Plenary Meeting: Address of The Gambia's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1998. p.23-29

⁵²¹ The Point Newspaper. W/African leaders drop term limit idea after Gambia, Togo oppose. Newspaper Report, Banjul: The Point Newspaper, May 20, 2015.

If Realism and Liberalism were invoked to unveil the role of the Gambia in the conflict, Realism may attribute it to national interest, while Neoliberalism may commend rules and organizations as the basis,⁵²² but that would have been an insufficient explanation for the causes and consequences of the Gambia's role in the sub-region, especially in Liberia. However, Constructivism has revealed the role of nonmaterial factors especially identity in the conflict resolution of Liberia. What has been done above is to show how the ideation and construction of the conflict in identity terms influenced the role played by the Jawar led governments in the Gambia within the sub-region -West Africa.

Culture: African Identity and Muslim Identity

When the AFPRC seized power in 1994, the conflict was raging. And in 1994, Sonko expressed hope that the role of ECOWAS and UNOMIL will lead to disarmament and a lasting peace in Liberia.⁵²³ Thus, it was clear that the APRC would support the ECOWAS peace Initiative which has received the backing of the international. On the one hand, the AFPRC inherited the culture of a peace entrepreneur developed by the toppled PPP regime. Therefore, AFPRC was interested in maintaining this valued status for its own benefit and the country. Geopolitically on the other hand, the Gambia remained a country that posed no existential threat to any country for hegemonic or expansionist reasons.

The Gambia had taken an active foreign policy in peacebuilding in Guinea. This has been done by working with and supporting ECOWAS as well as at state level by singly engaging parties in the conflict. For instance, in October 1998, the Gambia took a leading role in finding peace to the civil war in Guinea Bissau when Yahya Jammeh, brought President Joao Bernardo Vieira and General Ansumane Mane two of the leaders in the conflict to the negotiating table in Banjul.⁵²⁴ After a successful meeting with the men where Jammeh convinced the two to embrace peace, Jammeh travelled with the two to the ECOWAS Summit in Abuja where the two, Mane and Vieira signed the Abuja Accord.⁵²⁵ The Abuja Accord amongst others stipulated the establishment of a Government of National Unity, withdrawal of all foreign troops and the

⁵²² Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. *International Relations Theory*. 5. New York: Longman Publishers, 2012.

⁵²³ Sonko, Bolong L. "United Nations General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, 27th Meeting: Address by The Gambia's Minister of External Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 1994. p.13-18.

⁵²⁴ Ndow, Musa. op. cit.

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

deployment of an ECOWAS Monitoring Group, a military force to enforce the agreement etc. The Gambia would later negotiate for Vieira to be allowed to seek temporary treatment in the Gambia and subsequently asylum in Portugal after he was deposed and refused travelling.⁵²⁶

Ansumane Mane was a Gambian by descent, linguistically a Mandinka and therefore he shared a bond with Gambians. "General Mane comes originally from Gambia. He left here, and climbed up through all the ranks to become army chief of staff. The [Gambian] president has very close relations with him. He has often succeeded in calming him down and in making him accept a great number of situations."⁵²⁷ Also, it could be that Jammeh's revolutionary rhetoric attracted Mane to have some respect for the young captain which allowed the former to convince the latter on many occasions. Meanwhile, Jammeh's ideal of being an ideal mediator and his revolutionary image building led him to take active parts in the conflict and brokered the deal.

In 1998, the Gambia served as the coordinator of Friends of Bissau in the UN, a lobby group for peace and resource mobilization to end the crisis facing the country.⁵²⁸ Furthermore, the Gambia contributed troops to the ECOMOG forces deployed in the country in February 1999.⁵²⁹ The role of the Gambia in the Bissau conflict was a continuous one of active involvement in peace building in the region. In 2001 and 2002 Jange appealed to the international community to work with the Group of Friends of Guinea Bissau to mobilize funds to help the needy in the country. In 2003, Jange commended UN Security Council for its support to Guinea Bissau and as the chairman of the group of 5, he called for more support to the country.⁵³⁰ Thus, in addition to the peace efforts, the Gambia had served as an advocate for more aid to Guinea Bissau.

Nonetheless, the Gambia did not take the case of Bissau to the international community alone; it took important steps at home to address the conflict. For instance, in 2009 Jammeh hosted a meeting of Bissau Guinean leaders where he stated that Gambia's relationship with and

⁵²⁶ Ibid.

⁵²⁷ BBC News. *Gambia begins mediation bid in Guinea-Bissau*. June 17, 1998.

⁵²⁸ Jobe, Momodou Lamin Sedat. "United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, 18th Plenary Meeting

⁵²⁹ Ndow, Musa. *op. cit.*

⁵³⁰ Jange, Baboucarr Blaise. "United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, 16th Plenary Meeting: Address by TheGambia's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs." New York: United Nations Library, 2003. p.31-38.

help to Guinea Bissau was based on goodwill alone.⁵³¹ The Gambia had established itself as a peacemaker in Bissau so much that by 2011, Jean Ping, the Chairman of the AU Commission told journalist that he was in the Gambia to seek advice from Jammeh who had a good knowledge about the Conflict.⁵³² In 2016, Jammeh expressed happiness about the relationship between Bissau and Banjul, calling the former a true friend and one of the best allies in the sub region after he met with President Diaz. “We are the same. We are not pretending to be friends when we are not” he stated.⁵³³ Although Jammeh and Jawara shared different regime identities, they were all able to mediate in conflicts within the sub-region. While Jawara’s democratic identity availed him great opportunities, Jammeh’s revolutionary rhetoric and affinity with Mane gave him a unique opportunity to broker peace between the parties in the Bissau Guinean conflict.

Development Status: Developing Country Identity

The ECOWAS protocols on free movement of goods and peoples were important for the supposed benefits they would bring to the Gambia. In fact, the aims of ECOWAS were in line with the interests of the Gambia. “The Gambia considered the formation of ECOWAS to be the right step towards a broader regional integration.”⁵³⁴ In fact, Jawara was of the view that the signing of the treaty “could be implemented overtime into trade, economic and social co-operation among member states. it is in this way alone that the organization could improve the [living conditions] of the people of the sub-region and strengthen the economies of all the member states of ECOWAS...”⁵³⁵ Thus, joining the organisation was seen as appropriate for the country’s development status.

As a start, ECOWAS was founded because of development needs. Its preamble succinctly captured this: “[conscious] of the over-riding need to encourage, foster and accelerate the economic and social development of our States in order to improve the living standards of our people...that the promotion of harmonious economic development of our States calls for

⁵³¹ State House. Govt's Efforts in Fostering Peace in Bissau is Based on Friendship and Brotherhood - Says President Jammeh. Banjul. June 11, 2009.

⁵³² Shouth Africa. Gambia: AU Chairman meets President Jammeh over Guinea Bissau political crisis. December 30, 2011.

⁵³³ JOLLOF MEDIA NETWORK. *Gambia: Jammeh Hails Banjul – Bissau Relations*. September 29, 2016.

⁵³⁴ Touray, Omar A. *The Gambia and The World*. op. cit.

⁵³⁵ Ibid.

effective economic co-operation and integration largely through a determined and concerted policy of self-reliance;” the states established the economic community for development because they shared similar development identity.⁵³⁶ For this reason, states have expected roles to play in achieving the objectives.

Furthermore, in line with the development identity of the region, the Gambia with the member states of the regional grouping were working on founding the Eco, a common currency for the sub region. Although neoliberals may attribute this to economic interest and needs, it must be noted that, the economic need arose only after an identity of similitude of development was constructed. Without that identity of common development status, it would have been impossible to establish the need for the economic bloking and the monetary zone. While the French speaking countries uses the Franc and Cape Verde uses the Escudos, “the remaining six countries of ECOWAS manage their respective currencies at the national level with a national central bank and a flexible exchange rate regime, without any form of peg to another currency.”⁵³⁷ Therefore, the countries shared not just a common interest but an identity that brought expected roles and aligned them towards a particular interest. Their belief that having a common currency will bring them more value originated from their identity of developing countries limited by the vulnerabilities of their currencies. It is for this reason that the Gambia supported the Eco policy.

Analysis III: The Gambia and the European Union

Lomé Convention I, of 1976 laid the foundation for cooperation between the Gambia and the EU.⁵³⁸ The Convention was adopted not for the Gambia alone but all African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.⁵³⁹ The focus of that cooperation was preferential treatment for exports from ACPs, respect for equality and sovereignty as well as interdependence, allowing states to

⁵³⁶ The Economic Community of West Africa. "Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) Revised Treaty." Cotonou, 24th July, 1993. 1-54.

⁵³⁷ Seck, Diery. *Private Sector Development in West Africa*. New York : Springer International Publishing, 2014.

⁵³⁸ European Union. *ec.europa.eu*. n.d. http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/cotonou/lome_history_en.htm (accessed May 24, 2017).

⁵³⁹ *Ibid.*

determine their policies for aid amongst others. Lomé, I was followed by Lomé II, Lomé III and Lomé IV which were signed in 1979, 1984, and 1990 respectively.⁵⁴⁰

Lomé IV was different from the former conventions in its thematic areas. For the first time, the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance; strengthening of the position of women; the protection of the environment; decentralized cooperation; diversification of ACP economies; the promotion of the private sector; and increasing regional cooperation” were included.⁵⁴¹ It is important to note that the Conventions were not an imposition on developing countries; rather they were an agreement developed by the EU and African Caribbean and Pacific Countries to serve as the basis of their relationship.⁵⁴²

Regime Type II: Non-democratic Identity (Military/Revolutionary Regime)

The military government had accused the former government of being a corrupt democracy led by a Western puppet. Thus, when the EU suspended the aid programme and placed sanctions on officials of the military regime, the regime accused the EU of being an enemy of not just the regime but the people of the Gambia.⁵⁴³ Because the military had accused Jawara and the PPP of not being able to build high schools, hospitals and a TV due to corruption, the new regime must build them to prove that it is not corrupt. Therefore, anyone who had the means to help and refused to help because of the regimes military identity was framed as an enemy of development in the Gambia. In fact, the government accused the EU for not coming forward with aid despite the government’s progress in democracy. The military government argued that it had established the National Council for Civic Education, Provisional Electoral Council which the former regime did not do. The military further used its axiom “soldiers with a difference” to gather support but it did not materialize.⁵⁴⁴ This situation continued until after the elections were held in 1996 for transfer of power to a civilian president.⁵⁴⁵

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁴¹ European Union. <http://ec.europa.eu>. July 15, 2005.

http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/cotonou/lome_history_en.htm (accessed May 17, 2017).

⁵⁴² Ibid.

⁵⁴³ The Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council. *Statement after 1994 Coup - The Gambia*. Banjul: Petergrimes33 Youtube Channel, July 1994.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁵ Saine, Abdoulie. *The Paradox of Third-Wave Democratization in Africa: The Gambia Under AFPRC-APRC Rule, 1994-2008*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009.

There are at least two evidences derivable from the discourse during the military transition. Although the Gambia remained an African country and a developing country its aid programme was suspended simply because the identity and value of the government had changed from a democracy to a military government. The Gambia on the other hand condemned the EU for meddling in its affairs and vowed to protect the sovereignty of the Gambia. Secondly, despite that the government needed money, it did not immediately hand over power to escape the sanctions and allow the country to get the much-needed aid. Instead, it framed the EU as one that was interested in installing a corrupt dictator, hence it was an enemy of the Gambia.

Also, when the military decided to end the military rule, its members simply resigned from the army, but asserting that “a soldier is always a soldier” and changed the name of its council from AFPRC to APRC party. This maintenance of the same letters was a symbolic strategy to win back aid. The military would turn into civilians to qualify for aid but they argued that it was in respect of the Gambian people’s recommendation that they were contesting the elections. All the above factors show the role that identity played in the relationship between the Gambia and the EU.

The Lomé IV convention signed in 1990 was amended in 1995 while the military of the Gambia was still in charge of the state. When the Lomé IV Convention expired, it was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement otherwise known as the ACP-EU Partnership which was signed in 2000 and revised in 2005 and 2010.⁵⁴⁶ The EU has hailed it as “...the most comprehensive partnership agreement between developing countries and the EU. Since 2000, it has been the framework for EU’s relations with 79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP).”⁵⁴⁷

The Cotonou agreement is a comprehensive agreement which focuses on processes, institutions and mechanisms for cooperation between the EU and the ACP who are signatories to the agreement.⁵⁴⁸ Individual countries determine what type of aid they would need and the EU

⁵⁴⁶ European Union. "The Cotonou Agreement." <http://eeas.europa.eu>. June 2010. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/namibia/documents/eu_namibia/cotonou-agreement_en.pdf (accessed May 24, 2017).

⁵⁴⁷ The European Union. <https://ec.europa.eu>. n.d. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/african-caribbean-and-pacific-acp-region/cotonou-agreement_en (accessed May 30, 2017).

⁵⁴⁸ European Union. "The Cotonou Agreement." <http://eeas.europa.eu>. June 2010.

provides the funds. The Gambia's policy at the time was guided by its Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and it hoped for help from the EU to finance its development programme outlined in the strategy which was aligned to the Gambia's Vision 2020 - the overall dream of the government.⁵⁴⁹ The Gambia's foreign policy and its relationship with the EU guided by the Cotonou Agreement was influenced by nonmaterial factors and where material factors played an important role, it was the meanings attached to them that made them important.

Laws and Rules

The relationship between states and international organizations is a relationship of constructing and/or deconstructing discourse. For instance, while the EU alleged that the Gambia was violating human rights with impunity, in other words a discourse of the cause of strained relationship was constructed, a policy of sanctions for the violation of international laws and the rule of law was in existence; the Gambia attempted to deconstruct that discourse and in fact it did deconstruct it at least at national level by arguing that despite important reforms and the rule of law, the EU had decided to ignore those achievements. "The domestication of international Conventions...the harmonious integration of the Common Law and Islamic Law (Sharia), the establishment of an Alternative Dispute Resolution Tribunal...are among genuine endeavours to institute a just and effective judicial or legal system..." argued the government.⁵⁵⁰

What the government aimed at was to deconstruct the discourse put forward by EU in international quarters and the media. It argued that the laws it had were more "democratic" than those being put forward by the EU, because the former were informed by the participation of the people, participation being a principle of democracy, while the EU's was an imposition which was not derive from consultation (note that the government called it conditions) and thereby undemocratic. Here, foreign policy was not only actions, it was an effort to deconstruct and construct the discourse of the country's foreign policy. The government went to add that laws everywhere were socially instituted with regard to culture and identity. Essentially, the laws of

⁵⁴⁹ State House. "Vision 2020: Overview." <http://statehouse.gov.gm/vision-2020-overview/> (accessed July 14, 2017).

⁵⁵⁰ Jammeh, Yahya, A.J.J. "Address on the Eve of the 48th Independence Anniversary of The Gambia by the President." <http://qanet.gm/statehouse>. February 18, 2013. http://qanet.gm/statehouse/Speeches/Independence-Day-eve-message_17022013.htm (accessed March 15, 2017).

the Gambia would be different from those wanted by the EU because the two had different cultural laws and ideals. In his own words Jammeh reiterated:

“our laws are depictive of our values, religions, traditions, customs and, generally, our culture. Our institutions seek to speak to and preserve those elements that instill and sustain social cohesion, stability and economic development. In the quest for self-determination, as a sovereign nation, we are guided by these precepts”.⁵⁵¹

Furthermore, Jammeh argued that his regime was against the recommendations of the EU regarding media laws. The EU wanted the government to allow freedom of expression but the government shows such laws as against its ideals. “One wonders sometimes how certain myopic nations and regional bodies think and behave...” Jammeh went on to add:

We must not be told what laws to enact or abrogate, as we experienced lately. In The Gambia, there is equality in all aspects: equality before the law and in relation to opportunities. This did not exist during colonial rule. As a matter of common sense, the descendants of former colonial masters, slave traders and armed robbers that pillaged Africa and other continents yesterday cannot give lessons on Governance to any African country. Certainly not The Gambia and Gambian people would not accept such insolence.⁵⁵²

The Sovereignty Value and Ideation

The relationship between the Gambia and the EU was further defined by discourse on sovereignty. For Jammeh transnational sovereignty and allowing the flow of democracy was a violation of sovereignty. Going by Jammeh’s argument, it is evident that his desire and belief in confrontational policy when it comes to human rights issues informed his discourse of sovereignty. Although every nation and regime, places values on sovereignty but reducing the EU discourse to a violation of sovereignty was mainly informed by Jammeh’s non-democratic credential. This is because, the recommendation on all laws including media was lump together

⁵⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵⁵² Ibid.

as an affront to sovereignty. This is different from the gay rights issue which was limited to religion and African values. In his 2013 Independence Anniversary message, he remarked:

For us, our national sovereignty is exclusively about our right to exercise political freedom and control over our priorities, policies and programmes...In defense of the nation, we are conscious also of the fact that interference or violations of our sovereignty can emerge from both within the nation and without...But, we fervently oppose at all times all external interference in our rights and privileges as a sovereign state, and we demand that all external regional and sub-regional organizations focus on genuine socio-economic agendas, and refrain from being prescriptive over and dictate to nations that do not fall within their spheres of hegemony. This is particularly so, where such interference seeks to condone crime and protect criminals, encourages immoral and ungodly attitudes or behaviors like homosexuality.⁵⁵³

In other words, Jammeh was arguing that the EU could prioritize where it would direct its money and this was allowed as the body could finance projects and the civil society who were contributing in areas that the EU considered critical for poverty eradication. However, when it comes to local policies about human rights and politics, that was a “no-go area”. This was understandable, because the APRC, since 1994 had referred to any democratic move as a challenge to its survival. Therefore, it had no interest in allowing the spread of democracy. On the other hand, this interest did not exist a priori, it was created through discourse, and it was through discourse that the advocates for democracy waged their campaign.

Liberalist accounts and Realist accounts would be deficient in explaining the impasse between the EU and the Gambia. Classical Realism for instance cannot fathom a small state like the Gambia disagreeing and denouncing an organization like the EU. In fact, realist accounts would consider EU as an unimportant actor in international relations, but what is evident is that EU an international organization is the main partner of the Gambia. On the other hand, neoliberalist accounts favor small states to cooperate with organizations and abide by rules governing such organizations exist.

⁵⁵³ Ibid.

However, the case of the Gambia and the EU in 2013 and 2015 shows that states including small states do challenge and walk away in their relationship with states and non-state actors when their identities clashed. Whether such end in their benefit or not is another thing, depending from whose point of view benefits are measured. They also abide by rules if their values, beliefs and identity are in line with those rules.

Culture: African Identity and Muslim Identity

However, between 2009-2011, the relationship between the Gambia and the EU deteriorated as the government of the Gambia's human rights records deteriorated severely. While the EU criticized the government, and called for reforms, the government of the Gambia relied on Muslim and African cultural norms to justify its domestic policies. For instance, in 2009, the EU started its political dialogue under article 8 for the discussion of governance and human rights concerns with the government of the Gambia.⁵⁵⁴ In the same year, the EU publicly voiced concerns about the conviction of six journalists on seditious charges. In 2010, the EU cancelled a 22 million euro meant for budgetary support in retaliation to deteriorating human rights situation.⁵⁵⁵ The government of the Gambia responded by asking the EU to stop meddling in internal affairs of the country. Although the government needed the money, its values and beliefs and ideation clashed with the wants of the EU.

In 2012, the 27-year moratorium on the death penalty was ended when the government announced the execution of nine prisoners. The EU expressed concern over the executions. In his December 2012 new year address, Jammeh responded:

2012 witnessed the execution of convicted murderers based on the provisions of the Constitution and Laws of the Land...despite being constitutional were misconstrued outside The Gambia and hypocritically blown out of proportion unnecessarily. In

⁵⁵⁴ BOSSUYT, Jean, Camilla ROCCA, and Brecht LEIN. "Political Dialogue On Human Rights Under Article 8 of The Cotonou Agreement." Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union-Policy Department, European Union Parliament, Brussels, 2014.

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid.

fostering peace and stability in The Gambia, my Government will never compromise with criminals whose main intention is to stall our progress.⁵⁵⁶

For the government of the Gambia, it was no one's duty to tell it how to run its laws. In addition to arguing that the execution was legal under the laws of the Gambia, the government went on to argue that Islam advocated for killing those who had killed. The argument here is not whether Islam condones the execution or not, the researcher is interested in how different cultural norms were used to frame the discourse and policy with the EU. Whether the government believed in Islam or not is another matter, what is clear is that the Islamic card was invoked in the discourse and it garnered support for the government in its domestic policy and its foreign policy with the EU. The national TV showed religious and cultural leaders as well as women groups begging the president to conditionally halt the executions. They argued that the executions were right but they just wanted the government to exercise mercy. The president of the Islamic Council was a key proponent of this view.⁵⁵⁷ Even if the values of the president were the reason for the execution and the rupture with the EU, the discourse was structured on the basis of culture and religion.

In 2013 also, the EU Council Africa Working Group (COAFR), launched Intensified Political Dialogue under article 8 after the human rights situation deteriorated sharply in the Gambia. A draft list of 17 points of recommendations to be met at a probable date was proposed by the EU for considerations by the Gambia. Although, the points for discussion were confidential, the government called them demands and made it public through the National Assembly and the media. A Press release from Statehouse announced that the government was suspending all discussions with the EU.⁵⁵⁸

The government stated that the EU demands would "Turn the Gambia; a Muslim country, into a sinful, abominable and Allah disobeying country by allowing the children of Satan" and it

⁵⁵⁶ Jammeh, Yahya, A.J.J. *New Year Message*. December 31, 2012. http://qanet.gm/statehouse/Speeches/New-yr-msg_311212.htm (accessed March 15, 2017).

⁵⁵⁷ The Associated Press. <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2012/09/06>. September 6, 2012. <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2012/09/06/gambia-islamic-council-supports-executions> (accessed April 30, 2017).

⁵⁵⁸ BOSSUYT, Jean, Camilla ROCCA, and Brecht LEIN. "Political Dialogue on Human Rights Under Article 8 of The Cotonou Agreement." Directorate-General For External Policies Of The Union-Policy Department, European Union Parliament, Brussels, 2014

was the role of the government to defend the country from such vices.⁵⁵⁹ Immediately after the government made the statement, it was followed by nationwide demonstrations against the EU in all the regions of the country. The North Bank Evening Standard reported that Jammeh said the EU wanted to destabilize the Gambia and or install a puppet government to exploit the natural resources of the Gambia. Some of the protesters called EU's aid to the Gambia chicken change.⁵⁶⁰ For the government of the Gambia, the recommendations were an imposition of values and beliefs which were against the Islamic values of the Gambia. Although gay rights were not part of the points, the government argued that the demands were also meant to promote gay rights in the Gambia

In 2013, the National Assembly adopted a petition against the EU where Tombong Jatta said Gambia "is ready to forgo any aid that will enslave us."⁵⁶¹ The discourse was that the development status of the country was important but the Gambia disagreed with values that would challenge the culture of the Gambia. During the petition Njogu Bah, Minister for presidential affairs stated that the manner in which EU treats Muslims and Africans is enough to deter the body from serving as moral point of view. What is evident is that where the AFPRC has acted abruptly to sever relationship based on ideations of culture or identity, the national assembly justified it.

During the Independence commemoration of the Gambia in 2013 Jammeh hailed "Gambians [who] spontaneously demonstrated their vehement and uncompromising opposition to conditions that the European Union wanted to impose on the Gambian nation". According to him, the solidarity marches showed the importance that "the Gambians attach to their dignified existence as a sovereign nation..."⁵⁶² Therefore, one another that determined the reaction and policy of the government was its ideation on dignity and sovereignty. In the 19th anniversary of the coup in 2013 he stated: "As faithful believers, it is obligatory that we live strictly by the

⁵⁵⁹ Government of The Gambia. "Gambia Govt. statement on EU Article 8 Political Dialogue." <http://thepoint.gm>. January 11, 2013. <http://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/article/gambia-govt-statement-on-eu-article-8-political-dialogue> (accessed May 30, 2017).

⁵⁶⁰ Joof, Momodou S. January 17, 2013. www.thenorthbankeveningstandard.blogspot.com.tr/2013/01/gambia-eu-political-dialogue-in-disarray.html?m=1 (accessed May 2017, 20).

⁵⁶¹ Jeng, Amat. "Law Making Body Approves Gambia's Petition Against EU Demands." <http://africabusiness.com>. January 28, 2013. <http://africabusiness.com/2013/01/28/law-making-body-approves-gambias-petition-against-eu-demands/> (accessed May 23, 2017).

⁵⁶² Jammeh, Yahya. "Address to the Nation on the Eve of the 48th Independence Anniversary of The Gambia." <http://qanet.gm/statehouse>. February 18, 2013. http://qanet.gm/statehouse/Speeches/Independence-Day-eve-message_17022013.htm (accessed March 15, 2017).

dictates of our religion in order to build on the gains made...we should...reject the moral decadence of homosexuality, lesbianism and other immoral acts..."⁵⁶³

Jammeh further added that "For Muslims, this is a Declaration of WAR ON ISLAM, A Declaration of WAR AGAINST ALLAH, A Declaration OF WAR on HUMAN EXISTENCE - For Which Every True Believer must be ready to lay down your life to defend ISLAM, FIGHTING THE CAUSE OF ALLAH and Defend HUMAN EXISTENCE."⁵⁶⁴ Similarly, in his 2013 Christmas message he noted: "we must also hold fast to our treasured traditions and culture for meaningful socioeconomic development...Evil and strange social cancers like homosexuality will never be condoned in this country and therefore we should ensure that our children are not exposed to alien cultures..."⁵⁶⁵

Although the points of discourse did not include gay rights, the government of the Gambia argued that EU was imposing its values on the Gambia including gay rights. Analyst and opposition figures argued that the government was diverting attention from real issue and argued that severing ties with EU would greatly hurt the Gambia because it was the main donor to the Gambia. However, other than explaining that the tactic was meant for the survival of the regime, no one has gone to explain the role of nonmaterial factors in the issue. Essentially, what this research has shown on the issue is that its ideation and construction was done on the basis of culture and religion.

Identity of Self and Other

After portraying the Dialogue with the EU as an imposition of conditions, Jammeh went on to construct difference between a self (the Gambia) and the other (EU) based on culture and identity. He stated that "Nations are defined by their citizens in relation to the common identity, sense of direction, sets of interests and other peculiar traits that bind them...holding a nationality connotes belonging to a peculiar stock of people with a distinct way of life within a definite geographical area, all of which define their multiple contexts. This accounts for differences in

⁵⁶³ Jammeh, Yahya. "Address on the Eve of the 19th Anniversary of the 22nd July Revolution on the Theme "Let's Live and Behave According to our Religion"." <http://qanet.gm/statehouse>. July 17, 2013. http://qanet.gm/statehouse/Speeches/22nd-July-19th-anniversary-eve_21072013.htm (accessed March 15, 2017).

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁵ Jammeh, Yahya. "Christmas Statement by the President of the Republic of The Gambia." <http://qanet.gm/statehouse>. December 2013, 24. http://qanet.gm/statehouse/Speeches/christmas-msg2013_24122013.htm (accessed March 15, 2017).

our value systems and cultural heritages".⁵⁶⁶ This argument of the president laid the foundation for a difference in culture and identity. The culture and identity of the Gambia was defined by its geographical position, the African location which has an influence over its identity. Similarly, this denotes that the EU which was constituted by different countries within Europe had a distinct culture due to its location amongst others. Thus, the two were different and their ways of life ought to be different. The argument here is that all states have interest but that interest is guided by their identity. The ideation of difference in identity and ideals was a central point in Gambia-EU relations which constructed a "self" and "other".

Construction of an Enemy

Although the two were different in cultural orientations, that does not necessarily lead to enmity. Once the self and other were constructed, then an enemy was constructed. According to Jammeh, it was the tremendous achievement he and his government had achieved which draws hatred from different parts of the world; the latest being EU. "Nationally, we are better organized and united, internationally, the image and status of The Gambia has changed, as we are more active on the world stage than ever before. Such successes have not gone unnoticed outside the shores of this Land".⁵⁶⁷ Although the EU was helping the Gambia, the government was able to portray it as an enemy because of the latter's emphasis on democratization and good governance. Learning from Wendt's axiom that "anarchy is what states make of it" one can argue that "enemies are created" out of discourse. And through discourse, Jammeh constructed the EU as an enemy.

Development Status: Developing Country Identity

When the government changed its identity by transforming the Armed Forces Ruling Provisional Council to Alliance for Patriotic Reconstruction and Construction, the EU started to let the money flow. There are assertions that the pressure by EU and other development partners through sanctions made the junta to accept the recommendation of the National Consultation Committee and called for elections. If the junta had given up their uniforms due to the sanctions

⁵⁶⁶ Jammeh, Yahya. "Address on the Eve of the 19th Anniversary of the 22nd July Revolution on the Theme "Let's Live and Behave According to our Religion"." <http://qanet.gm/statehouse>. July 17, 2013.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid.

as some claim, then it was about the development status of the country. The development status was nothing but an identity. The promise made by the APRC to the people was that the new party would develop the country and make it look like Singapore. This was an image and a proposed identity. To achieve this, money was needed. But that money was nothing if the image and the accompanying discourse didn't exist. Therefore, when the junta transformed into a political party and accepted the Cotonou agreement's condition, it did because of the identity of the Gambia as a developing country and the dream of transforming it into a "Singapore".

From 2000 to 2008, the APRC's policy towards the EU was among other reasons intended to gather resources that will contribute to making a clear distinction between the new "revolutionary party" and the former corrupt democratic government. To do this, the new government needed to build roads, schools etc. to show that the new government does what both 400 years of colonialism and 30 years of PPP government could not do. In many circles, the EU was recognized as a helper, development donor etc. However, the government of the APRC took the credit for the projects the EU financed. It told its supporters and non-supporters that it had brought more infrastructure than the past regime did. In light of this, the APRC did engage in implementing some of the reforms desired by the EU. However, this was only true if the proposed reform did not threaten the identity and status of the regime. Having acclaimed itself as a helper of women and champion of women rights, the government was very open to reforming laws about women rights and gender equality. Although the EU was not the only institution interested in such reforms, the government always used reforms in gender laws and policies to prove to the EU that it was democratizing.

Nonetheless, the government would not implement all the reforms and abide by the principles of good governance and democracy because it was against its identity of militarism. Notwithstanding, the two managed to keep the relations cold without severing or framing the EU in explicit terms. During the period, the EU was often praised for their help in the realization of the goals of the government towards realizing vision 2020. The analysis on the discourse on Gambia's foreign policy of the EU has shown the power and role of non-material factors especially identities in shaping the relationships.

Conclusion

This work has argued that Constructivist approach better explains the foreign policy of the Gambia than both Liberalism and Realism. The fundamental assumption of Realism, that “phenomena exist independent of human behavior”⁵⁶⁸ was found to be inconsistent with the policies of both Jawara and Jammeh whose regime identities, regional identities and the identity of the Gambia as a poor or developing country influenced their foreign policies. Furthermore, Realism’s emphasis on “power politics [for] national interest”⁵⁶⁹ was not in existence as would be assumed by realists in the Gambia’s foreign policy. Both Structural and Classical Realism’s argument that the international system⁵⁷⁰ and human nature⁵⁷¹ respectively, makes the international system anarchic and thus promotes competition among states do not hold true in the Gambia’s policy of international organizations as long as their identities do not exist in opposite poles. In fact, the existence of multiple identities such as regime type, cultural identity and development status-identity as developing country in the case of the Gambia guaranteed friendship in at least one or more domains.

As stated in the methodology, Gee’s analytical guideline was adopted for the Discourse Analysis to understand the construction of the Gambia’s foreign policy in international organisations.⁵⁷² In total, seven main questions were asked and the documents were analyzed in response to those questions. The questions are: what is accorded significance in the speech or statement being analyzed; what type of activities does the speech portray; what kind of relationship is being constructed; what type of identity is being constructed; what type of connections are being constructed; what type of judgement is being made on social goods; and what type of knowledge or system is being constructed or promoted?⁵⁷³ Together, the answers for the above questions found in the documents analyzed provided the results of the thesis.

The Discourse Analysis on the construction of the Gambia’s foreign policy within the UN has shown that the Gambia’s multiple identities were the main determinant of its policy options.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid., p.20.

⁵⁶⁹ Donnelly, Jack. *Realism and International Relation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

⁵⁷⁰ Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Amsterdam. California. London. Massachusetts. Ontario. Sydney: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979. p.35.

⁵⁷¹ Hobbes, Thomas. *The Leviathan*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1660. paragraph 1.

⁵⁷² Gee. op. cit.

⁵⁷³ The questions are adapted from James Gee’s analytical guide.

Thus, its policy cannot be seen as alliance with big powers within the UN as it took policy options which were against the US position in the UN. Similarly, where its identity has tallied with that of the US and other states, they have acted together. This occurred in both the PPP regime's three years which was analyzed and Jammeh's twenty years in power. Hence, the realists' assumptions discussed in the literature review that small states ally with big powers and that the international system is for countries with huge capabilities is at best an over-exaggeration of some historical episodes.

Liberalism on the other hand emphasizes that trade, interdependence and harmony of interests among states is the basis of international relations, hence it sees realists' emphasis on anarchy and competition among states are problematic.⁵⁷⁴ In its emphasis on the role and importance of international law, human rights and cooperation, justice and morality, Liberalism dismisses the Realist emphasis on power politics.⁵⁷⁵ Thus it envisaged greater international cooperation between states especially through international organisations. However, it has been found that at one point, human rights played important role in Jawara's foreign policy, yet regional identity influenced many other decisions taken by him in the AU. For Jammeh, human rights were a nonstarter, but he found a common ground with the EU with regards to the country's development identity. Although Jeremy Bentham argued that man is a "rational being" who calculates the cost and benefits of every decision he makes,⁵⁷⁶ this was found to be inconsistent with the policies of Jammeh, the only viable explanation becomes that he was driven by his identities. Whereas, EU was the biggest donor to the Gambia, its emphasis on human rights which was not in line with Jammeh's identity made him to reject several EU proposals. Although Jammeh may have known the cost, the bearing of his identity was greater.

By using Constructivism, this thesis has confirmed that both Jawara's and Jammeh's foreign policies were attempts "to ensure a correspondence between their own conduct and international prescriptions for legitimate behavior, that states have driven from their identities."⁵⁷⁷ Without an understanding of the cultural affiliations of Jammeh and Jawara, any study of their policies will be reduced it to interests as favored by realists and neoliberals.

⁵⁷⁴ Sutch, Peter, and Juanita Elias. *International Relations: the Basics*. London. New York: Routledge , 2007. P6

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid., p.230-231.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

The four features differentiating Constructivism from Realism and Liberalism are first, “the original insight behind Constructivism is meaning is “socially constructed”...people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them”. Second, constructivist upholds that state interest is socially driven and constructed. Third, constructivists argue that there is a “mutual constitution of structures and agents...the actions of states contribute to making the institutions and norms of international life and these institutions and norms contribute to defining, socializing, and influencing states”. Finally, Constructivism posits that there are “multiple logics of anarchy”.⁵⁷⁸

Thus, this thesis has argued both Jawara and Jammeh were acting toward the UN, AU, ECOWAS based on the meanings they have for these organisations. The meaning that Jammeh has for the EU as an imperialist imposing its regime identity on him, made him to clash with the EU despite the material cost such has for the Gambia. Hence actors do not always act to gain material benefits. They act in accordance with their identities. Thus, interests of the Gambia were socially constructed. Moreover, the discourse on the Gambia and the AU has shown that agents and institutions influence each other. Thus, Jawara’s identity of being an African led him to support the antiapartheid movement and resolutions within the OAU but the OAU’s identity too had an influence on his policies and discourse. This is equally true for Jammeh.

Therefore, the work has argued that neither “material constraints” and opportunities alone nor “institutional constraints” and opportunities⁵⁷⁹ can explain the Gambia’s foreign policy. In this manner, it has been revealed that culture in the form of regional and religious identity, development status as an identity of a developing country and regime type as in the form of democracy or non-democracy were the multiple identities which mainly determined the pattern of relations that the Gambia pursued. It appears that regime type was the most dominant factor because it surfaced in both regional, organizational and interstate relations, but this is difficult to fully established because there were times it was not invoked.

In summary, this work has established the following. The main determinants of the Gambia’s foreign Policy were its regime type, culture as constructed through regional and/or

⁵⁷⁸ Hurd, Ian. "Constructivism." In *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, by Christine Reus-Smith and Duncan Snidal, 298-316. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. p.300-305.

⁵⁷⁹ Griffiths, Martin. *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Routledge Publishers, 2007.

religion, and its identity as a developing country. However, sometimes, two identities influenced a particular discourse of its policy, yet other times, there was one type of identity which manifested itself.

Within the UN, from 1990-1993, the regime identity constructed on democracy played a very significant role in policy options. Similarly, the cultural identity of Africanism, was accorded a huge space in the discourse of its foreign policy. Finally, the identity of the Gambia as a developing country also led to discourse of development and underdevelopment and its promotions. Although these have been discourse individually during the discourse analysis in order to provide an exhaustive analysis from all angles, it is important to take them as a whole. Man is made of several traits and personalities, in essence policy makers have multiple identities which serve as a guide to behavior.

From 1994-2016, the regime type of Yahya Jammeh, leader of AFPRC and later APRC, was the most pronounced identity influencing his policy discourse and activities. In the analysis, military and revolutionary government has been used to refer to his type of government because he came to power after a military coup and established a military ruling council. He has referred to his regime as a revolutionary government and it was invoked here to mean his discourse on policy which emphasized rhetoric about systemic change for morals and international justice often leading to a discourse which emphasize confrontation and antagonism with countries and organizations with different identities. The work argued that most of his policies during his military rule and after retiring from the army to serve as a civilian president took a similar line of discourse. As in the case of Jawara, Jammeh's perception of the Gambia as an African country in cultural terms, led to the discourse of a policy that promoted African ideas and beliefs within the UN system. Also, the Muslim identity featured in his discourse especially after the first decade of the second Millennium (2010). Finally, the identity of the Gambia as a developing country also led to the construction of a policy on development and underdevelopment.

Thus, two fundamental differences existed in the discourse and actions of Jawara and Jammeh within the UN. The primary difference was as a result of their regime identity. While Jawara identified as a democrat, Jammeh identified as a soldier with a difference and revolutionary government, thereby leading to differences in their world view of justice, human rights, democracy etc. The second difference is that although both Jawara and Jammeh affiliated

with the African identity, Jammeh adopted an “extreme position” on Africanism which often lead to “us” versus “them”. However, this was not entirely constructed on culture but also on regime type. Finally, Jammeh adopted a discourse on Islamism especially in the later part of his regime in the UN.

Considering all the above, it has been argued that the foreign policy of the Gambia in the UN was constructed on a discourse of regime type, democracy from 1990-1993 and nondemocracy (military/revolutionary) from 1994-2016, cultural identity of moderate Africanism (1990-1993) and extreme Africanism (1994-2016) and Islamism and Muslim identity (after 2010) and identity of developing country from 1990-2016. However, only three years (1990-1993) of the discourse of Jawara’s policy falls under this study while Jammeh’s 22 years falls under this study, hence the study on the policy discourse of Jawara may not be generalized to mean all other periods. What has been established is that the identity of a developing country existed from 1990 to 2016, Africanism continued but in a different way while the discourse on democracy was replaced by one of a revolutionary and Islamism and Muslim discourse was added to the cultural identity in post 2010 by Jammeh.

The discourse analysis on the AU and ECOWAS has also shown that regime type was used by both Jawara and Jammeh to construct a policy at regional and sub regional levels. While Jawara used his democracy identity to promote peace within ECOWAS and AU, Jammeh used his military/revolutionary identity to construct a policy of peaceful coexistence, sub regional and regional interests. There was no marked difference between the discourse on Africanism between Jawara and Jammeh within the AU and ECOWAS.

The fundamental difference noticed between the two, Jawara and Jammeh was on their regime types. Jammeh was against most of the regime change resolutions and democratization often calling it an imposition. For instance, while Alasana Ouattara was recognized as the winner of the second round of votes in Ivory Coast, Jammeh dismissed the results, similarly he vetoed the AU resolution on sending troops to Burundi after Pierre Nkurunziza refused to step down at the end of his term calling it a Western agenda to impose puppet regimes. No discourse was recorded on Islamism and Muslims within the AU and ECOWAS. The Development identity was also discernable from the few documents analyzed on that matter. But this is not conclusive because data was missing on that area especially for the AU during Jawara’s 1990-1993 reign.

Notwithstanding, the discourse analysis of the Gambia's foreign policy in ECOWAS and the AU has found that regime identity, cultural identity (Africanism) and identity of developing countries were the dominant factors in the construction of Jawara and Jammeh's policies within the sub regional and regional organisations.

Finally, the period between 1990-1993 was not extensively discussed because there were not many documents directly related to Jawara's discourse and foreign policy of the EU. However, inferences were made from agreements and secondary sources to gauge the pattern the discourse may have taken. Nonetheless, there were enough documents for 1994 to 2016, Jammeh's regime. What the discourse analysis has revealed is that Jammeh's regime identity since 1994 when he overthrew Jawara's regime has been the main factor in the Gambia's relationship with the EU. This has often led to EU calling for Jammeh to democratize to which Jammeh responded by labelling the EU as an "imperialist" and "neocolonialist" bent on imposing their will on him. However, there were cooperation as well as a result of the Gambia's identity of a developing a country but regime identity of Jammeh has often stalled such cooperation. Furthermore, cultural identity, Africanism with emphasis on African culture was a recurring feature in the discourse while Islam and Muslim cultural values were mainly dominant in discourses relating to the EU.

From all the above, it can be stated that this thesis has fulfilled its aim of finding the role of nonmaterial factors in the foreign policy construction of the Gambia between 1990-2016. If Liberalism and/or Realism were adopted, the results found would not have been found because the two are positivists and extremely materialist. But by adopting a constructivist perspective as a theoretical base, and the use of Discourse Analysis, this study has uncovered the role of nonmaterial factors especially identity, in the construction of the Gambia's foreign. Thus, it has established a foundation on Discourse Analysis of the Gambia's foreign policy in international organizations from 1990-2016. Similar it has laid a foundation for constructivist perspective of the Gambia's foreign policy.

Two fundamental limitations encountered were lack of enough primary documents containing speeches relating to the EU, and a few speeches of Jammeh and Jawara relating to development within ECOWAS and AU were accessed, hence inferences had to be made from secondary sources and to discuss the development status factor. The methodological choice of

using one type of data collection meant that in the absence of primary sources, no interview could be made to fill the gap led to in depth search of documents.

Notwithstanding, findings and contributions made by this research has laid a foundation in Discourse Analysis and constructivist perspective of The Gambia's foreign policy precisely in international organizations. This has also opened many questions for further research. For instance, the same method and theoretical framework can be used to study the Gambia's bilateral relationship during the same period (1990-2016) to see whether the same results can be attained. Also, Jawara's foreign policy construction (1965-1994) can be separately studied or a comparison with Jammeh's can be made with a similar methodology to better understand the foreign policy of the country. Further research is also needed to look at the role of parliament's discourse on the Gambia's foreign policy because this work has mainly focused on the executive's construction of foreign policy. Likewise, one may focus on a single organization like the UN with its specialized agencies and their relationship with the Gambia, to understand how identity from both ends affected their relationships. Discourse Analysis and Constructivism is a virgin field in the study of the Gambia's foreign policy and there are many lingering questions that should be explored through constructivist lenses. It is hoped that this study will serve as an impetus for further research.

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
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Appendixes

Appendix 1: Map showing how the country is divided into two, north and south by the River Gambia



Source: worldatlas.com

Appendix 2: Map Showing the Gambia surrounded by Senegal on all sides except the West




Source: <https://2012books.lardbucket.org>

Appendix 3: Map of Africa




Source: <http://worldatlas.com>

Appendix 4: Map showing ECOWAS member states




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Appendix 5: Table Showing Population Growth Since Independence



Source: Gambia Bureau of Statistics

Appendix 6: Organogram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Gambia




Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Gambians Abroad (Sanneh, A. "Organizational Structure." *www.mofa.gov.gm*. June 3, 2016. From <http://www.mofa.gov.gm/organization-chart>)

Appendix 7: List of Ministers for Foreign Affairs since 1990

Period	Name
1987-1994	Omar Sey
1994-1995	Bolong Sonko
1995-1997	Baboucarr-Blaise Jange
1997-1998	Omar Njie
1998-2001	Momodou Lamin Sedat Jobe
2001-2004	Baboucarr-Blaise Jange (2 nd time)
2004-2005	Sidi Moro Sanneh
2005-2005	Musa Gibril Bala Gaye
2005-2006	Lamin Kaba Bajo
2006-2007	Bala Garba Jahumpa
2007-2008	Crispin Grey-Johnson
2008-2009	Omar Touray
2009-2010	Ousman Jammeh
2010-2012	Momodou Tangara
2012-2012	Mambury Njie
2012-2012	Momdou Tangara (2 nd time)
2012-2013	Susan Waffa-Ogoo
2013-2014	Aboubacarr Senghore
2014-2014	Mamour Alieu Jange
2014-2015	Bala Garba Jahumpa (2 nd time)
2015-2016	Neneh MacDouall-Gaye
2017-present	Ousainou Darboe

Source: <http://www.mofa.gov.gm/international-organizations>

Appendix 8: Analytical Frame for Discourse Analysis



Source: Adapted from James Gee (Gee, James P. *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method*. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2010.).